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ABSTRACT
Chartered in 1672 with a monopoly of the British slave 
trade, the Royal African Company initially prospered amid 
speculative enthusiasm. However, before its first decade of 
business closed, the company ominously had begun to suffer 
from various difficulties. These were compounded by loss of 
royal favor and general discredit which enabled opponents to 
revoke the company's monopoly by a Parlimentary act of 1698.
This paper describes the Virginia slave trade of the African 
Company from 1689 to 1713, using as the basic source microfilms 
of the company 1s own records.
During the 1690s, the company increased its delivery of 
slaves to Virginia, although on a much smaller scale than its 
sales in the West Indies. As Virginia became an increasingly 
attractive outlet for Africans, the company commissioned agents 
there to manage its business and protect its monopoly against 
smugglers. Virginians chosen as agents were knowledgeable of 
Virginia's affairs, held political favor in the colony, and 
maintained exceptionally strong ties in England. They were 
commissioned at a rate which increased over the period from 
four to ten per cent of the bills they collected and paid them 
a substantial sum annually.
The slaves which the Royal African Company imported to 
Virginia came from the same regions of the West Coast of Africa 
as most American slaves, but their origins were scattered, with 
no evident patterns of concentration in areas thought among 
slave traders of that day to be the sources of the best slaves. 
These Africans were generally purchased in small lots by a 
varied cross-section of farmers, with no direct correlation 
between size of landholdings and number of slaves purchased. 
However, the typical purchaser, who resided in one of the 
"Middle Peninsula" counties, owned over three times as much 
land as the average Virginia landholder.
English traders, the most outstanding of whom was Micajah 
Perry, financed the credit purchases. Prices remained generally 
stable throughout the period despite fluctuations in supply and 
demand. The dominant factor influencing the relative success 
of company sales to Virginia was the frequent interruption of 
naval warfare and depression. Because of the wars of the 
League of Augsburg, 1689-97, and the Spanish Succession, 1702- 
13, the company employed emergency precautions during most of 
the period; both wars intensified tobacco depressions in 
Virginia. The inter-war period, however, provided a stimulus 
to the slave trade which doubled the slave population of 
Virginia in a decade. Despite the renewal of the colonial 
wars, the trade flourished in 1705, a year when the import 
duty on slaves expired. But soon the London merchants 
strangled the trade by tightening credit to Virginians.
Before the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, the African Company, 
mired in mismanagement, unable to compete on an equal basis 
with private traders, its stock practically worthless, 
temporarily ended its slave trade to Virginia.
vi
THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY SLAVE TRADE TO VIRGINIA,
1689-1713
INTRODUCTION
The study of American Negro slavery has drawn the 
attention of scholars with increasing frequency and intensity 
in the quarter-century since World War II, partially as a 
result of the concurrent campaigns for political independence 
by black majorities in Africa and for social, political, and 
economic gains by black minorities in America. Equipped with 
new attitudes of the post-war era and borrowing the methods 
of the social scientists, historians concentrated on such 
subjects as the social and economic effects of slavery and 
the development of racial attitudes and concepts in America. 
Some historical evidence intrinsically lent itself to this 
vein of treatment: translations from the Arabic and oral
histories shed new light on the African past; field case 
studies by anthropologists added dimension to Western knowl­
edge of the origins of slaves and their New World cultural 
survivals; descriptions from the journals of early European 
witnesses were revived to illustrate the horrors of the 
"middle passage"; the writings of literate slaves and of 
early Negro intellectuals were reviewed in an attempt to 
understand their seldom articulated attitudes, to portray 
the humanity of the race and to overcome the "Sambo" stereo­
type; and local laws were re-evaluated as landmarks in the 
sequential institutionalization of Negro inferiority.
2This paper will discuss the slave trade to Virginia in 
the two decades which closed the seventeenth and began the 
eighteenth century. Although it has scanned the subject, the 
scholar's spotlight has not often been focused on the trade 
in slaves to Virginia in this period. Except for the arrival 
of the original twenty Africans in 1619, the Virginia slave 
trade has most often been treated as an appendage of the 
tobacco trade, and with some merit, for the slave trade to 
colonial Virginia was inextricably tied to the fortunes of 
the venerated weed. Nor has the period at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century been a frequent target for students of 
Virginia,slavery, with the possible exception of the studies 
of appropriate laws. This lack of attention comes as no 
great surprise, primarily because of the insignificance of 
the era relative to the entire slavery question. Furthermore, 
the period has not produced an abundance of evidence, parti­
cularly of the type adaptable to the methods of the social 
scientist— too often the slaves of this era appear to the 
historian as mute and faceless. The period has been over­
shadowed by more dramatically eventful epochs before and 
after; most historians agree that the Virginia Negro had been 
identified with lifetime servitude before the end of the 
seventeenth century, and not until the nineteenth century was 
slavery recognized as a social and political problem of 
grave national proportions. But the forgotten interim has 
an importance of its own in Virginia history, for it was
3during these years that Virginia slaves increased from a few 
to nearly one-fourth of the total population, Negro bondage 
thereby replacing white servitude as the major source of 
Virginia labor and establishing a firm demographic basis for 
the Virginians' fears of that "dangerous population."
The records of the Royal African Company offer an 
opportunity to examine the history of this unspectacular but 
important era. They are limited nonetheless by several weak­
nesses. One is an absence of written testimony by the 
company's Virginia agents who might have defended themselves 
and described conditions of the Chesapeake slave trade in 
detail from their perspective, as agents in the West Indies 
and Africa did in their correspondence. If such records 
existed, as they surely must have, they have apparently been 
lost, forcing the historian to resort to inference where he 
might otherwise have found explicit answers. Another prob­
lem is the obscurity of the records. According to statistics 
available in the Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1708-09,
No. 215, and those cited by Kenneth G. Davies from the 
company's Invoice Books, Homeward (T 70/936-956, P.R.O.), the 
company's trade accounted for barely 10 per cent of the 
slaves delivered to Virginia during this era; and the 
Virginia trade of the African Company represented probably 
less than one per cent of the annual British slave trade to 
the Americas. Nonetheless, those extant records relevant to 
Virginia, having been microfilmed by the Virginia Colonial 
Records Project from the company's archives preserved among
4the records of the Treasury (T 70), Public Records Office,
London, offer sufficient evidence— including letters sent to 
captains and plantations, accounts, and ships' books— to 
represent the company's Virginia activities. An advantage of 
working with the company's Virginia records is the abundance 
of parallel primary and secondary sources; while the West , 
Indian records are more voluminous and more important to the 
history of the trade, they are also more difficult to confirm 
and to place in perspective. This paper will attempt to test 
basic assumptions made from other Virginia sources, to reach 
new conclusions, where warranted, and generally to fill out 
the historical account of the Virginia slave trade. The 
company's records have been used before, but usually to 
document a part of the West Indian slave trade or of the 
economics of colonial Virginia. Here the records will be 
considered a unit worthy of study in themselves, not as they 
are typical of the functioning of the slave trade, but as they 
represent the operations of the Royal African Company in Virginia 
from 1689 to 1713.
The specific topics on which assumptions are tested and 
conclusions drawn are dictated primarily by the scope, com­
pleteness, and direction of the information in the records 
and will center in three major areas: the people of the slave
trade, merchants, planters, slaves, and particularly the 
company's Virginia agents; maritime commerce, including the 
dangers and effects of naval warfare and the company's attempts 
to survive its disruptions; and the economy, most notably the
interrelationships between Virginia tobacco, the world market, 
and the slave trade, as reflected in the company correspon­
dence. Treatment of these topics will be confined to the 
years 1689-1713 for three reasons: first, the concentration
of material dictated setting the study in the years around 
the beginning of the eighteenth century; second, the change 
in the company's legal status in 16 9 8 suggested a chronologi­
cal balance between the years when the company's monopoly was 
in effect and the years after it was modified by the British 
Parliament; and third, the predominance of warfare imposed 
itself as a factor to be reckoned with. The extremes of the 
two major wars of the period were chosen to limit the paper 
to the period from the beginning of King William's War, 1689, 
to the end of Queen Anne's War, 1713. This segment of time 
includes a period of four years of peace as a contrast to the 
twenty years of warfare, and it provides a period otherwise 
appropriate to the objectives of the project.
CHAPTER I
THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY, 1672-1688
The Royal African Company of England was created by 
Royal charter in 1672 as a direct descendant of the ill-fated 
Royal Adventurers into Africa, the Restoration company which 
began searching for gold and ended in financial ruin after 
several years of mismanagement at the end of the Second Dutch 
War. Like the Royal Adventurers, the African Company was 
organized as a joint-stock company, which guaranteed it the 
benefits of incorporation and the association of capital.
Each, in turn, was expected to serve as a public utility, 
which would satisfy an economic need of the British empire 
by supplying a labor force to its colonies; as a means to 
achieve its mission, each was granted a monopoly of the 
English slave trade.^ But the African Company enjoyed a much 
more businesslike capitalization than its predecessor; 
although it retained royal support, the new company was not 
dominated by the Crown and the. peerage as the Royal 
Adventurers had been— two-thirds of the company's share­
holders were businessmen, and others, including John Colleton, 
Sir George Carteret, John Locke, Sir Edmund Andros, and
^"Kenneth G. Davies, The Royal African Company 
- (New York, 1957) , 122.
6
7Sir Ferdinando Gorges, were intensely interested in the 
colonies.^
From the start, the company held several apparent 
advantages over the individual traders who were to become 
their staunch competitors. The company's most important 
advantage was its monopoly of the English trade to West 
Africa. The 16 72 charter barred other Englishmen from even 
visiting the West Coast south of Cape Blanco without permis­
sion of the company, authorized seizure by company officials 
of the ships and cargoes of intruders, and arranged for their
prosecution by establishing on the Guinea Coast a court of 
3
judicature. An additional advantage was its ownership and 
operation of slave factories and forts on the Guinea Coast 
which were staffed by permanent agents, many of whom were 
veterans of the trade. In the years ahead, however, the 
forts were to prove a mixed blessing.
The African Company began rather prosperously; it was 
capitalized ahead of schedule in a period of relative financial 
fluidity, began to pay dividends with some regularity in 1676, 
and, primarily because of capital appreciation, afforded
Ibid., 17, 44 ff., 65-70; William R. Scott, The 
Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish, and Irish 
Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 (New York, 1951), 1, 325 ff.; 
Charles M. Andrews, A Guide to the Materials for American 
History to 1783 in the~Public Record Office of Great Britain,
II, (Washington, 1914), 256.
8sizeable profits to its original investors /  By the time the 
company was chartered,, the African trade had been converted 
from the original quest for gold to a more complex triangular 
system which served as the source of prosperity for the West 
Indian colonies and as the basis of the struggle by European 
states for mercantilistic hegemony. The company had there­
fore become one of England's tools in its seventeenth-century 
commercial contest with the Dutch, and its income had become 
geared to the triangular trade. On the first leg of the 
triangular journey, the African Company exported English 
manufactured goods, East Indian textiles, and European iron 
and copper, all of which were traded in West. Africa for slaves, 
ivory, gold, dyewoods, palm oil, and other African raw materials. 
The slaves were then transported on the "middle passage" to the 
New World for sale to planters, particularly to provide labor 
for the sugar plantations of the West Indies. The final leg 
of the journey normally transported the African and New World 
products, such as sugar, cotton, ginger, and tobacco, to be 
sold in England for retail and re-exportation, as well as the 
bills of exchange by which the planters arranged credit 
payment for their purchases.
^Scott, Constitution and Finance of Joint-Stock 
Companies, I, 302 ff.
5
Davies, Royal African Company, 165 ff. See also ibid., 
Appendix I, Exports, '350-357, and Appendix II, Imports, 358- 
360. The British manufactured goods included metalware, 
woolens, gunpowder, firearms, and knives.
By the mid-16 70s the African Company began to en­
counter a myriad of troubles which resembled all too closely 
those which had plagued the p.oyal Adventurers and the other 
previously unsuccessful Eurr,,;,ean ventures in the African trade 
It became apparent that the company was under-capitalized, and 
it began quickly to experience a perennial pitfall of the 
slave trade inability to obtain liquid capital because of 
the delays in transportation and communications and the pre­
ponderance of long-term credit payments. As a result of the 
slow turnover of capital, the company found it extremely 
difficult to purchase the f.'h)0,000 worth of goods required
for annual export to Africa \n order to meet the West Indian
6demand for slaves, and the torts along the Guinea Coast fell 
progressively into disrepair,7 to compensate, the company 
began in the mid—16 70s to brwrow money from which it also 
paid dividends. Though at fi.rst it borrowed on a short-term 
basis, the debt grew in scalp until the interest became a 
sizeable portion of the company's annual expenditures, over 
£6,000 for the year 1688.^
Nor were all the African company's troubles financial. 
The spirit of the Glorious .involution engendered considerable 
opposition to monopolies ba&oq on royal prerogative, and the
g
Davies, Royal African Company, 74.
7Scott, Constitution ^nd Finance of Joint-Stock 
Companies, I, 303.
0
Davies, Royal African Company, 77, citing R.A.C. 
General Home Ledgers, T 70/6;u.-TT0 8, P.R.O.
10
African Company's close 'identification with the Crown, once a
boon in inspiring confidence and financial support, now
became a liability. Opposition from anti-Royalists and anti-
monopolists complemented opposition to the company from other
sources in the cities and the colonies. Merchants and
shipping interests in London and Bristol fancied a slice of
the African trade, manufacturers wanted wider markets for
their goods with fewer artificial restraints, and colonists
complained of inadequate supplies of slaves. The growing
ill-will created by the company's favored status led to the
formation of an organized coalition of opponents to the
company's monopoly who out-petitioned them during the period
9
of the debates at the rate of five-to-one. The African 
Company could no longer rely upon the Crown to shelter it 
from political attack; seizing upon the company's new vulner­
ability, the free-trade coalition forced in the 1690s a series 
of Parliamentary inquiries culminating in the compromise act 
of 169 8 which opened the slave trade to all who would pay the 
specified charges to the African Company for the upkeep of 
its factories in Africa.^
Statistics found in the Company's Bill Books emphasize 
the importance of the West Insies in the total commercial
9
Davies, Royal African Company, 129-130, counts 100 
petitions favoring free trade compared to fewer than 20 for 
the monopoly.
■^Leo Francis Stock, ed., Proceedings and Debates in 
the British Parliament Respecting North America (Washington, 
1924-41),11, 145.
11
scheme of the African Company and act as a reminder that the
company, as a public utility, existed more to serve the plan­
tations than to be served by them. More important to this 
study, the Bill Books also emphasize the relative unimportance 
of Virginia as a market for company slaves, particularly in 
the years before the English Revolution. From 1673 until 1688, 
the years when the company1s monopoly was strongest, Virginia
accounted for less than 3 per cent of the company’s slave
11sales. But obviously Virginia had not been totally neglected 
as a slave market. Virginia planters continued to arrange 
purchases of slaves from their English tobacco merchants, and 
it is apparent from testimony of the planters, from later 
hearings of the Board of Trade, and from Virginia population 
estimates that the combined activities of the “enemy" separate 
traders far surpassed those of the African Company in 
supplying slaves to the Tidewater, both before and after the 
Glorious Revolution. In the 1690s, however, the company 
gained enough interest in Virginia to begin commissioning 
representatives there. It was through its Virginia agents 
that the company attempted to intensify its operations and to 
compete with the separate traders in the Tidewater; and it is 
largely from the correspondence which the London office main­
tained with these agents that a description of the African 
Company slave trade to Virginia is possible.
1^-The following totals can be derived from Davies,
Royal African Company, 359-360, Appendix II, Imports, Bills 
of Exchange, which was compiled from Bill Books, T 70/269- 
277: bills of exchange received, 1673-1688, West Indies,
£248,049; Virginia,£7,087.
CHAPTER II
THE COMPANY AGENTS IN VIRGINIA
By the latter part of the seventeenth century the slave 
traders had transported to Virginia a number of African 
laborers sufficiently large that they began to be treated as a 
distinct segment of the population: Negroes were, excluded from
the militia, given a separate classification in the census and 
tax returns, and legally defined as slaves.^ And although the 
bulk of the several thousand Virginia slaves had been trans­
ported by individual traders, the Royal African Company began 
to develop an interest in that Chesapeake colony as a market 
for its human cargo. Always overshadowed as a slave market 
by the British islands in the Caribbean and periodically 
weakened by depression or internal disorder, Virginia emerged 
only in the final years of the century as a significant focal 
point in the African Company*s commercial system. Establishing 
a regular trade in slaves to Virginia involved a complex rela­
tionship between Mother Country and colony? slaves had to be 
transported and sold, bills collected, and payment submitted.
Wesley Frank Craven, The Southern Colonies in the 
Seventeenth Century, 1607-1689 (Baton Rouge, 1949), 219;
Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New York, 1959) , 
25; Thad W. Tate, Jr., The Negro in Eighteenth Century 
Williamsburg (Williamsburg, 1965), 1-22, particularly p. 7, n. 9.
12
13
The African Company delegated the responsibility for the 
profitable operation of the Virginia portion of its trade to 
a series of residents of the colony. Although letters written 
by these Virginians are apparently not to be found in the 
v African Company archives, enough information does exist both 
in the archives of the company and in the published records of 
Virginia history to provide the means for reconstructing an 
account of the agents— the company's methods of selection, 
the benefits and responsibilities of the position, and at 
least a partial sketch of each individual.
During the period 1689-1713, at least seven Virginians 
held the commission as African Company agent: Christopher
Robinson (1687-93), William Sherwood (1695-96), James Howell 
(James River, 1700-01) , Willis Wilson (York River, 1701) ,
Edward Hill III (James River, 1701-?), Henry Fielding (York 
River, 1701-04) , and Gawin Corbin (1705-?) . Although the 
company's records do not fully explain either the criteria or 
the procedure used to choose Virginia agents, a comparison of 
these individuals indicates that the company was discriminating 
in its selections. Whether the agents qualified as aristocrats 
is a moot question, but all clearly had exhibited certain of 
the traditional signs of success before being commissioned by
No letters from Virginia agents are included in the 




the company.-3 Each agent owned a large estate. At least six 
held an aggregate of sixteen political offices, including 
four who were burgesses and four who were justices of the 
peace. Three were officers in the militia, including two 
county commanders-in-chief.
More relevant to this study than these general indica­
tions of prominence are several factors which appear 
specifically to have qualified these seven men as potential 
candidates for the agency. First, records of correspondence 
and of marriage bonds indicate that most of the company agents 
or their families were related to or acquainted with some of 
the leading Virginia planters.^ The degree of prosperity and 
political leadership attained by the majority of these agents,
3
Louis B. Wright delineates the characteristics of 
early Virginia aristocrats in The First Gentlemen of Virginia 
(Charlottesville, 1964), 63-66. Genteel manners, cultural 
values, and personal traits, which are important to his thesis, 
are extremely difficult for the historian to measure, particu­
larly in dealing with men who left records less complete than 
those of Byrd, Fitzhugh, and Carter. But among Wright's 
criteria are several which frequently are a part of the 
historical record. These include prosperity, the ownership of 
large quantities of land, leadership in the militia, and the 
holding of public offices, particularly those of sheriff, 
justice of the peace, burgess, and councilor.
^Christopher Robinson, Sr., of "Hewick," Middlesex 
County, took as his second wife Catherine Beverley, widow of 
Major Robert Beverley. See Stella Pickett Hardy, Colonial 
Families of the Southern States of America, Second Edition 
TBaltimore, 196877 44 8. Louis WrTght, First Gentlemen, 291, 
notes that Robinson was a friend of Robert Beverley, I, and 
later married his widow. Also, a "large-scale planter," 
Robinson was among the "friends, colleagues, and clients" of 
William Fitzhugh. Fitzhugh, William Fitzhugh and His 
Chesapeake World, 1676-1701, ed. Richard Beale Davis (Chapel 
Hill, 1963), 13, 235 n. 4. While serving in the House of
15
Burgesses, Robinson associated with Fitzhugh, ibid., 28.
Fitzhugh sent a letter to Robinson, "Instructions for John 
Withers,” 5 June 16 82, ibid., 119, and a bill, Fitzhugh to 
William Leigh, 27 June 1682", ibid. , 122. Robinson was asked 
to relate a legal matter to Major Robert Beverley, Fitzhugh to 
Beverley, 21 Jan. 1682/3, ibid., 129. Robinson was also 
Beverley's bondsman and neighbor, Fitzhugh, Chesapeake World, 
120, n. 7, 133, n. 2. The best indication of Fitzhugh's high 
regard for Robinson appears in a letter, Fitzhugh to Robinson,
26 Jan. 1689, ibid., 265-266 and nn.
William Fitzhugh wrote to William Sherwood of James 
City and referred to him in his correspondence: William
Fitzhugh to William Sherwood, 10 June 1679, "Letters of 
William Fitzhugh," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,
I (1894), 18-19; a second letter, Fitzhugh to Sherwood,
10 May 1684, ibid., 271, concerns Sherwood's handling tobacco 
at Jamestown for Fitzhugh. William Byrd, I, used Sherwood's 
services in legal matters: William Byrd, I, to Mr. Harpur,
1 Aug. 1690, "'Letters of William Byrd, First,' (From his book 
in the collection of the Virginia Historical Society),"
Virginia Magazine, XXVI (1918) , 258-259; Byrd to Mr. North,
8 Aug. 16 90, ibid., 389.
For evidence that William Byrd, II, was a neighbor and 
intimate of company agent Colonel Edward Hill, III, of 
"Shirley," see William Byrd, II, The Secret Diary o_f William 
Byrd of Westover, 1709-1712, eds. Louis B. Wright and Marion 
Tinling (Richmond, 194177 passim. Evidently Byrd and Hill had 
mutual business interests. See ibid., June 17, 1709, p. 49; 
March 14, 1710, p. 152; July 5, 1710, p. 200; July 18, 1710, 
p. 206; Oct. 12 1710, p. 242; Oct. 19, 1710, p. 245; Nov. 1, 
1710, p. 252; Jan. 25, 1711, p. 291; Feb. 17, 1711, p. 303. 
Elizabeth, sister of Edward Hill, III, married John Carter of 
"Corotoman" and eventually inherited "Shirley" from her father, 
Hardy, Colonial Families, 111.
The marriage of agent Henry Fielding's daughter, Frances, 
to John Lewis of "Warner Hall" is recorded in "Virginia Council 
Journals, 1726-1753," (Vol. 605-1418, 4 Nov. 1727), Virginia 
Magazine, XXXII (1924), 258 n. 14.
That Colonel Gawin Corbin of Middlesex and King and 
Queen Counties probably knew Robert "King" Carter is indicated, 
by an account of Ralph Wormeley's will. "Genealogy: The
Wormeley Family," Virginia Magazine, XXXVI (1928), 100-101; both 
men were among "friends and-relations" who were asked to aid in 
the management of the Wormeley estate. Corbin first married 
Wormeley's daughter, Katherine; second, Jane Wilson, widow of 
Willis Wilson and heiress of John Lane of "Lanesville"; third, 
Martha Bassett, daughter of William Bassett of "Eltham." Hardy, 
Colonial Families, 17 3. William Byrd's mention of Corbin,
Nov. 1, 1710, Byrd, Secret Diary. . . 1709-1712, 252, suggests
that the two were at least social acquaintances: " . . .  we went
home in the Governor's coach and Colonel Carter set Colonel 
Corbin and me down at the coffeehouse where we made Colonel 
Digges treat us." See also March 5, 1711, ibid., 310; June 13, 
17H ,  ibid. , 359.
16
which implies that thev were better known than is documented 
here, also indicates a very practical consideration on the 
part of the company. The nature of the job necessitated 
their attempting to employ men with prior knowledge of the 
business activities of a wide circle of Virginians, and it 
would have worked to the advantage of both agent and company 
if they also were known and respected.
Secondly, they were in political favor in Virginia.
Six of these men won political appointments during their
5 . . . . .careers. In addition, there is an uncommonly high incidence
of close personal and political relationships with various
5Christopher Robinson, I, was Secretary of State and a 
member of the Council, "List of Colonial Secretaries,"
William and Mary Quarterly, Ser. 1, X (1902), 167, 173. A 
"List of Colonial Attorney-Generals," ibid., 165-166, includes 
William Sherwood. James Howell is listed as a justice of the 
peace in "Public Officers in Virginia 1680" (King & Queen Co., 
25 Feb. 1699), Virginia Magazine, I (1894), 234. Edward Hill, 
III, son of Councilor-Attorney General-Treasurer Edward Hill, 
II, of "Shirley," was a collector and was named by the governor 
as one of the "gentlemen of estate and standing suitable for 
appointment to the Council." "Notes on Charles City County 
Grievances, 1676: Edward Hill (Winder Papers, Virginia State
Library, Richmond)," ibid., III (1895-6), 156-159. Willis 
Wilson, son of William Wilson of "Ceelys," was a justice of the 
peace, "Public Officers in Virginia, 1680," ibid., I (1894) , 
234. A "Genealogy of the Corbin Family," ibid., XXIX (1921), 
520, states that Gawin Corbin was a collector and a naval 
officer; and later, according to Hardy, Colonial Families, 173, 
Colonel Corbin became a Councilor and president of the Council.
17
g
governors. This evidence suggests that the Royal African 
Company may have taken advice from the governors, or, more 
likely, that they simply preferred to employ men who stood in 
the good graces of the Virginia government and the Board of 
Trade.
A third common characteristic more directly influenced 
the company*s choices. Although it was not unusual for suc­
cessful Virginians of that era to depend upon London merchants 
to market their tobacco crops, to keep their accounts, and to 
supply them with English goods, at least four of these African 
Company agents maintained more than the ordinary commercial
During Bacon's Rebellion, Sherwood was "an adherent of 
Sir William Berkeley," Virginia Magazine, XI (1903-4), 411.
This is supported by "Bacon's Rebellion: William Sherwood's
Account" (1 June 1676), ibid., I (1894), 167-168. One of 
Sherwood's Jamestown houses was "burnt downe by the Rebell 
Lawrence" in 1676, and he was accused in "Proclamations of 
Nathaniel Bacon, 1676 'The Declaration of the People,'" ibid.,
60, as being among the "wicked, and pernitious Councellors,
Aiders and Assisters against the Commonalty in these our Cruell 
Commotion." For an additional account of Sherwood's part in 
the Bacon incidents, see "Persons Who Suffered by Bacon's 
Rebellion. The Commissioners' Report" (Winder Papers, Virginia 
State Library), ibid., V (1897-98), 66-68.
The Robinsons of Middlesex and King and Queen Counties 
"made a practice of allying themselves with the governor, who­
ever he might be." For this view see David Alan Williams, 
Political Alignments in Colonial Virginia, 1698-1750,
(unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1959).
The Hills of "Shirley" sided with the governors. Colonel 
Hill, II, "...always adhered to Sir William Berkeley, though in 
some things too much...." See "Persons Who Suffered by Bacon's 
Rebellion," Virginia Magazine, V (1897-98), 66-68. Hill was 
disfranchised by Bacon's House of Burgesses and dismissed from 
the Council, ibid., II (1895), 408. His son, Colonel Edward 
Hill, III, the African Company agent, was nominated for the 
Council by the Earl of Orkney, "Notes on Charles City County 
Grievances, 1676" ibid., III, 156-159. Williams, Political 
Alignments, 77, states that the Wilsons of "Ceelys" were 
pro-Nicholson.
relationships in England. Most either had formerly lived
7
there or retained influential relatives and friends. John, 
brother of Christopher Robinson, was Bishop of London, ambas­
sador to Sweden, and first English plenipotentiary at the
g
Congress of Utrecht; Colonel Corbin's brother Thomas was a
close London associate of merchants Micajah Perry and Thomas 
9
Lane; William Sherwood left his entire estate, after the death 
of his wife, to the London merchant Jeffrey J e f f r e y s a n d  
agent Henry Fielding named as an executor of his will Arthur 
Baily,^ another man well-known in London commercial circles 
and a frequent financier of the slave trade, as were Perry, 
Lane, and Jeffreys. Affiliations in England, particularly 
with merchants, were essential to the Virginia agent, and
7Robinson was born and spent his minority m  England, 
"List of Colonial Secretaries," Wm. and Mary Qtly., Ser. 1,
X (1902), 173, as did Sherwood, irLists of Colonial Attorney- 
Generals," ibid., 166-16 7. Robinson, Fielding, and Corbin had 
close relatives in London. For Fielding's English relatives, 
see J. L. Miller, M.D., contributor, (will of Edward Fielding, 
dated 9 Feb. 1690) "Fielding and Davis Notes. The Fielding 
Family of Northumberland County," Virginia Magazine, XII 
(1904-05), 54.
o
"Lists of Colonial Secretaries," ibid., 167.
9
This relationship among Thomas Corbin, Perry, and Lane 
is indicated in a letter, Royal African Company to Gawin Corbin
26 April 1705, Treasury Group, Class 70, Piece 58 (T 70/58), 
175-176, Public Record Office, London (Virginia Colonial 
Records Project microfilm.) Hereafter cited as T 70/58.
■^"Smiths of Virginia," Wm. and Mary Qtly., Ser. 1, V 
(1896) , 52, and Virginia Magazine, XII (1904-05) , 54.
^Hfill of Henry Fielding, signed 26 Oct. 1704, probated
27 Nov. 1712, Will-Register Books, 208 BARNES, Principal Probate 
Registry, Somerset House, London (Colonial Records Project 
photostat.)
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they help to explain the process by which the African Company 
chose its personnel.
Leading London merchants played an important and some­
times decisive role in the selection of company agents. Each 
agent was recommended by a particular merchant, and more
important, the merchant posted a performance bond or "security”
12for the Virginian of his choice. The agent's efficient 
execution of his job constituted a link in the colonial trade 
of importance to the London mercantile set, who entrusted the 
agents with the task of extending large sums of credit, in 
the form of bills of exchange, to Virginia purchasers of 
slaves.13 If the agents accepted excessive numbers of bad
12Jeffrey Jeffreys recommended William Sherwood to be 
agent in 16 95. See Royal African Company to Sherwood, 14 Jan. 
1695, T 70/57, ff. 120 vo.-121 ro., P.R.O. The company 
acknowledged in a letter, R.A.C. to James Howell, 23 April
1700, T 70/57, f. 157 vo., P.R.O., that Arthur Baily and 
Benjamin Hartley recommended and made security for Edward 
Hill, III, according to R.A.C. to Edward Gill [sic], 3 April
1701, T 70/57, ff. 172 ro. and vo., P.R.O. A letter, R.A.C. 
to Henry Fielding, 16 Dec. 1701, T 70/58, 20-21, P.R.O., 
informs Fielding that Arthur Baily recommended, and Baily and 
Benjamin Hartley made security for him. Thomas Corbin and 
Micajah Perry recommended Gawin Corbin, and Perry made his 
security. See R.A.C. to Gavin [sic] Corbin, 26 April 1705,
T 70/58, 175-176, P.R.O.
13 "In its simplest form, the bill of exchange may be 
defined as 'An unconditional written order from one person to 
another to pay a third party a certain sum in money at speci­
fied time.1" John M. Hemphill, II, Virginia and the English 
Commercial System, 1689-1733 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Princeton University, 1964), 128, citing Sir James Murray, 
comp., A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles,
(Oxford, 18887^ ^  7 . the bill of exchange on a British merchant
was the only money with face values in English denominations 
which circulated to any extent in Virginia before the intro­
duction of paper money in 1755." Hemphill, Virginia and the 
English Commercial System, 99. See also Philip A. Bruce,
Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (New
York, 189677 II, 516-521.
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bills, or if they were delinquent in pursuing payment of 
protested bills, then the merchants would inevit£}bly suffer 
losses. In the depression years of the early eighteenth 
century it became even more important that the agent know the 
financial standing of Virginia planters so that he could limit 
bills accordingly. If he failed to prevent overdraughts, his 
next course of action was to press persistently for payment
of the interest and fees charged those who were overdrawn, in
. . 14addition to rewriting the bills in acceptable form.
Several additional motives existed for the merchants' 
interests in recommending Virginians for the position, aside 
from a desire to protect themselves as financiers. The agent 
was always able to assist in loading the merchants 1 vessels 
for the Atlantic voyage. Though the company owned slavers, 
they often leased ships from English merchants, contracting 
for the delivery to Virginia of a specified number of slaves. 
Once the slaves had been delivered, this transaction was 
terminated, the captain carrying to the company the entire 
proceeds of the sale in an envelope containing bills of 
exchange. The captain and the agent, acting on behalf of the
14In 1707, the company charged 15% interest and a 
fine ranging from 4/8 to 7/6 for each protested bill. A 
bill totalling £30, therefore, could have been increased to 
£34.17.6 by a protest from the merchant on whom the bill 
was written. R.A.C. to Corbin, 18 Nov. 1707, T 70/58,
310-311, P.R.O.; Copy Book of Bills, 8 Auer. 1707, T70/279,
29, P.R.O.
ship's owner, were then free to arrange a profitable return 
cargo. An agent who made judicious arrangements in exports 
and in bills of exchange with the proper Virginia planters, 
and who followed them to payment, could enhance the commercial 
operations of such prominent English merchants as Perry, Lane, 
Baily, and Jeffreys. Other than direct financial interest, 
the most obvious reason for the weight carried by English 
merchants in the selection of African Company agents was the 
merchants' custom of influencing Virginia appointments. Perry 
and his colleagues participated in the selection of councilors 
much to the distaste of Governor Spotswood, who expressed his 
displeasure in a letter to his friend Colonel Nathaniel 
Blakiston:
I think it is doing little honor to the Government 
to have its Council appointed in the Virginia Coffee 
House, and I believe a Governor who has a power 
under the Great Seal to constitute and appoint 
Persons who are to be, to all intents and purposes, 
Councillors, until confirmed or removed by the Crown 
has a [s] good a title to name and is as capable of 
Judging of the qualifications requisite for Persons 
in that Port as an Merchant in London who has no 
other Rule to judge of a man's merit than by the 
Number of his Tobacco hogsheads. ^
If this group of English merchants were powerful enough to
assert their will in the Virginia affairs of state, it follows
logically that they would have been able to impose themselves
similarly on the conduct of trade to Virginia by an English
15Spotswood to Blakiston, 1 Dec. 1714, Alexander 
Spotswood, The Official Letters of Alexander Spotswood. . . ,
ed. R. A. Brock, in Virginia Historical Society, Collections, 
New Ser., II (Richmond, 1885), 79. (Brackets supplied by 
editor.)
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company in which they held financial interest.
The recommendation and the "security" of an agent
apparently were a single transaction, the company requiring
the merchant to insure his choice. Once the merchant had
posted the bond and the agent had been informed of his duties,
the company was able to utilize the "security1 directly
against the agent as a tool of moral persuasion, reminding
him of the affirmation of confidence in his performance and
character made by the particular London merchant.^ Company
officials also used it against the merchants, and thereby
indirectly against the agents, by making threats of forfeiture
of the performance bond. In several instances the company
actually initiated lawsuits against London merchants, and once
they told Colonel Gawin Corbin in a letter that they had sued
his sponsors, Thomas Corbin and Micajah Perry, because of the
17Colonel's failure to pay the bills.
Because the slave trade was beginning to be regarded 
in the Chesapeake colonies as a very profitable operation, 
many merchants and planters were eager to participate— as 
financiers, wholesalers, shippers, and consignment
16The company wrote to Henry Fielding in 1701, "...be 
careful to sell our Negroes to the best advantage for us, and 
make good and quick returns that your actions will correspond 
with Mr. Baily's account of your character." R.A.C. to 
Fielding, 16 Dec. 1701, T 70/58, 20-21, P.R.O. See also 
R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Feb. 1705/6, ibid., 217, and 19 March, 
ibid., 451.
17R.A.C. to Corbin, 3 Dec. 1713, ibid., 474; R.A.C. to 
Corbin, 19 March 1712, ibid., 451.
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18agents. The only men legally ineligible to become
African Company agents in Virginia were the governor,
lieutenant-governor, and judges of the colony, they having
19been disqualified by the compromise act of 169 8. Among
20those eligible, there was competition for the position, and
evidence indicates that at least one agent, Henry Fielding,
21 . . .  made application before being selected. The competition is
not surprising; the agency allowed sufficient time for other
22business ventures, at least during the slower months of the
18Arthur Pierce Middleton, Tobacco Coast: A Maritime
History of Chesapeake Bay in the Colonial Era (Newport News, 
Va., 19 537, 139 ff.
19 "No Governor or Deputy Governor of any of his 
Majesties Colonies or Plantations in America or His Majesties 
Judges in any Courts there. . . Shall be Factor or. . . Agent 
. . . for the said Company, . . . "  An act to Settle the 
Trade to Africa," 5 July 1698, Elizabeth Donnan, ed.,
Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade to America, I 
(Washington, 1930), 421-429, citing Statutes of the Realm,
VII, 393-397, 9 and 10 Wm. Ill, c. 26. A letter, Governor 
Beeston of Jamaica to the Board of Trade, 5 Dec. 1698, ibid., 
429 n . 2, citing Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1697~9 8 , 
pp. 567-568, indicates that the inaccurate term "Deputy 
Governor" was interpreted as "Lieutenant-Governor."
20R.A.C. to Corbi, 20 Feb. 1705/6, T 70/58, 217,
P.R.O.; Davies, Royal African Company, 296-297.
21R.A.C. to Fielding, 16 Dec. 1701, T 70/58, 20-21, 
P.R.O. The fact that Fielding was also the least known of the 
agents may be more than coincidental with his application.
22Davies, Royal African Company, 111, quoting T 70/76, 
fo. 64 d., T 70/7 3, fos. lid., 101; Davies, Royal African 
Company, 2 96. Examples of agents’ business ventures are 
numerous: Robinson was a planter; Sherwood continued his legal
practice; Corbin was a customs collector as well as a planter; 
Hill was a planter and trader.
2 3year, and it afforded additional economic influence. The 
source of this economic authority rested largely in the 
credit economy, in which the agent assumed the role of proxy 
creditor to large numbers of the Virginia planters. The 
Governor of Barbados noted in a 1695 letter the extreme to 
which agents had asserted their authority on that British 
Island:
The agents held . . . 'such a sway here as almost to
stop any proceeding, for if a man does not vote as 
they would wish for a vestryman or assemblyman they 
proceed against him for what he owes them for 
negroes (most of the planters being in their debt), 
thus ruining him and his family.124
Although it is unlikely that any Virginia agent ever achieved
such "sway," Gawin Corbin was accused of misusing his position.
In 1705, the Virginia Council objected to the Governor's
renewal of Colonel Corbin's appointment as Naval Officer
because, they charged, "he was agent for the Royal African
25Company and took exorbitant and unlawful fees."
The agent enjoyed several benefits, the greatest of 
which was his commission of the company sales which offered 
the possibility of a substantial income if the trade developed
23The slower months were normally those at the end of 
the year, after the tobacco had been sold and before the slaves 
were needed for tobacco cultivation, Elizabeth Suttell, The 
British Slave Trade to Virginia, 1693-1728 (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, College of William and Mary, 1965), 29; Middleton, 
Tobacco Coast, 99-101.
^Davies, Royal African Company, 297, cruoting Calendar 
of State Papers, Colonial, 16 9 3-6, No. 1930.
^Wm. and Mary Qtly., Ser. 2, X (1930), 72.
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to its potential volume. During the course of the period 
being examined, the company considerably increased the rate 
of pay of its Virginia agents; unfortunately for both company 
and agents, even the increased commission seldom produced the 
lucrative income for which they had hoped. Though the details 
of the series of Virginia pay raises are obscured, the pattern 
established by the company in dealing with its agents in the 
West Indies helps to clarify the Virginia situation.
The West Indian agents were permitted to trade in 
slaves while being paid at the rate of 4 per cent. When the 
company granted raises in pay, however, it normally tied to 
the raises certain new restrictions and obligations. Accord­
ingly, in 1680, when the company prohibited private trading 
activities by its agents, it raised their pay rate in lieu
of the profits they had formerly gleaned from private 
2 6endeavors. The commission in the West Indies was increased
again in 1697 from 7 to 10 per cent; in return the island agents
were made personally responsible for all credit they granted,
and they were compelled to initiate payment of the entire
27proceeds from a slave cargo within a year of the sale.
There is no evidence to suggest that Virginia agents 
were subject to the 1680 pay increase or the additional obli­
gations, and in April 1700, they were still being paid at the
2 6Davies, Royal African Company, 111.
^^Ibid., 295, quoting T 70/85, fo. 11, P.R.O. See also 
according to Davies, T 70/57, fos. 133d.-134, 135d., 137d.,
138d., P.R.O.
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2 8rate of 4 per cent. Soon thereafter, probably by the 
following April, their commission was raised to 10 per cent, 
equivalent to the West Indian rate, and it remained at that
29level through the first two decades of the eighteenth century.
The increase entailed new responsibilities similar to those of
the West Indies, requiring them to submit full payment within
30 . . .18 months of the sale of the slave. Also during this period
the first evidence appears that the company barred its agents
from collecting a commission on unpaid bills. These policies
could have been enforced? but it is unlikely that the company
was able to enforce its ban on private trade by agents, since
there was seldom a company representative nearer to Virginia
than the Maryland agent.
Because of the fragmentary state of the company's
records, it is impossible to determine with certainty the
31annual earnings of a Virginia agent. However, during the 
years 1703-1710, the period for which the records of bills of
2 8A company letter, R.A.C. to James Howell, 23 April 
1700, T 70/57, f. 157 vo., P.R.O., states that Howell would 
be paid at the rate of four per cent.
29A letter from the company to Edward Hill suggests that 
he may have been paid 10 per cent. See R.A.C. to Edward Gill 
[sic], 3 April 1701, T 70/57, ff. 172 ro. and vo., P.R.O. By 
1705, Gawin Corbin was being paid 10 per cent commission, as 
he was in June 1708, T 70/279, 3, 6, and 36, P.R.O. For evi­
dence that the company continued to pay agients at the 10 per 
cent rate as late as September 1722, see T 70/280, 17, P.R.O.
30R.A.C. to Corbin, 8 Nov. 1710, T 70/58, 393, P.R.O.
31Davies, Royal African Company, 295.
27
exchange are most complete, it can be estimated that the agent 
earned between one hundred and four hundred pounds stex'ling 
annually, averaging approximately £282.







1703 2,126.18.05 448.00.00 167.17.10
1704 1,640.16.02 333.13.10 130.14.07
1705 . 11,878.05.07 1,672.06.03 1,020.11.10
1706 4,695.05.01 958.13.11 373.12.11
1707 8,628.00.02 4,797.11.04 383.01.07
1708 4,202.08.04 2,637.05.09 156.10.03
1709 2,571.10.07 1,541.16.08 102.19.04
Except for the two or three years at the beginning of the
32The agents' annual earnings were calculated from the 
records of bills of exchange, most of which appear in letters 
from the company to its agents, Virginia Colonial Records 
Project microfilms of the Royal African Company records, T 70, 
passim., P.R.O., from letter books and from accounts, bills of 
exchange. An attempt was made to avoid duplicating bills and 
to attribute each to the correct year of sale rather than 
assigning the bill necessarily to the year when it was accepted 
or protested. In most cases there is no indication that these 
procedures occurred in different calendar years.
The agents1 earnings were determined as 10% of the bills 
known to have been accepted annually, which is the difference 
between annual total sales and annual bills protested. Inasmuch 
as bills existed which are not included in these figures, the 
agents probably earned more than these calculations document.
But this factor is at least partially offset by the liJcelihood 
that more protests were lodged than are represented above, thus 
preventing the agents' collecting that portion of their commis­
sions. The tentative nature of these totals is therefore 
obvious.
Curtis Nettels states that the Royal African Company 
received in the years 1703-1706 bills for £8593, of which £2253 
were protested. According to Nettels' totals, the agent would 
have averaged £15 8.10 per annum during this period, Curtis P. 
Nettels, The Money Supply of the American Colonies Before 1720 
(Madison, Wis., 1934), 52 n. The totals calculated here from 
the African Company bills of exchange are approximately 7 8%
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eighteenth century when the company maintained agencies on 
both the York and James Rivers, a single agent collected the 
entire annual commission. The major variables which influ­
enced his income were the volume of sales and the portion of
33those sales for which the agent could collect. The company
paid him not at the time of the sale, but upon completion of
34 .payment. Normally this was either at the time the bill of
exchange was accepted, or, if protested, when the agent was
able to collect and submit to London an acceptable "second"
bill including fees and interest.
It is as difficult to evaluate the agent's income as
to compute it. The first years of the eighteenth century
were years when depression and war impeded the trans-Atlantic
trade: tobacco prices were low, credit from England was
tight, and currency was scarce. During this period, even a
modest source of income would have been valued. A recent
writer, in appraising Edward Randolph’s 170 2 income, states
higher, but this is a deceptive figure because of the abnorm­
ally high sales total for the year 1705. If that year is 
overlooked, the company figures exceed Nettels' by approxi­
mately 45%. This discrepancy can only be attributed either to 
a duplication in counting company bills in this study, a
pitfall which this writer made a conscious effort to avoid, or
to Nettels' failure to use a more complete account of the 
company's total sales. For external evidence supporting the 
sales boom of 1705, see below, pp. 95-97.
33According to Nettels, Money Supply, 52 n ., approxi­
mately 26 per cent of the Royal African Company bills from
Virginia, 1703-1706, were protested. The above table, Figure 1,
indicates that approximately 31 per cent were protested in the 
years 1703-1710.
34T 70/279, 28, P.R.O.
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that “a man could support a family and live as a gentleman on 
35£150 a year." By nature the commission, directly dependent 
upon the volume of trade, was less reliable than the salary 
paid to an official of the state such as Randolph, and unlike 
many commissioned salesmen, the company agents could not have 
enhanced their total sales by means of aggressiveness and dili­
gence. But the agents* earnings in this era consistently 
resembled Randolph's gentlemanly wage, exceeded the earnings of 
the commissioned Virginia officials— customs collectors, the
auditor, and the receiver-general— and surpassed even the sala-
3 6ries of most all but the governor and councilors. In addition 
to being apparently well paid, the agents occupied an advanta­
geous position with respect to the flow of Chesapeake commerce. 
Surveying the trade from the mouths of the rivers, they could 
collect any income to which they were entitled, either in
35Michael Garibaldi Hall, Edward Randolph and the 
American Colonies (Chapel Hill, 1960), 219.
3 6The following were estimated from the statements of 
the accounts of the tobacco export duty revenue, known as the 
"two shilling per hogshead tax," and from the "15 pence per ton 
for ships trading to Virginia and 6 pence per poll for persons 
entering the colony," where available for the years 1702-1714, 
in the Virginia Colonial Records Project microfilms, CO 5/1313- 
1316, P.R.O.









37sterling coin, bills, slaves, or select imports from London 
which they could then credit to their own accounts.
The duties which the African Company expected its 
Virginia agent to perform were numerous. Even though he was 
free from company surveillance and relatively unrestricted by 
law from entering other private and public pursuits, the agent 
was limited by the company’s demand that he fulfill several
Annual Commissions (pounds sterling)
rate average earnings
Auditor 3-7&% 83.6
Receiver General 3-5% 113.4
Customs Collectors 10% 39.6
York River district 99.4
Rappahannock River district 56.16
Potomack River district 34.6
Upper James River district 26.16
Lower James.River district 14.4
Accomac River district 4.11**
Eastern Shore district 4.13*
**reported only twice 
*reported only once
Accordinq to the Audit Office Declared Accounts,
773/907, 23 Oct~ 1697-25 Dec. 1698, P.R.O. (Colonial Records 
Project microfilms), the customs collectors were paid an annual 
salary of £40 which included maintenance of a boat. If this 
salary was continued in the years 1702-1714, in addition to the 
commission, the average income of the collector of the York 
River district, for example, would have been £139.4.
The figure of £2,000 annual salary for the Governor is 
confirmed in "Instructions for Francis, Lord Effingham, 1683" 
(printed in year 1688), Mcllwaine, ed., Executive Journals of 
the Council, I, 517.
37"Whatever coin was to be found m  Virginia at this 
time was most probably in possession of men who held. . . posi­
tions which gave them an opportunity of acquiring whatever 
money sterling had been paid by the merchants and shipmasters." 
Bruce, Economic History, II, 506-507.
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3 8roles. As "correspondent," the agent was expected to serve
as a source of information for the company. He was to submit
a succession of reports on the importation of slaves to the
colony, including the names of captains and the ships, and the
39
condition, source, quantity, and prices of the slaves. In
addition,the agent was instructed to quiz the captains for
information concerning the state of the company operations in
Africa.40 And, since the company often commissioned agents on
41both the James and the York Rivers, they were encouraged to
42consult and inform each other, though there is little to
3 8For references to the agent as "correspondent" see 
R.A.C. to Sherwood, 14 Jan. 1695, T 70/57, ff. 120 vo.-121 ro., 
P.R.O. R.A.C. to Edward Gill [sic], 3 April 1701, ibid., 172 ro. 
and vo.; R.A.C. to Fielding, 16 Dec. 1701, T 70/58, 20-21, P.R.O.
39R.A.C. to Captain Sorel, 5 Feb. 1701, T 70/43, P.R.O.; 
R.A.C. to Edward Gill [sic], 3 April 1701, T 70/57, ff. 172 
ro. and vo., P.R.O.? R.A.C. to Hill, 4 March 1702, T 70/58, 56, 
P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 18 Oct. 1705, ibid., 201-202; R.A.C. 
to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705, ibid., 211; R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 
1707' f 277-279.
40R.A.C. to Corbin, 18 Oct. 1705, ibid., 201-202; R.A.C. 
to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705, ibid., 211. The company had become 
infuriated, says Davies (Royal African Company, 125) with the 
friendliness which company agents and factors in Africa had 
shown towards the separate traders. This would have provided 
a point of inquiry along with general questions about the state 
of the trade and the condition of company property in Africa.
41Howell and Hill worked the James River through at least 
most of the first decade of the eighteenth century, while Wilson, 
Fielding, and Corbin were serving as their counterparts on the 
York. Corbin served part of his agency on the Rappahannock.
42R.A.C. to Hill, 10 March 1701/2, T 70/58, 29, P.R.O.
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prove that the efforts of any two Virginia agents were ever 
coordinated. A final duty of the agent as correspondent was 
to act as political liaison with his customers. Particularly 
when the company solicited support for the Parliamentary 
defense of its monopoly were the agents called upon to
4 3“Communicate to the Gentlemen Planters of your Colonys. . . . "
Because much of his work as correspondent was tedious,
44unprofitable, and hindered by the inadequacy of the mails, 
the agent frequently ignored the company's letters. But he 
had more important obligations: the agent represented the
company in all its affairs in Virginia, managed the company 
property, and supervised the shipping and sales transaction 
from the time the ship docked until the last bill had been 
collected, or, more realistically speaking, until the last 
debtor had been prosecuted.
In order to fulfill his duties as company executive, 
the agent was expected to keep a vigil of the Virginia coast
4^R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 April 1708, ibid., 331-332;
R.A.C. to Corbin, 4 June 1709, ibid., 364.
44Letters often went astray as a result of their being 
forwarded indiscriminately aboard any ship bound for the correct 
general destination. See John Spencer Bassett, “The Relation 
Between the Virginia Planter and the London Merchant," American 
Historical Association, Annual Report, 1901 (Washington, 1902),
I, 568. For an example see R.A.C. to Richard Knight, 14 Feb. 
1705, T 70/44, P.R.O.
45in order to prevent the illegal entry of slaves. He could 
expect assistance from the collector of the district and, 
possibly, from another company agent. However, given the
46irregularity and great length of the Chesapeake shoreline
and the willingness of Virginia planters, merchants, and offi-
w 4 7cials to protect illegal trade, this task was immense.
In addition to detecting illegal entry, the agent had 
to be familiar with appropriate laws and methods of prosecu­
tion, some of which were changing during the period in 
48question. These were relatively unsophisticated procedures 
which could have been learned while on the job, but they could 
not be taken for granted. Before the legislation of 1698 
ended the African Company monopoly, the agents were allowed to
45Philip A. Bruce states that " . . .  there were ship 
masters who. . . would seek to bring their cargoes of negroes
into the Colony by stealth. In October (16 8 7). . . one hundred
and twenty slaves were landed at a lonely point on the Eastern 
Shore, from the English ship Society of Bristol. . . . The col­
lector of the district seized it. . . . "  See Bruce, Economic 
History II, 85, citing W. P. Palmer et al., eds., Calendar of 
Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts. . . Preserved
. . . at Richmond (16~52-186 9 ) I, 30.
46 "The total shoreline has recently been calculated at 
fifty-six hundred miles. . . . Nearly two thousand miles of
that shoreline was open to seagoing seventeenth-century vessels. 
David Hawke, The Colonial Experience (New York, 196 4) , 114.
47Davies, Royal African Company, 113, 118.
4 8 •It may be significant to note that William Sherwood,
formally trained in law, was one of the best known attorneys
in Virginia. For accounts of Sherwood’s preparation and promi­
nent career see "List of Colonial Attorney-Generals, 1 Wm. and 
Mary Qtly., Ser. 1, X (1902), 166-167; "History of York County
in the Seventeenth Century, Tyler1s Quarterly, I (1920) , 252;
"Historical and Genealogical Notes: Sherwood," Tyler 1s Qtly.,
II (1921), 207.
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prevent outright the importation of slaves by any ship not
49sailing for the company. The conflict in jurisdiction 
involved in the seizure of a ship and its cargo required the 
agent to discriminate between the authority of common law and 
that of the Royal African Company monopoly, both of which he 
had at his disposal. The preferred course of action, and the 
only one which proved consistently profitable, was immediate 
seizure of an interloper before he unloaded his slaves. This 
entitled the company to the cargo. Once the interloper had 
unloaded his slaves, he could not be held liable for damage 
to the company monopoly under authority of the charter. At 
this point, the company expected the agent to resort to common 
law procedures. While smuggling their slaves into the colony, 
interlopers usually violated the law by making false declara­
tions to customs officers or landing slaves at places other
than ports; common law courts recognized such acts as criminal
50offenses and punished the violators accordingly. In common 
law cases, however, the maximum reward the company could win
was the ship, the proceeds from the sale of which were often
51so meager that they failed to cover the court costs.
49Ships and Ship captains who attempted the illegal 
importation of slaves into the colonies were termed 
"interlopers." If they were apprehended, interlopers could be 
punished for violating the monopolistic charter of the company. 
Since in 169 8 the monopoly was dissolved by law, the new term 
"separate traders" came into use to denote the category of 
those who imported slaves into the colonies by paying a 10 per 
cent duty to the African Company.
50Davies, Royal African Company, 116.
51Ibid., 117-118.
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The 1698 "Act to Settle the Trade to Africa," which 
altered the company's status in order to legalize the activi­
ties of private traders, also changed the executive role of 
the agent. The law prescribed a new 10 per cent ad valorem 
tax to be paid to the company by all non-company traders on
goods, excluding slaves and redwood, exported from the Guinea
52Coast to England or any of her colonies. No longer could 
the company agent legally prevent trade to Virginia by private 
or, as they were now called, "separate" traders; instead, his 
major responsibility was to ensure payment of the duty to the
52An account of the law appears in "An Act to Settle 
the Trade to Africa," 5 July 169 8, Donnan, ed., Documents, I, 
421-429, cited from Statutes of the Realm, VII, 393-397, 9 and 
10 Wm. Ill, c. 26. Goods subject to taxation were those im­
ported "from the Coast of Africa between Cape Blancho and Cape 
Mount. . ."
The law designates the "Collector of His Majesties Chief 
Custom-houses in England, or any of his Majesties Plantations" 
to make entry and bonds, administer oaths and receive the 
duties. African Company letters instructed the Virginia agents 
that they were ". . . Impowered to collect the Duty of 10 per
Cent granted by a late Act of Parliament to Settle the Trade 
to Africa. . ." See R.A.C. to James Howell, 23 April 1700,
T 70/57, f. 157 vo., P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Edward Gill [sic] 3 
April 1701, ibid., 172 ro. and vo.; R.A.C. to Henry Fielding,
16 Dec. 1701, T 70/58, 20-21, P.R.O. This seeming contradic­
tion is explained by the probability that the Customs Collector 
exacted the duty and submitted it to the company agent who 
received and forwarded it to the African Company, London.
Davies seems to concur in Royal African Company, 135-136: 
"Collection of the duty was in the hands of Customs officials, 
but agents in the West Indies were ordered to keep a careful 
record of vessels clearing for Africa for purposes of checking.
In Virginia, Maryland, and New England, where there were no 
permanent agents, attorneys were appointed to receive the money." 
By "permanent agent" Davies apparently denotes an official sent 
from London, a non-resident, non-planter, like those agents in 
the West Indies. In any other sense, the company's Virginia 
agents appear to have been permanent.
The British duty resulting from the 1698 act of 
Parliament is not to be confused with the duties imposed by 
Virginia on imported slaves, discussed by Suttell, British Slave 
Trade to Virginia.
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African Company's London office. By letter, the company
defined a threefold procedure by which the agent could execute
the new law: he was instructed to screen imports, making
certain that the customs collectors taxed the appropriate
goods; to keep his own set of accounts compiled from his
observation and from “a true and fair Duplicate of all such
Entries and Oaths made and Signed and bonds given and Monies
paid," which he was legally authorized to demand from the 
53collectors; and to submit to the company office the returns 
which he received from the collectors.
Enforcing the tax clause of the 16 9 8 law would appear to 
have significantly increased the work load of the agency. 
However, direct imports to Virginia of African gold, ivory, 
wax, ginger, indigo, palm oil, and the other African products 
were probably very small during these years, and consequently 
the instructions to the agent overemphasize the new tax. In
all likelihood, the agent added to his job no more than a
periodical check of the collectors' books. The 1698 regulation 
certainly did not require as careful scrutiny in Virginia as 
had the prevention of interloping in the years before the law; 
but regardless of which trade regulation was in effect, the 
arrival of an Atlantic cargo always intensified the agent's 
activities.
The first few hours after the arrival of a slave ship
were critical. The agent immediately had to board every
53R.A.C. to Howell, 23 April 1700, T 70/57, f. 157 vo.,
P.R.O.
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slaver, company-operated or private, to examine the captain's
records of the cargo. If the slaves were property of the
Royal African Company, the captain was required to account for
every one purchased in Africa, a policy which was intended to
encourage the careful treatment of the slaves in order to
reduce mortality in the "middle passage" and to discourage
"black market" sales by the captains. If company slaves had
been shipped aboard a leased or rented vessel, this count of
heads determined the freight charge, which was based solely on
54the number of slaves delivered alive m  Virginia. After
completing the preliminary inspection, the agent and the
captain "mustered" the slaves and grouped them according to
55size, age, and sex, in preparation for the sale.
The agent suspended his legal and executive duties at 
this stage in the procedure, and he began the day-to-day busi­
ness of selling slaves. He was expected to "give due and 
public notice" to the sale which would transpire two or three 
days after the ship landed. Publicity was especially impor­
tant to those planters who were remote enough from the rivers 
to require advance notice, and lack of information was a 
common source of complaint by Virginians against the company.^
54George Francis Dow, Slave Ships and Slaving (Salem, 
Massachusetts, 1927), p. 68, abstracted from Captain Thomas 
Phillips' "Journal," printed in Churchill's Collection of 




R.A.C. to Henry Feilding [sic] , 7 Nov. 1704, T 70/58, 
151, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Gawin Corbin, 4 June 1709, ibid., 364.
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"I am so remote,1 wrote William Fitzhugh to Ralph Wormeley,
"that before I can have notice, they’ll be all disposed of,
57or at least none left but the refuse."
In the eyes of the company officials, the one factor
which was most important in determining the agent’s success
or failure as a sales manager was his ability to demand high
prices, since the majority of the company's Virginia sales
were made under the consignment system which eliminated most
contracts and pre-arranged prices. By letter which preceded
the arrival of a ship, or in the instructions carried by the
captain, the company encouraged the agent to "sell our Negroes
5 8to the best advantage for us." However, since the price 
depended most on the physical condition, skills, and ages of 
the slaves and the economic climate in Virginia, the agent
59had less control over the profits than the company contended.
The agent made most of his sales "by inch of candle," or 
auction, as provided in the charter,^ with the agent presiding, 
though some slaves were sold in Virginia by contract. In the
57 .Fitzhugh to Wormeley, 19 June 1681, Fitzhugh, 
Chesapeake World, 92-93 and nn.
5 8
R.A.C. to Edward Hill, 2 Dec. 1701, T 70/58, 29; 
R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705, ibid., 211; R.A.C. to Corbin, 
20 Feb. 1705/6, ibid., 217.
59 .Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 139, citing Journal of the 
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, Jan. 1772/3-DecT 172 8 
(London, 19 2 0-3 8), 64-66.
^Scott, Constitution and Finance, II, 21.
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latter instance, the agent merely had to distribute the slaves
to those who had contracted to buy them, a minimal service for
which the agent received a 1 1/2 per cent commission of the
61pre-arranged price. It is unlikely that the "scramble"
method, another fixed-price method utilized in the West Indies
during the eighteenth century, was ever a part of the Virginia
slave trade.^
While the slaves were being sold, the agent could not
concentrate entirely on the sale because he was responsible
for aiding the captain in the preparation of the slave ship
 ^3
for its homeward voyage. First of all, this meant paying 
the captain and the crew a portion of their wages in order to 
facilitate the purchases of necessities, a practice which was 
requested by the captain in the event that his crew had been 
hired with the understanding that they would be paid monthly
^Davies, Royal African Company, 2 95.
6 2The "scramble" method operated as follows: After
the sick and "refuse” slaves were taken ashore and sold to 
"Jews and surgeons on speculation," all the remaining Africans 
were herded into a "large yard," each to be sold at the same, 
previously agreed price. When the hour of sale arrived, the 
gates were flung open and the purchasers rushed in "with the 
ferocity of brutes," rounding up all the slaves they could, 
and creating a great deal of confusion and animosity, as easily 
can be imagined. For a first-hand account of this practice, 
see Dow, Slave Ships, 152, "The Doctor's Narrative," abstracted 
from Alexander Falconbridge1s Account of the Slave Trade on the 
Coast of Africa, (London, 1788]n
63R.A.C. to Feilding [sic], 7 Nov. 170'', T 70/58, 151- 
152, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 1707, ibid., 277-279.
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6 4wages while the ship was in port. Agent Henry Fielding,
for example, was instructed in a 1704 letter to pay the
captain of the Angola frigate in cash rather than in bills,
so that he might enjoy full purchasing power for the crew’s
needs. Whether Fielding obliged with cash is not of record,
65but cash payment was not the standard practice.
After the captain and crew were accommodated, the 
agent began the task of loading the ship for the return 
voyage. In few cases had the company contracted in advance 
for the entire voyage, so that the agent normally bargained 
on the open market for the ship's return cargo,^ The 
slavers sometimes returned to England in ballast, either 
because of the scarcity of profitable goods in Virginia and 
their low prices in England, or because of "the general 
prejudice against slaving vessels as suitable ships to
64 "The ship Nymphas, bound from Suffolk, Virginia, 
to Cadiz, advertised for sailors promising them £2.5s. 
currency per month 'from the time of their Entry to the 
Ship's clearing out in Virginia, and Eleven Guineas for the 
Run, upon their being discharged at Cadiz.'" Middleton, 
Tobacco Coast, 2 7 8-2 79, quoting the Virginia Gazette, 2 0 Oct. 
1752; see also R.A.C. to Captain William. Cooked 9 April 1706, 
T 70/63, 80-83, P.R.O.: R.A.C. to Cooke, 27 April 1708,
T 70/44, P.R.O.
65R.A..C. to Captain Cooke [sic] , 4 May 1708, T 70/9, 
P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Captain Cooke, 27 April 1708, T 70/44, 




6 7carry tobacco to Great Britain." Frequently the agent 
assisted the captain in obtaining a cargo of export-quality^^
67By the middle of the eighteenth century, slavers 
exporting tobacco from the Chespeake area were forced at times 
to charge freight rates lower than the established ones.
It became "the general belief," says Middleton, Tobacco 
Coast, 141, "that slavers were 'never after in a Condition 
to take in tobacco.'" Evidence indicates, however, that this 
belief was not sufficiently widespread at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century to have prevented or seriously 
limited the exportation of tobacco on slave vessels from 
Virginia. See the letters from the company to the ship 
captains and plantations, T 70, passim., P.R.O.
6 8Export-quality tobacco was requested in the letter, 
R.A.C. to Gawin Corbin, 27 March 1707, T 70/58, 277-279,
P.R.O. Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 124, explains that export- 
quality tobacco was that stock which was "prized" into hogsheads 
for export, as opposed to bulk tobacco, loose, in bundles or 
hands, which was termed "transfer" tobacco, and was utilized 
for local transactions. Middleton adds that "transfer tobacco 
could not be exported— because the act of Parliament of 16 9 8 
prohibited the importation of bulk tobacco into England."
In discussing inferior grade tobacco as "one of the 
curses of the trade," Calvin B. Coulter, Jr., The Virginia 
Merchant, Ph.D. dissertation (Princeton University, 1944),
8-9, explains: "Pressed by the difficulty of making a living
when prices were very low, a good many planters in Virginia 
tried to help themselves by increasing their production.
Many of them did so by planting greater crops than they were 
able to take care of and by planting on land that was not 
proper for producing good tobacco and by growing 'suckers' 
or second growth tobacco. When they got around to curing 
their tobacco, these planters . . . processed everything . . . .
Some planters tried to pass off out-and-out 'trash' as good 
tobacco to the merchants. In general, though, the planters 
used some of their poor tobacco to pay their taxes and quit 
rents."
Richard L. Morton, Colonial Virginia (Chapel Hill, 1960), 
I, 42 3, concurs, citing Alexander Spottswood, Official Letters, 
ed. R. A. Brock, I, 12, 13, 57, 72-74, 164; II, 28, 35: "
"Since tobacco passed as legal tender for public dues and 
private debts according to weight rather than quality, many 
people were raising a quantity of trash tobacco with which to 
meet their obligations--a practice which led to fraud and 
injustice at home and discredit to Virginia abroad."
69tobacco. During the war years, the company preferred to
transport tobacco only when a convoy was available. If no
convoy was scheduled to sail from Virginia, or if the slaver
loaded during a season inappropriate for the purchase of
tobacco, the agent would arrange to substitute less desirable
70items of export. Among the substitutes sometimes available
71 72in Virginia were ivory, furs, and skins, though lumber
products seem to have been the most frequent alternatives to 
73tobacco. Virginia timber was a source for British naval
R.A.C. to Captain William Cook [sic], 22 Sept. 1707,
T 70/9, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Christopher Robinson, 14 Feb. 1688, 
,T 70/57, f. 38 ro., P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Henry Feilding [sic],
•7 Nov. 1704, T 70/58, 151-152, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Gawin Corbin 
27 March 1707, ibid., 277-279; R.A.C. to Corbin, 30 Sept. 
,1707, ibid., 304; R.A.C. to Captain Thomas Arnall, 2 Nov. 
T704, T 70/63, 41, P.R.O.; lists of ships (Sarah), T 70/1225, 
6, P.R.O.
70R.A.C. to Feilding [sic], 7 Nov. 1704, T 70/58, 
■151-152, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Arnall, 2 Nov. 1704, T 70/63, 
;B5-41, P.R.O.
7^R.A.C. to William Burlace, 11 Feb. 1708/9, T 70/9, 
P.R.O.; another letter, R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 1707,
T 70/58, 229, P.R.O., indicates that ivory was valuable 
enough so that the company preferred that a large cargo 
either be divided or transported in a man-of-war.
72According to Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 171, "The 
fur trade, which was so important m  the' early days of 
Virginia . . . steadily declined after the middle of the
seventeenth century." An account of a voyage of the slave 
ship, Sarah, lists of ships (Sarah), T 70/1225, 6 , P.R.O., 
serves as evidence that the exportation of skins from 
Virginia had not ended by 1721.
73Ibid.; R.A.C. to Arnall, 2 Nov. 1704, T 70/63, P.R.O. 
R.A.C. to Captain Thomas Mackley, 28 Jan. 1706/7, 113, P.R.O.
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stores, being especially well-suited for the production of
masts. Smaller wooden products, such as staves, heading,
shingles, and trunnels, far exceeded the more spectacular
masts in export quantity, as did raw timber and its by-
74products of tar and pitch. For example, Fielding was
directed by the company in a letter of November 7, 1704,
to make special arrangements in the event the Angola frigate
did not arrive at a proper season to buy tobacco. In this
situation the company advised its agent to "load her with
Plank, Pitch, and Tarr" from the Elizabeth River area where
75these products were said to be plentiful and cheap.
The final stage of the sales transaction— collecting
and arranging payment for the slaves— was the most difficult.
The agent was involved in each of the various methods of
payment. If the planter paid for the slaves in cash, it was
the agent who accepted it; but because of the shortage of
7 6currency in Virginia at the time, this seldom happened.
Many more slaves were sold on contract than were purchased 
with cash, especially during the period of the monopoly.
74Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 16 2.
^^R.A.C. to Feilding [sic], 7 Nov. 1704, T 70/58, 152. 
Bruce, Economic History, II, 49 3, confirms the company's 
directions: "In 1698, the only place where pitch and tar
were produced in Virginia in a considerable quantity was 
in Elizabeth City County."
^^Nettels, Money Supply, 59, 206-209; Robert Polk 
Thomson, The Merchant in Virginia, 1700-1775, unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation (University of Wisconsin, 1955), 11;
Bruce, Economic History, II, 506-521; Hemphill, Virginia and 
the English Commercial System, 98 ff.
4 4
Contract sales were made in lots undifferentiated by the
normal standards of sex, age, and health, and they required
on delivery a cash collection of one-third of the total
purchase price of the lot, the balance to be collected
77equally at intervals of two and six months. The contractual
sale of slaves always constituted a minor portion of the
agent's total sales, and after 1690 the contract system
lapsed into obsolescence.^
The overwhelming majority of slaves imported to Virginia
by the company were purchased by means of the credit system,
using as the vehicle the bill of exchange, the misuse of
which proved the greatest single source of friction between
the company and its agents. The agent, by spreading small
amounts of credit among many planters, soon accumulated a
large and unmanageable deficit. In theory, the bill of
exchange was utilized only when the drawer had a balance in
• 79
the^hands of the merchant on whom the bill was drawn. If 
the agent had, in fact, limited credit to those who maintained 
a sufficient balance in London, and if, therefore, the London
^Edward D. Collins, "Colonial Policy of England,"
American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1900 (Washington, 
1901), I, 158. According to Davies, Royal African Company, 294, 
the contract system was advantageous to the Royar-African 
Company because of "obvious merits, a guaranteed market and 
price, few or no agency costs, no debts, no lawsuits for the 
recovery of debts," and no problem in remitting payment at London.
7 8Davies, Royal African Company, 29 4.
79Bruce, Economic History, II, 516.
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merchants had been able to accept the bills of exchange, the
problem would not have existed. Acceptance of the bills as
valid would have released the agent from responsibility. The
company accordingly advised its agents that producing ''better
bills" would have benefited all concerned; "Surely if any
Care was taken to Inquire into the Circumstances of the
Drawers," they reprimanded Corbin in a 1709 letter, he
8 0"would never send such a parcel of bills."
Corbin's tendency to ignore the company's warnings
against bad credit is partially explained by the fact that they
were unrealistic. Such a large number of Virginia planters
were indebted to London during this era that Corbin undoubtedly
81had difficulty in locating good risks. Successive unprosperous
years of anticipating better returns from the tobacco crop led
Virginia planters so deeply into debt that many found it difficult,
82if not impossible, to emerge. William Fitzhugh, a virtual 
model of prudence, managed to escape long-term indebtedness, but
R.A.C. to Gawin Corbin, 11 March 1709, T 70/58, 378, 
P.R.O. For additional examples of Royal African Company 
complaints about the poor condition of bills of exchange from 
Virginia, see the following letters, R.A.C. to Gawin Corbin,
T 70/58, P.R.O.; 15 May 1705, 184; 20 Feb. 1705/6, 217;
27 March 1707, 277-279; 30 Sept. 1707, 304; 18 Nov. 1707, 310- 
311; 24 Feb. 1708/9, 351; 11 March 1709, 378; 8 Nov. 1710,
393; 14 Sept. 1711, 405.
It is apparent from a company letter, R.A.C. to Corbin, 
14 Sept. 1711, T 70/58, 405, that partial acceptance of a 
bill was possible. In this instance, Micajah Perry accepted 
"between £4 and 5" of Martin Chalmer's bill for £33.12.9, but 
protested the remainder.
81For an explanation of this indebtedness and its 
relationship to war and depression, as well as an account of 
the general Virginia economy of this period, see Hemphill, 
Virginia and the English Commercial System, passim.
82Bruce, Economic History, II, 36 8.
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even he did so only with concerted effort, as he revealed
in a 16 95 letter to his English consignment merchant: "I
desire you Sir to send my Account Currant by the first ships
and send me two or three duplicates for fear of miscarriage,
for not knowing how my account stands, I dare not send for
8 3goods though my wants are very great and pressing." In
addition to the general indebtedness, each planter usually
dealt with more than one London merchant, which made credit
rating an intricate task; when funds were low, some planters
would keep an adequate standing with one merchant while
simultaneously abusing the others by writing bad bills on 
84• them. To make the agent*s job worse, these merchants
guarded their credit much more closely than they had during
8 5more prosperous and peaceful times, and they were not above
Virginia Magazine, IV (1896-97), 416. Middleton, 
Tobacco Coast, 3 80 n., says "few planters were as cautious as 
•William Fitzhugh.
Middleton continues, Tobacco Coast, 106, citing Colonel 
William Byrd, (II) to — , 2 July 1736, ""Letters of William 
Byrd, 2d, of Westover, Va.," Virginia Magazine, IV (1901- 
02), 124; Byrd to — , 20 Aug. 1733, ibid., 115: "The more
prudent planters, realizing the importance of keeping out of 
debt, carefully avoided ordering more goods than their tobacco 
would cover . . . when in debt to the London merchant 
Alderman Micajah Perry, William Byrd II sold land and slaves 
in a desperate attempt to extricate himself from the clutches 
of that 'hungry magistrate,' preferring to incommode himself 
rather than 'continue in the Gripe of that Userer [sic].*"
For a statement of Colonel Byrd's "long and vexatious" 
debt to the London firm of Perry and Lane, see Bassett,
"The Relation Between the Virginia Planter and the London 
Merchant," 5 72.
84Thomson, The Merchant in Virginia, 15-16.
85Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial System,
26, 102.
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cheating the planters, perhaps in retaliation, by making
8 6false statements of account.
The company's letters and directions to their agents 
in Virginia imply that the position of agent must have been 
a demanding one, as in some respects it was. The responsi­
bilities were broad in scope, and, at the height of slave 
trading activity, they were intense. However, this assessment 
requires qualification. The mere fact that Christopher 
Robinson, William Sherwood, and Gawin Corbin carried the 
agency as if it were a supplement to their extremely active 
careers in Virginia trade and politics places the job in a 
more realistic perspective. Though an agent potentially 
expended considerable amounts of time and energy, the fact 
is that the Royal African Company slave trade to Virginia 
failed to reach its potential. As a result, some of the 
duties anticipated by the company in its job descriptions 
were required only infrequently, and others in seasonal 
spurts. The major responsibilities were those directly 
associated with selling slaves; and the absence of company 
complaints against the agents for failure to sell implies 
that there were no serious breaches of that primary function 
during the period being studied.
The one time when the agent would have been busiest 
was the period during which a slave ship was anchored within
Q £
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 10 6.
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his domain, but this was infrequent. Although the Royal 
African Company sent considerable numbers of slavers to 
Africa during this era, relatively few were dispatched to 
Virginia, and of those, some fell prey to pirates and 
hostile privateers. Normally, at least four or five slave 
ships reached Virginia per year, but the majority belonged 
to separate traders. Some years passed when not one company 
slave ship sailed into Chesapeake Bay. Even in the busier 
years, the trade was concentrated between April and October.
FIGURE 2: SLAVES AND SLAVE SHIPS ARRIVING IN VIRGINIA,
1700-171087
Jan-Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
ships 0 2 4 4 7 10 8 2 0 1
slaves 0 210 979 632 1308 1627 1125 491 0 67
Thus, in a dull year or an off season, the agent could have 
been relatively free, depending upon the degree of enthusiasm 
which he devoted to the peripheral tasks.
8 7This estimate represents a synthesis of two sources: 
Elizabeth Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative of the History 
of the History of the Slave .Trade to America, IV, 172-173; 
and the Virginia- Colonial Records Project microfilms of the 
Royal African Company records, T 70, passim., P.R.O.
Bruce, Economic History, I, 622-623, gives an explanation 
of this seasonal trend, which emphasizes that "all the 
planters were eager to forward their hogsheads to the foreign 
markets at the earliest possible moment in order to obtain 
the highest price." This allowed the. shipper an opportunity 
for a "double profit, first the profit on the sale of 
laborers themselves after deducting the cost of their trans­
portation, and secondly, the profit on the tobacco . . . when
passed to the English dealers." This is obviously a goal 
similar to that of the Royal African Company.
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These lesser responsibilities appear to have been 
left largely to the conscience of the particular agent. It 
is impossible to render a summary evaluation of the efficiency 
of the agents in corresponding, managing company property, 
prosecuting smugglers, and keeping the company accounts, 
though the company occasionally did censure or command its 
agents for certain of these activities. Even considering 
the extreme unreliability of communications, Colonel Corbin 
was a poor correspondent who apparently did not bother to
88inform the company when separate traders imported slaves;
in addition, his bookkeeping and management of credit caused
89complaint that his services were "very unmerchantlike."
Edward Hill, on the contrary, was complimented for his
correspondence in which he had submitted intelligence
concerning the arrivals of ships and the duties they paid,
and officials even sent a copy of the letter of commendation
90to Hill’s "security," Micajah Perry. The company also 
thanked Christopher Robinson for his "diligence in lookeing
after Interlopers" when he and a collector had seized the
. . 91ship Little Society.
^R.A.C. to Gawin Corbin, 18 Oct., 1705, T 70/58, 
p. 201, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 14 Sept. 1711, ibid., 405.
89R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705, ibid., 211.
^R.A.C. to Edward Hill, 4 March 1702, ibid. , 56.
91R.A.C. to Christopher Robinson, 14 Feb. 16 88, T 
70/57, f. 38 ro. and vo., P.R.O.
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Too frequently, mediocre performance by the agents 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Royal African 
Company, just as their successes contributed to its temporary 
survival. When they.enforced the monopoly during its existence, 
they increased the company's share of the total volume of 
slave imports; and yet the company's best efforts to prevent 
interloping, to meet Virginia demands, and to withstand 
mounting pressure in Parliament were inadequate. By collecting 
a tax on goods imported into Virginia after 1698, the agents 
increased the company's profits; but even the assistance of 
Parliamentary legislation which prolonged the company's 
favored position did not salvage its Virginia trade or its 
financial structure. Enthusiasm could not have come easily 
to agents who were expected to manage such a sporadic trade; 
when there were no ships, there was no income, and when a 
ship arrived, the agent often had to deal slaves to fellow 
planters from whom he knew he would collect only with great 
difficulty.. - While short-term profits depended to some extent 
upon the agents, it was hardly within their power to assure 
the company's general success.
The day-to-day activities of the Virginia agents 
represent on their most fundamental level the operations of 
the Royal African Company in the colony. However, in order 
to achieve a balanced understanding of these operations it 
is necessary to view the dynamics of the Virginia market—  
personnel, supply, demand, and prices— against the changing 
background of the domestic economy and the conditions of 
world trade.
CHAPTER III 
VIRGINIA AS A MARKET FOR COMPANY- SLAVES
Although the Royal African Company found Virginia an 
unimportant and unstable market for its slaves during most 
of the period 1689-1713, the company's London officials 
continued to anticipate an improvement; they periodically 
assessed the market, designated a succession of colonial 
merchant-planters as company agents, and imported into the 
Tidewater area possibly as many as one thousand slaves over 
the duration of that quarter century. Because the company 
maintained an active interest in the Chesapeake trade in 
spite of discouraging and unprofitable results, its records 
reflect certain characteristics of Virginia as a slave 
market: the geographic origins of Virginia slaves, the
identity and geographic distribution of the Virginians who 
purchased company slaves, the identity of the British 
merchants who financed the trade, and an estimate of the 
average prices paid for slaves in this era. Following is an 
account of some of these characteristics.
A. Origins of Virginia Slaves
It was once argued that American Negro slaves repre­
sented a cross-section of the population of the entire
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continent of Africa.^ Considerable disagreement followed in
attempting to determine African origins, but most contemporary
scholars concur in their belief that the vast majority
originated along a three thousand mile strip of West African
coastline stretching between the Senegal River and present-day 
2Angola. One would instinctively expect the Virginia Negroes 
to have been representative of the total pattern. Anthropologist 
Melville J. Iierskovits, whose work in this field is authori­
tative, was largely responsible for the new understanding of
the role played by the West African in populating the New 
3
World; he found from the abstracts of ships1 manifests that
slaves imported into Virginia originated from the same stretch
of West Coast, particularly from the regions of the Gambia
River, the Guinea Coast, the Niger River Delta, and the
4lower Congo. African Company records substantiate Iierskovits' 
conclusions; letters to ships1 captains and agents show that
“^Melville J. Iierskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past 
(New York and London, 1941), d£licusseir~oXd and new
ideas of African origins of American Negroes.
2
Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America
(London, 196 4), 15-16. ~
3Stanley Elkins, Slavery (New York, 196 3) , 93, states 
that he "is accepting without "question the findings and 
generalizations put forth . . . [by Iierskovits] insofar as
they relate to the Negro in Africa." Winthrop Jordan, White 
Over Black (Chapel Hill, 1968) , 102, says, "though now 
challenged on many points, the single most important work on 
the African background of American slaves remains . . .
Iierskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past."
4
Iierskovits, Myth of the Negro Past, 40-51.
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the slaves imported by the company in the years 1689-1713 
came predominantly from the same areas— the Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, the Gold Coast, "Guinea," the Niger River, and Angola. 
This is to be expected, not only because it is consistent with 
the larger pattern, but because '^ tfhis portion of the West 
African coast was both the domain of the company charter and 
the home of company slave forts and "factories" during this era.
FIGURE 3: AFRICAN ORIGINS OF VIRGINIA SLAVES5
Place of Origin Year Ship Number of s
Angola 1702 Lusitania 360
1702 Angola frigate 320
1720/1 Prince George
Gambia 1683 Sarah 180
1683 Two Friends 190
1686 Speedwell 200
1701 Evans frigate 300
1702 Urban frigate 250










1702 Thomas & John
Niger River 1689 Benj amin
1693 Jeffrey 330
Sierra Leone 1701 Gambia Galley 100 +
1705 Angola frigate
These imported African laborers brought to the New 
World, including Virginia, a variety of cultural backgrounds; and
5
This table is derived from the Virginia Colonial Records 
Project microfilms of the Royal African Company records, T 70, 



















though many of the West African groups can be classified by 
scholars as somewhat similar in language, music, dance, 
religion, and agrarian culture, the similarities are in many 
cases more academic than real. For example, many of the more 
than two hundred distinct tongues of modern-day Nigeria and 
Biafra can be linked by linguists, but only a few are mutually 
intelligible. Thus, although linguists would categorize most 
of the African slaves imported to Virginia as peoples of the 
same Mande and West Atlantic language groups, these Africans 
were to a large extent culturally heterogeneous. Virginians 
initially must have found the similarities of Africans more 
obvious than their differences, but the experienced eye soon 
began to distinguish the tall Gold Coast Ashanti from the 
shorter, lighter-skinned Bantu of the Congo River basin. Not 
only did the New World colonists discriminate, but they 
evaluated and labelled each ethnic group. That the purchasing 
of slaves became an artful business, at least in some areas of 
the Americas, is indicated by the descriptions of the 
eighteenth-century English emigrant planter-historian Bryan 
Edwards:
There are among several of the African nations 
some striking and predominant features.
Eric Wi11iams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chape1 Hill,
1944), 37. See also Ulrich B. Phillips, Life and Labor bn the 
Old South (Boston, 1929) , 188-191. An early example of 
European”thought about African ethnic traits is found in Dow, 
Slave Ships, 86, citing Churchill's Collections of Voyages 
TLondorT, T746) , Vol. V: "The slaves of New Calabar are a 
strange sort of brutish creatures,'very weak and slothful, but 
cruel and bloody in their temper, always quarreling, biting and 
fighting and sometimes choking and murdering one another without 
mercy."
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The Mandingoes have frequent wars with each 
other. . . In truth, they display such gentleness
of disposition and demeanour, as would seem the 
result of early education and discipline, were it 
not that, generally speaking, they are more prone 
to theft than any of the African tribes.
The circumstances which distinguish the 
Koromantyn, or Gold coast negroes, from all others, 
are firmness both of body and mind; a ferociousness 
of disposition; but withal, activity, courage, and a 
stubbornness, or what an ancient Roman would have 
deemed an elevation of soul, which prompts them to 
enterprises of difficulty and danger;
Even the children brought from the Gold coast 
manifest an evident superiority, both in hardiness 
of frame, and vigour of mind, over all the young 
people of the same age that are imported from other 
parts of Africa.
Papaws. . . are unquestionably the most docile
and best-disposed slaves that are Imported from any 
part of Africa. Without the fierce and savage 
manners of the Koromantyn negroes, they are also 
happily exempt from- the timid and desponding temper 
of the Eboes. . . . That punishment which excites 
the Koromantyn to rebel, and drives the Ebo negro to 
suicide, is received by the Papaws as the chastise­
ment of legal authority, to which it is their duty 
to submit patiently. . . .
Eboes. . . in general. . . appear to be the
lowest and most wretched of all the nations of Africa. 
. . . The great objection to the Eboes as slaves, is
their constitutional timidity, and despondency of 
mind; . . .
Those from Congo and Angola. . . [are] of a 
disposition naturally mild and d o c i l e .^
Regardless of the degree of truth represented by these exten­
sive ethnic generalizations, apparently they were a part of 
the popular lore of the slave trade. The question arises,
7 .Bryan Edwards, The History Civil and Commercial of the
British Colonies in the West Indies (Philadelphia-, 1806) , II, 
261-283.
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then, as to the influence which such rhetoric exerted on the 
Royal African Company trade to Virginia— did Virginians prefer 
slaves of a particular ethnic origin?
One historian of the Virginia trade, Calvin Coulter, 
contends that although differences in "physique and temperament"
g
were discernible, Virginians had little or no preference. 
Contrasted with the demands in South Carolina and Jamaica where 
slaves were carefully chosen by physique and temperament to 
work in the extensive sugar and rice plantations, the Virginia 
tobacco labor was so light that physical power was not essen- 
tial. Because purchasers in other New World markets were 
more discriminating than Virginians in their demands for slaves, 
the Coulter argument continues, the Virginia slave population 
originated generally from less valued African sources. Blacks 
from the Gold and Slave Coasts seldom reached Virginia; instead, 
slave ships brought their Virginia cargoes from scattered 
localities, but particularly from the Gambia, Angola, and the 
Niger Delta. An analysis of the company records confirms the 
conclusion which Coulter made from his study of Naval Officers' 
Lists— at least 17 of the 2 3 ships in the company records 
secured their slave cargoes from the "less popular" regions.^
0
Coulter, "The Import Trade of Colonial Virginia," Wm. 
and Mary Qtly., Ser. 3, II (1945), 306.
9Coulter, The Virginia Merchant, 86-87.
^See above, Figure 3, page 53, for a regional listing 
of the origins of slaves imported to Virginia.
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However, there is no evidence to assure that this particular 
distribution of origins is more than coincidental. The argu­
ment that Virginians did not select slaves from a specific 
region of Africa is strengthened by the realization that the 
company often had great difficulty in filling specific orders, 
and as a result sometimes it did not even attempt to discrimi­
nate. There were instances when the company office in London 
was not certain of the number of slaves available at their 
various African "factories." Though orders to ship captains 
were usually specific, one captain bound for Virginia was 
told rather vaguely to take 300 slaves, if he found them 
available at Cape Coast Castle or Sierra Leone. If not, the 
captain was instructed "to proceed [to] Whidah Allampo or Ardah" 
where the company hoped he could complete his cargo.^
Despite Coulter's argument, another possible reason 
exists for Virginia's accumulation of a heterogeneous slave 
population— Virginia planters may have contrived heterogeneity 
as a measure of security. Several documents contemporaneous 
to the trade indicate that the planters deliberately diversi­
fied their slaves in order to minimize their cultural simi­
larities, their ability to communicate, and, as a result, the 
likelihood of slave insurrection. "The plantations desire 
Negroes from several nations because they are thereby not so 
subject to rebellion" was the explanation made in British
^R.A.C. to Captain Thomas Arnall, 2 Nov. 1704, T 70/63,
35-41, P.R.O.
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1?Parliament in 16 84. In 1710, Governor Alexander Spotswocd.
made a plea to the Virginia Assembly in an attempt to encourage
stronger laws for the prevention of slave insurrection: ,!The
Tryalls [of slaves for treason] of last Aprill Court may shew
that we are not to Depend on Either their Stupidity, or that
13Babel of Languages among 'em." Governor Spotswood may have 
arrived independently at the idea that the internal tranquility 
of. the colony would be enhanced by the inability of the slave 
laboring force to communicate, but the captains who trans­
ported the slaves had long depended upon this "babel" of
14languages to lessen the likelihood of mutiny.
There is little doubt that Virginia planters as well 
as colonial authorities were in this era aware of. the danger 
of slave conspiracy. "We went to Council," William Byrd 
entered in his diary in April 1710, "where among other things 
we directed the negroes to be arraigned for high treason."
Three days later, in the same "Tryalls" referred to above by 
Governor Spotswood, two of the slaves were convicted of 
treason by the General Court, executed, quartered, and in 
order to terrorize other potentially rebellious slaves, the
12Stock, ed., Proceedings, "Parliaments of England, 
William and Mary, Second Parliament" (2 March 1693/4, House 
of Commons), II, 93.
13Henry R. Mcllwame, ed. , Journals of the House of 
Burgesses of Virginia, 1619 . . . 1*76X , 9 vols. CRichmond,
T90 8-15FT* TTOJ T^TTT^ 240.
14Elkins, Slavery, 90-91.
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L5heads and quarters were “set up," one m  Williamsburg.'
Slave plots had been uncovered in Surry and Isle of Wight
16Counties in 1709, and in 1710 a conspiracy discovered and
foiled in Surry County drew widespread attention and prompted
17legislation in the Assembly. Another indication of the
same fear is the growing number of Virginia laws restricting
the Negroes1 behavior, in some cases with the overt intent of
preventing violent upheaval. Even the titles of some laws
captured this mood of apprehension: "An act for preventing
18Negroes Insurrections,’1 “A byll Restraining Negroes going 
19armed,” and "a more severe method . . .  to prevent the
20meeting of Negroes.”'
If Virginia planters were relatively unconcerned with 
the African origins of their slaves, they evidently were more
See 18-21 April 1710, Byrd, Secret Diary . . . 1709-
1712, eds. Wright and Tinling, 16 7-16 9; see also Morton, 
Colonial Virginia, II, 417.
^ 2 1  March 1709, Mcllwaine, ed., Executive Journals 
of the Council of Colonial Virginia (Richmond, 1925-1930),
III,~234-235~
17 . . .Robert E. and B. Katherine Brown, Virginia 1705-1786:
Democracy or Aristocracy? (East Lansing, 196T)~ 71; Hening’ 
ed., Statutes, III, 536-537; Spotswood, Letters, I, 42.
1 o
Hening, ed., Statutes, II, 481-482.
192 8 Oct. 16 86, Mcllwaine, ed., Journals of the House 
of Burgesses of Virginia . . . 1659-169T (Richmond, 1912), 266.
20Ibid., 429. See also ”An additional act for the 
better preventing insurrections by Negroes,” Hening, ed., 
Statutes, III, 86-88; "An act for suppressing outlying Slaves,” 
ibid.
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concerned vis-a-vis the West Indian Negroes. The standard in­
terpretation explains that the preferences of Virginia planters 
changed between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centu­
ries from West Indian to African slaves. Originally, before 
16 80, Virginians had favored slaves imported from the West 
Indies, particularly Barbados, because they had been "seasoned" 
— that is, planters felt that living in the West Indies had
conditioned the Africans to the work and the climate of the 
21New World. This made them more desirable than those "raw"
22Negroes imported directly from Africa, "savages of a very
gross type unaccustomed to any form of restraint," requiring
2 3the constant supervision of an overseer. In addition, credit
arrangements made in the West Indies were more lenient than
those made in London, Liverpool, or Bristol, an additional
factor which encouraged planters to import slaves from the
24islands rather than from Africa. However, by 1710, an appar­
ent change in the attitudes of Virginia planters had taken 
effect. The Virginia Council reported to the House of 
Burgesses in 1710 that West Indian Negroes were inferior,
"Either Such as are Transported for Crimes or Infected with 
Diseases." So opposed were the Councillors to the importation
21
Coulter, The Virginia Merchant, 86-87.
22Marcus W. Jernegan, "Slavery and the Beginnings of 
Industrialism in the American Colonies," The American Historical 
Review, XXV (1920), 225.
23Bruce, Economic History, II, 10 8.
24Coulter, The Virginia Merchant, 87.
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of slaves from the English islands that they submitted to the
House a resolution "Whither it may not be proper That a higher
2 5Duty be Laid on Them Than on Negroes Imported from Africa."
Again, company records do not conflict with the estab­
lished view; not a single reference is made in company corres­
pondence to slaves brought into Virginia by the Royal African 
Company from either the West Indies or any area other than the 
West Coast of A.frica. Repeated letters tell of slavers,
2 6destined for Virginia, which would stop at the West Indies,
and some of the captains were directed to sell their slaves in
the islands if they found it impossible to arrive in Virginia
2 7 butat the proper season, "in the month of Angus t or Sooner"; 
there is no indication that they or any other company slaves
25Entry of 30 Nov. 1710, II. R. Mcllwaine, ed., Journals 
of the House of Burgesses, 1702-1712, 286-287.
R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas James, 18 March 1685, T 70/61, 
f. 6 ro. and vo., P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Benjamin Alford, 10 March 
1701/2, T 70/58, 28-31, P.R.O.; R.A..C. to Paul Sorel, 16 Dec.
1701, T 70/62, 106-109, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. Joseph Bemister,
23 Dec. 1702, ibid., 173; R.A.C. to John Tozer, 11 Jan. 1703, 
ibid., 246-251; R.A.C. to John Addis, 26 Oct. 1703, T 70/43,
1837 P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. William Cooke, 9 April 1706, T 70/63, 
80-83, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas Macklev, 28 Jan. 1706/7, 
ibid., 111-113; R.A.C. to— , 4 Jan. 1708, T 70/44, P.R.O.; R.A.C. 
to Capt. John Mitchell, 16 March 1720/21, T 70/64, 47-50, P.R.O.; 
Stock, ed., Proceedings, II, 136 n ., citing Manuscripts, House 
of Lords, XV, 9 8~* Dorman, ed. , Documents, I, 414 and nT
27R.A.C. to Mackley, 28 Jan. 1706/7, T 70/63, 111-113, 
P.R.O.; see also R.A..C. to Horne, Thomas, Willy Barbados,
23 Oct. 1701, T 70/58, 17, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Sorel, 16 Dec.
1701, T 70/62, 106-109, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Bemister, 23 Dec.
1702, ibid., 173; R.A.C. to Tozer, 11 Jan. 1703, ibid., 246-251; 
R.A.C. to Cooke, 9 April 1706, T 70/63, 80-83, P.R.O.
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were re-exported to Virginia from the West Indies. This, of
course, does not preclude the possibility that Virginians
imported slaves from the West Indies after 16 80 through other
channels, particularly in light of the private dealings of
Chesapeake merchants; they frequently imported slaves in small
numbers from the West Indies as an adjunct to their importation
of goods and raw materials, not as a distinct slaving operation
2 8of the sort established by the African Company.
Virginia slave purchasers apparently did express one
outstanding preference; they regarded Virginia-born slaves as
29superior investments. This preference is not reflected m  
company records because the African Company did not participate 
in the domestic traffic--or "carrying trade," as it was known—  
and therefore did not sell Virginia-born slaves. But as 
long as slaves retained their fluid status in Virginia, until 
new laws of entail bound them to the land, there was a market 
for Virginia-born slaves which was catered to particularly 
by individual merchants. As late as 1713, however, natural 
increase had accounted for only a small minority of the 
total population of Virginia. A few slaves continued to
^Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 139 ff.
29Bruce, Economic Historv, II, 87; U. B. Phillips, in 
The Slave Economy"of the Old South, 86, concurs: "A very
instructive consideration is that, whereas in the West Indies 
among able-bodied slaves a freshly imported African would 
bring about the same price as a negro born and reared upon a 
sugar plantation, in Virginia, even before the eighteenth 
century a home-grown negro was considered nearly tv/ice as 
valuable as a fresh African."
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. . 30trickle from the West Indies to Virginia,. and there is some
scant evidence that slaves were being imported in small
31numbers from New England. But, primarily because the supply 
of slave labor was by far the greatest there, the Guinea coast 
far outstripped all other areas as a source for Virginia slaves 
throughout the period being examined.
B. Identity and Distribution of Virginia Purchasers
More open to question than the geographic origins of the 
slaves are the identity, distribution, and economic status of 
the Virginians who purchased them. In this regard, several 
questions have been asked: Were the gentry or the yeoman *< r
farmers most responsible for creating the demand for slaves in 
Virginia at the end of the seventeenth century? Was slave 
labor, because of high initial costs, the exclusive privilege 
of the wealthy planters who purchased them in great lots, 
thereby widening the social and economic gap between themselves
30Coulter, "Import Trade," Wm. and Mary Qtly., Ser. 3,
II (1945), 307.
31Donnan, ed., Documents, III, 21, records the follow­
ing notice of sale (1706-1707) : "Any person or persons that
has a Negro man slave or slaves to sell or to be transported 
to Virginia for a market may repair to John Campbell, 
Post-Master of Boston." For additional references to slaves 
imported into Virginia from New England, see Bruce, Economic 
History, II, 81; "Sale of a Negro," Wm. and Mary Qtly., Ser. 1, 
VI (18 9 8) , 117. :
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32and the poorer colonists?" Or were the small farmers, aided
by available credit and the relatively low long-term cost
of slave labor, also able to obtain slaves and thereby to
33perpetuate the existence of a strong yeomanry?
32This view is stated partially by W. F. Craven,
Southern Colonies, 400, and more precisely by Thomson in The 
Merchant in Virginia, 61-62. Thomson states, in part: "The
few seventeenth century planters who had wealth enough to 
produce on a large scale rapidly became wealthier and began 
looking for means by which they could increase their production 
and lower their unit costs. Small planters were almost ruined. 
. . . The greatest cost of production was that of labor and
small planters had utilized their own labor and that of 
indentured servants. . . .  In the long run they were more 
expensive than the other major type of laborer, the Negro 
slave. The slave cost so much initially that the small 
planters could only with great difficulty purchase one. . . .
"The wealthy planters began the widescale use of 
slavery as early as 1660. Gradually the importance of slavery 
increased in the Virginia economy. By 1700 slave labor had 
replaced convict or indentured servants as the major labor 
supply. . . .  The demand for land by the large planters who 
used slave labor led to the increase in the size of the 
plantation in the Tideweiter, and the increase of social and 
economic distinctions between the large land holder and the 
poor farmer. The poor whites fled Virginia by the thousands 
before the onslaught of the Negro slave."
33Wertenbaker, Planters, 152-15 3, most strongly 
represents this argument. Usfng eighteenth-century tax lists 
and county records, Wertenbaker concludes that "it must not 
be imagined that slavery drove out or ruined the entire class 
of small farmers, leaving Virginia alone to the wealthy. In 
fact, most of those who were firmly established remained, 
finding their salvation in themselves purchasing slaves . . .
with the influx of thousands of negroes, the more enterprising 
and industrious of the poor planters quite frequently made 
purchases. Although the initial outlay was greater, they could 
secure credit by pledging their farms and their crops, and in 
the end the investment usually paid handsome dividends and 
many who could not raise the money to buy a full grown negro, 
often found it possible to secure a child, which in time 
would become a valuable asset. . . .
"In Lancaster even so early as 1716 we find that the 
bulk of the slaves were in the hands, not of wealthy 
proprietors, but of comparatively poor persons."
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The African Company records do not answer these 
questions. In themselves, they tell little about Virginia 
society, and their documentation of some characteristics of 
the economy of that colony is limited to only a small minor­
ity of the slaves purchased in Virginia, even in this era. 
However, in identifying Virginia slave purchasers the Royal 
African Company records serve a unique and valuable function. 
The most popular method for identifying the owners of slaves 
in early eighteenth-century Virginia has been to evaluate the 
extant lists of tithables.^ While useful as an apparently 
complete index for some counties, these lists only indirectly 
identify slaveholders. Wertenbaker, who uses the tithables 
lists to document the existence of a "class of little slave 
holders," is forced to rest his case on an assumption, albeit 
a strong one: "As there were but few servants in the colony
at this time it may be taken for granted that the larger part
35of the tithables paid for by others were negro slaves."
His method is a reasonable one which has been invoked by 
3 6others, but regardless of how convincing, it does depend upon 
an inference. The value of the copies of the company's bills
34The tithables lists provided the basis for taxation in 
Colonial Virginia, and included at this time "all Slaves both 
Men and Women, and all white Men above the Age 16 Years."
Henry Hartwell, James Blair, and Edward Chilton, The Present 
State of Virginia and the College (1697; Hunter D~ FarXsh",~ed. , 
Wi riTamsburg, T9T0T^ 53i
35Wertenbaker, Planters, 15 3.
3 6 _ _See, for example, Browns, Democracy or Aristocracy?, 
Chapter 3, "The Impact of Slavery on White Society," 6 3-7 9.
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of exchange is that they specifically document purchases of 
slaves by certain Virginians. In addition, whereas the tith­
ables lists are limited in this era to several counties, none 
with extant lists for years before 1716, the company records 
touch all the existing counties in the first years of the 
eighteenth century. The records have their weaknesses. There 
is no assurance that the men named on the bills did not re~sell 
the slaves, and for this reason they are referred to as pur­
chasers and not owners. As noted above, the records do not in 
any sense comprise a full enough documentation of Virginia 
slave purchases to merit broad assumptions about the overall 
nature of the Virginia slave trade. But they do lead to 
several observations about the purchasers of company slaves in 
Virginia which add dimension to the understanding of Virginia 
as a market for slaves.
Perhaps most obvious is the notable absence of a dominant
figure or figures from the list of purchasers. Joseph Belfield
of Richmond County who bought 13, Richard Wise of King and
Queen County with 11, and Captain William Fox of Lancaster with
37eight were the leading purchasers.
Secondly, instead of being dominated by a few, the bulk 
of the company's business can be attributed to the many pur­
chasers who acquired slaves in small quantities. As indicated 
by Table 3 below, of the 20 7 purchasers recorded in the 
company's copies of bills of exchange for slaves sold in
^See Appendix F, pp. 138-146.
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Virginia, 89, almost half, purchased only one slave, and the 
average purchase for the duration of the period was only 2.1 
slaves.
FIGURE 5: SLAVES PURCHASED IN VIRGINIA FROM THE ROYAL
AFRICAN COMPANY, 16 89-1713: RELATIVE SIZES
OF TRANSACTIONS58
total purchase number of purchasers
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Third, there seems to have existed a limited correla­
tion between the size of a man's landholdings and the number 
of slaves he purchased from the company. Most of those who
made relatively large purchases, in excess of £90, owned over
39500 acres of land according to the 1704 quit rent rolls.
But there were exceptions, including William Crymes of 
Gloucester County and William Baker, Ann King, Henry Nelson, 
and Richard Wise, all of King and Queen. The reverse, however,
3 8Virginia Colonial Records Project microfilms of the 
Royal African Company records, bills of exchange, T 70, passim., 
P.R.O.
39The quit rent rolls were lists of landowners and the 
amount of land they owned prepared by the sheriffs of the 
counties as a basis for the annual quit rent tax of one shilling 
per each 50 acres paid by colonial la,,downers to the King of 
England. The only Virginia rolls in existence are those of 1704, 
exclusive of the Northern Neck counties of Lancaster, Northumber­
land, Westmoreland, Richmond, and Stafford, the quit rents of 
which were paid to the proprietors, the Fairfax and Culpeper 
families. The Virginia quit rent rolls have been reproduced in 
various issues of the Virginia Magazine and are consolidated as 
an Appendix in Wertenbaker, Planters.
6 8
shows no consistency. Many of the better-known and more 
prosperous planters who held vast estates— Major George 
Braxton, Major Lewis Burwell, Councillor Benjamin Harrison, 
Colonel Richard Kemp, William Tavloe of "Mount Airy"--bought 
only one or two slaves. This is substantiated statistically 
by the fact that the forty largest landholders, those owning 
in excess of 1000 acres, averaged purchasing 2.1 slaves, the 
exact average of the entire group of 207 purchasers. Absent 
entirely from the list are many of the familiar names of the 
Virginia aristocracy— Carter, Byrd, Ludwell, Beverley, 
Fitzhugh, Wormeley, Lee— a reminder of the relative unimpor­
tance of the company trade, of the fact that Virginians were
40being supplied slaves in large numbers from other sources.
Statistics compiled by superimposing the Virginia quit 
rent rolls of 1704 on the company records of bills of exchange 
indicate that those who purchased slaves from the African 
Company during this period held larger than average estates. 
But it must be added that small landholdings are quite in 
evidence throughout the company's records.
40Wertenbaker, Planters, 152, for example, figures that 
Robert Carter owned 126 slaves in 1716, none of which are on 
record as having been bought from the African Company.
William Byrd, who had during the seventeenth century obtained 
slaves through his London agents, Perry and Lane, began in 
1697 to import them directly from Africa in his own vessels. 
Wright, ed., "William Byrd and the Slave Trade," Huntington 
Library Quarterly, VIII (1945), 379-387.
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FIGURE 6: LANDHOLDINGS OF VIRGINIA PURCHASERS OF 41
AFRICAN COMPANY SLAVES, 170 4 (in acres)
(1) AVERAGE LANDHOLDINGS
King & Queen Gloucester Essex 
all landholders 407.5 387.7 388.3
slave purchasers 1123.1 801.8 576.67
(2) SIZE OF LANDHOLDINGS OF PURCHASERS
number of total slaves average slaves 
slaveholders purchased purchased
1000 acres and over 40 84 2.10
750-999 acres 11 26 2.36
500-749 acres 16 40 2.50
250-499 acres 21 32 1.53
1-249 acres 29 46 1.59
Because of the appearance among the company's financial records
of many small-scale purchases and of Virginians with modest-
to-average landholdings, the weight of the findings of this
study support the belief that many small farmers in Virginia
were able to purchase slaves in the early eighteenth century.
Fourth, the African Company transactions in this era
indicate a definite geographic concentration in the Middle
Peninsula, particularly in the counties of King and Queen,
Gloucester, and Essex. The Northern Neck counties were a
distant second, while the company did very little business
42 .south of the James River at this time. This distribution can 
be partially attributed to the location of Gawin Corbin, the 
dominant figure in the company's Virginia transactions of this era.
41Derived from the records of Royal African Company, 
bills of exchange, T 70, P.R.O., and from 1704 quit rent rolls, 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biographv, Vols. XXVIII-
XXXVTT T 1 lT2(T-T(f29) 7 P^islm7~' ^
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Corbin, who lived in Middlesex and King and Oueen Counties,
served as the sole company agent in Virginia during much of
the period, first locating his agency at the Rappahannock
River, and after 170 7 at the York River. Aside from the fact
that Corbin's residences and agencies were located in the
Middle Peninsula, there is no ready explanation for the
concentration there of company business. This distribution
does coincide neatly with the pattern which Robert E. and
B. Katherine Brown found to have existed later in the eighteenth
century, except that slavery had not by 1713 spread west to
the Piedmont. Contrary to the standard belief that slaves were
most heavily in evidence throughout the Tidewater area, the
Browns show that "the greatest density of slaves existed in a
strip of land which included both tidewater and piedmont
counties, an area bounded roughly by the James and Rappahannock 
4 3Rivers." The Royal African Company appears to have contributed 
to this concentration of slaves in the Middle Peninsula.
c • English Financiers
The planters of the Middle Peninsula and other Virginia 
counties were able to accumulate slaves through credit arrange­
ments made with English merchants. As indicated above, the 
credit system was integrated with the tobacco trade? to obtain 
a slave each planter normally signed a bill of exchange on a 
particular merchant with whom he had established credit, or 
who would accept the bill in anticipation of future tobacco
43Browns, Democracy or Aristocracy?, 72.
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shipments. Approximately 65 merchants and firms are on record 
as having supplied credit to Virginia purchasers of company 
slaves in this era. Of these, ten are credited with financing 
over £250 worth of bills, and one, Micajah Perry, stands alone 
as the dominant financier.^
FIGURE 8: LEADING ENGLISH FINANCIERS OF THE AFRICAN 45
COMPANY SLAVE TRADE TO VIRGINIA, 16 89-1713
amount
Micajah Perry & Co.
(Perry, Lane & Co.) £2176.05.06
Arthur Baily 549.11.01
Robert Bristow & Co. 49 3.19.00
Robt. Wise 42 6.05.00
Francis Willis & Co. 385.00.00
Richard Lee 355.16.00
John Goodin (Goodwin) 32 8.18.09
Francis Lee 285.15.06
Thomas Corbin 2 5 8.12.07
John Wright 2 54.18.08
Not only did he excel as a financier of the company’s Virginia
trade, but Perry exemplified the degree to which a tobacco
merchant of his time could participate in Virginia affairs.
While incorporated with his brother, Richard, and Thomas Lane
as the London house of Perry, Lane, and Company, Micajah Perry
served as London agent for the colony and as banker for the
colony and the College of William and Mary as well as for many
individual planters. In these positions, Perry was often
called upon to express recommendations for mercantile laws and
44For a more complete listing of the English financiers of 
the African Company trade to Virginia, 16 89-1713, see Appendix G, 
135-136.
4 5 .Derived from, the records of the Royal African Company, 
bills of exchange, T 70, P.R.O., passim.
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as noted above, for colonial appointments; and at times he
took the initiative in sponsoring legislation favorable to the
46tobacco trade. In his contact with colonial planters, Perry 
accumulated extensive miscellaneous duties: he handled mail
for colonists, bought and marketed their products, purchased 
and shipped goods for them, and administered their estates. 
There is some evidence that Arthur Baily and Thomas Corbin 
participated in a spectrum of activities wider than those of 
the slave trade, and it can be assumed that others among the 
financiers of the company's trade followed Perry's model, but 
incompletely and on a much smaller scale.
Prices of Slaves
A precise account of the price levels at which British 
merchants financed and planters bought company slaves would 
add depth to this sketch of Virginia as a slave market. Copies 
of the bills of exchange include the total amount paid, but
46Among his efforts, Perry attempted to open new markets 
for tobacco, including a contract with the Czar of Russia pro­
viding that the latter destroy all Circassian tobacco; he 
testified before the Board of Trade and the House of Lords in 
an effort to establish a July tobacco convoy; he petitioned the 
Board of Trade to send a man-of-war to clear pirates from the 
Virginia coast, and he reported to the Board on potential sites 
for Virginia ports, shipments of Virginia tar and pitch, and 
monetary legislation desirable for the colonies. A standard 
channel through which Virginians expressed to the Board of Trade 
their desire for public office in the colony, Perry is credited 
with securing for William Byrd a seat on the Virginia Council 
and making Philip Ludwell auditor of the colony. Although his 
interests normally coincided with those of the tobacco planters, 
Perry on occasion joined with fellow merchants in opposing 
Virginia planters, as was the case when the former protested 
against a Virginia lav/ regulating the size of tobacco hogsheads. 
For a discussion of Perry's activities, see Donnan, "Eighteenth- 
Century English Merchants, Micajah Perry," Journal of Economic 
and Business History, IV (1931-32), 70-98.
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unfortunately they do not specify the number of slaves which
the total represents. As a result, average prices cannot be
calculated from the internal evidence within the bills of
exchange. However, other sources, both primary and secondary,
exist for constructing a tentative appraisal of slaves sold in
Virginia at this time, including several letters contained
4 7within the company's correspondence. If the bills are inter­
preted in conjunction with existing knowledge, it is possible 
to calculate an annual average price for some years of the 
company's trade.
4 7 . . .Sources for estimating prices of slaves m  Virginia at
this time are numerous. The relevant company letters are R.A.C. 
to Paul Sorel, 16 Dec. 1701, T 70/62, 106-109, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to 
Messrs. Chaplin and others, Jamaica, 7 Dec. 1704, T 70/58, 154; 
identical letters follow to Barbados, Antiqua, Montserrat, and 
Nevis. Other primary sources include Byrd, Secret Diary, 1 and 
2 June 1710, p. 186; 2 Feb. 1711, p. 295; "Instructions for 
John Withers," Fitzhugh, Chesapeake World, 119; Fitzhugh to 
Oliver Luke, 15 Aug. 1690, ibid., 279; Donnan, ed. , Documents, 
IV, 57 n .; Lt. Gov. Nicholson to Board of Trade, 1 Aug. 1700, 
ibid., 67; Gov. Ed. Nott to Board of Trade, 21 Dec. 1705, ibid., 
88; testimony of Virginia and Maryland merchants before Board 
of Trade, 1707, ibid.; Report of Board of Trade, 19 Dec. 1709, 
ibid., II, 105; ibid., 77; Report of Board of Trade to House of 
Commons, 19 Dec. 1709, Donnan, ed., Documents, II, 106. Sir 
Charles Turner from Commissioners of Trade. . . , 19 Dec. 1710,
(H.C .), Stock, ed., Proceedings, III, 224 n . ; Calendar of State 
Papers , Colonial, 16 69-74 j, No. 985.
Among the estimates in secondary sources are Ballagh, 
History of Slavery in Virginia, 13, citing Cal. S_. P. Col. ,
444, 452; Bruce, Economic History, II, 89; Gray, History of 
Agriculture, 36 8; Davies, Royal African Company, 143, citing 
Cal. S. P. Col., 1708-9, 215; Wertenbaker, Planters, 131; Morris 
Talpalar, The Sociology of Colonial Virginia"! (New York, 1968), 
3051
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FIGURE 9 : AVERAGE PRICES OF COMPAN/ SLAVES SOLD.,. 
IN VIRGINIA, 1689-1713 (pounds ster.)
year total price total slaves average price
1689 61 3 20.06.08
1690 100 5 20.00.00
1703 2124 71 29.18.11
1704 1876 60 31.06.04
1705 3366 122 27.12.07
1706 473 17 27.16.10
1707 64 3 21.06.04
1708 1692 63 26.16.00
1709 917 35 26.04.02
1710 463 18 25.14.08
1711 47 2 23.10.06
Even if annual average prices could be established with
confidence in their validity and accuracy, their value would
be minimized by the nature of the auction method of sale used
by the African Company in Virginia. In this system, the
planters assessed the worth of individual slaves and paid
accordingly; thus the price of a healthy, skilled adult would
be sufficiently higher than that of an unhealthy or unskilled 
4 9youth. However, if it can be assumed that there were no 
drastic deviations in the annual percentage of healthy adult 
male slaves delivered by the company to Virginia over the 
period 1689-1713, several observations can be made about 
relative trends in prices.
4 8These average prices were derived from the records 
of the Royal African Company, bills of exchange, T 70, P.R.O., 
passim. They include only bills accounted for individually, 
naming purchaser, date, and amount of purchase. The totals 
differ from Figure 1, p. 2 7, above, which includes bills 
accounted for en masse, disregarding individual names and 
amounts.
49See Davies, Royal African Company, 312, 313; see also 
Parke Rouse, Jr., Planters and Pioneers; Life in Colonial 
Virginia (New /ork7 F96 8) , 131.
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1. Virginia prices appear to have been relatively
stable. The value of a company slave in Virginia remained
between £20 and £30 throughout the period, except for a
rise to slightly over £31 in 1704, after which the average
price declined very gradually. This trend agrees with
Elizabeth Donnan1s evaluations, both in price range and in
50its characteristic stability.
2. The increase in supply of slaves during the period
had no obvious direct influence on their prices. It has
been stated that prices of slaves rose in Virginia as their
importance in the economy increased— despite an accompanying
51increase in supply. Although it is apparent that prices 
were generally higher in the first decade of the eighteenth 
century than they had been in 16 89, this study can make no 
evaluation of supply-demand relationships because of the 
many variables which influenced market conditions in the 
few years when average prices are available.
3. There ensued throughout the period a continuous 
dispute between planters and company officials about the 
prices of slaves. Planters consistently thought that the
50Donnan, Documents, IV, 6, citing Virginia Historical 
Society Collections,- IV, 722.
51Davies, PvOyal African Company, 14 3; Herbert S. Klein, 
Slavery in the Americas (Chicago, 1967), 176; Bruce, History 
of Agriculture, II, 89.
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52company's prices were too high; the African Company
office repeatedly expressed the feeling that the prices
53its slaves brought m  Virginia were inadequate.
4. In the midst of the long legal struggle to regain
its monopoly, the company expressed several opinions about
price fluctuations. Officials argued simultaneously before
Parliament and the Board of Trade that prices in the colonies
54increased after 1697 as a result of the open trade; and
they predicted that a fall in the prices of slaves purchased
55m  Africa would reduce their sale price m  Virginia. There 
is no objective evidence in the records to support either 
claim, and because both were made in the context of a partisan 
campaign, they are not to be taken at face value.
Much of the information about Virginia as a market 
for African Company slaves is derived from extant copies of 
the company's bills of exchange. The bills in some cases 
supply information sufficient to document the course of the
52Daniel P. Mannix and Malcolm Cowley, Black Cargoes,
A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1518-1865 (New fork, 
1962) , 29.
53R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705, T 70/58, 211, P.R.O.; 
R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Feb. 1705/6, ibid., 217.
54Scott, Constitution and Finance, II, 24, citing 
Journals of House of Commons, XVI, 6 4.
55R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 April 1708, T 70/58, 332-334,
P . R. O .
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journey, the buyers, the creditors, and the size of their 
transactions. Valuable as is their contribution, the bills 
cast an uncertain image, one which reflects only in vaguest 
outline some of the fundamentals of the Virginia market.
For a more complete understanding of the African Company 
trade to Virginia, one must consider the company operations 
and the Virginia market in the light of the prevailing 
commercial conditions of this quarter century. In this era, 
the slave trade to Virginia was nourished and impoverished 
by powerful forces— the fluctuations of the tobacco economy 
and the frequent disruptions of European warfare.
CHAPTER IV 
AFRICAN COMPANY OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA
While the success of the African Company in selling 
slaves to Virginians depended to a degree on the effective­
ness of the company agents, this success was largely a 
function of the fluctuations of the Virginia market and of 
the company’s ability to meet the changing demand for 
slaves in Virginia. The Virginia market was not an inde­
pendent entity; the rise and fall of tobacco prices and the 
resultant changes in the fortunes of Virginia planters were 
inseparable from conditions of world trade. The primary 
factor influencing trans-Atlantic commerce in the period 
1689-1713 was the prolonged state of armed conflict among 
the European powers. During all but five of those twenty- 
five years, British trade to Virginia was seriously impeded 
by all the dangers and inconveniences brought to bear on her 
merchant marine by naval warfare— harassment and capture by 
French men-of-war and pirates, the necessity of armed con­
voys, embargoes, and other emergency measures imposed by the 
British Navy, including Impressment of merchant sailors.
The impediments of warfare and the related fortunes of the 
economy are documented in varying degree throughout the 




A . Obstructions of Trade by Naval Warfare
Trans-Atlantic commerce suffered many forms of dis­
orientation and abuse during the wars of King William and 
Queen Anne, not the least of which resulted from precautions 
taken to prevent actual losses of men and goods. The com­
pany 's home office feared the seizure of its ships, and in 
an effort to continue its trade in the face of war and 
piracy it included routine precautionary measures in the 
orders to its captains. The format which recurred most 
often in the company’s orders directed the captain "to be 
very circumspect, and not to leave [his] Ship, nor speak 
with any other, without absolute necessity, but always keep 
a good look and guard, to prevent surprize."^ In addition, 
the captain was warned to avoid potential enemies, including 
the Portuguese, "that they may not under any pretense by 
stopping bring [him] under necessity of Complying to any
unreasonable demands, or have Power to stop [his] shipp,
2
ruin [his] voyage, as they have already done to some."
These vague precautions were probably included in the
1R.A.C. orders to captains, T 70/64, 2, P.R.O. For 
similar instructions, see Appendix C, pp. 120-122. See also 
R.A.C. to Paul Sorel, 16 Dec. 1701, T 70/62, 106-109,
P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas Arnall, 21 July 1702, ibid., 
121-126; R.A.C. to Capt. Joseph Bemister, 3 Nov. 1702, 
ibid., 162-166; R.A.C. to Capt. John Tozer, 11 Jan. 1703, 
ibid. ,. 246-251.
^R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas Mackley, 28 Jan. 1706/7, 
T 70/63, 111-113, P.R.O.
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company’s orders to all Its captains during this period,
even in the years of peace.
The company did resort to more specific measures,
however, in attempts to avoid and compensate for their
losses at the hands of pirates. One preventive measure,
prescribed to Captain Marmaduke Goodhand of the Speedwell
in 1687, was to record in his journal the identity of the
pirate ship and its master, owners, origin, destination, and
any other information which might assist the company and,
presumably, the Royal Navy, in apprehending the pirates.
Other measures varied greatly in degree of aggressiveness,
the boldest in 1689 when Captain Thomas Hone of the Benjamin
was ordered to take advantage of his commission for the
"taking of Ships . . . belonging to the French king and his
subjects." This commission for seizure of the enemy
appears to have developed from a peacetime commission to
4
arrest interlopers and discriminated among nations during 
the wars, for instance exempting the ships of the Dutch
c:
Guinea Company from seizure in 170 4. Seventeenth-century 
merchant ships were much less defenseless than their
3R.A.C. to Hone, 19 Nov. 1689, T 70/61, f. 83 r o .,
P.R.O.
4 'R.A.C. to Captain Marmaduke Goodhand, 12 Jan. 1685,
T 70/61, ff. 3vo.-4ro., P.R.O.
^R.A.C. to Capt. Edward Tomlin, 16 Nov. 1704,
T 70/63, 44-46, P.R.O.
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modern-day counterparts;^ In time of war, all the Royal 
African Company ships were armed and instructed to keep 
their gunpowder dry, a "ship of force" mounting 2 4 to 36
g
guns, and the smaller vessels from six to ten. Merchant 
ships also attempted to enlarge their crews during time of 
war, though the African slavers normally maintained large 
crews for "holding down hundreds of frightened and sometimes
Q
desperate slaves." Even the large, well-manned, and 
heavily-armed slave ships were not always safe, as was 
demonstrated by the French capture of two of the four "ships 
of force" dispatched by the company in 1694. ^
By 1703, in the early stages of Queen Anne’s War, 
the Company had become more prudent, attempting to avoid 
conflict in the treacherous Caribbean area. In cases when 
either the company or the captain deemed a voyage to 
Virginia potentially "prejuditiall and hazardous" to both 
owners and freighters, the captain was provided the
^See Donnan, ed.. Documents, II, 606.
7R.A.C. to Arnall, 21 July 1702, T 70/62, 121-126,
P.R.O. See also Appendix B, p. 118.
g
Davies, Royal African Company, 192.
9Ibid., 193-
■^Davies, Royal African Company, 192, also notes from 
T 70/61, T 70/62, and T 70/63, passim., P.R.O., that 88 of 
the 184 company ships clearing English customs, 1691-1713, 
were in the 50-150 ton range. Nine were under 50 tons and 
twenty were over 350 tons.
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alternative of selling his slaves at one of the company *s
11island agencies, most likely Nevis, Barbados, or Jamaica,
thus enabling him to return to England without venturing
across the Caribbean to Chesapeake Bay. The privateers of
the Atlantic ports of Europe, particularly the French
adventurers of the Gulf of St. Malo, easily intercepted the
company ships as they sailed out of the English Channel and
12turned southward. The captain’s first obligation when
under attack was to attempt to escape; but if escape was 
impossible, he was instructed "to throw overboard the Let­
ters and pacquetts on board so that the Enemy may not by
them come to any knowledge of your Company’s castle fac-
1^
torys or affairs." If any company ship was seized by
pirates or any enemy man-of-war during the outward-bound 
voyage, the captain, at last resort, was authorized to 
"Redeeme your ship and Cargoe on the best tearmes you pos­
sibly can, not exceeding fifteen hundred pounds sterling."
He could allow one officer to return to France with the 
French navy, if necessary, and the company advised that they
l;LR.A.C. to John Addis, 26 Oct. 1703, T 70/43, 183, 
P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. John Mitchell, 16 March 1720/21, 
T 70/64, 47-50, P.R.O.
12Davies, Royal African Company, 20 5.
13R.A.C. to Tozer, 11 Jan. 1703, T 70/62, 246-251, 
P.R.O. The "castle factories" referred to above were the 
company's forts scattered along the Guinea coast of Africa, 
for example, Cape Coast Castle.
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would reimburse the captain for the ransom when he 
14returned.
A survey of company records and other sources indi­
cates that the fears of seizure were well-founded. One 
contemporary author estimates that French privateers took 
approximately one-fourth of all company ships dispatched
from England during the years of war, accounting for total
15losses in company goods and ships approaching £300,000,
while another sets the company’s total losses during King
William's War at £400,000.^ Though no composite of
seizures exists, at least seventeen ships carrying Royal
African Company cargoes to Virginia were reported seized
between the years 169 4 and 1708, over four of which were
years of peace. The Averilla and the Three Brothers, each
320 tons, and three smaller ships were taken by the French
17in 1694, as were eight of the smaller variety in 1703.
Much less certain were the circumstances surrounding the 
disappearance of the seventy-ton Gambia Galley, carrying in 
excess of one hundred company slaves from Sierra Leone, 
in the waters between Capt St. Antoine and Virginia in
14 .R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas Arnall, 2 Nov. 1704,
T 70/63, 4l, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. Edward Tomlin,
9 April 1706, ibid., 47.
15Davies, Royal African Company, 205.
■^Scott, Constitution and Finance, II, 21-22.
17Davies, Royal African Company, 192.
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181702. The company feared the possibility that the Gambia 
had been stolen by her captain, just as it feared similar 
treachery in the winter of 1705/6 by the Captain of the 
Phoenix whom Gawin Corbin had highly recommended. For­
tunately for Corbin, who appeared already to have strained 
his relationship with the company’s London office, the com­
pany discovered by the following February that the loss of
19the Phoenix was the result of French seizure. The French
were also blamed for the 1707 loss of the Dearing and John 
20galleys and the Chester man-of-war, the latter of interest
to the company because of the 51 bills of exchange which.
21were on board when she disappeared. The only instance
recorded in company annals of the loss of a Virginia-bound
ship having been expressly attributed to privateers is the
221708 seizure of H. M. S. Dunbarton, but it appears likely 
that pirates and privateers were responsible for many more 
losses.
l8R.A.C. to Benjamin Alford, 10 March 1701/2,
T 70/58, 29-31, P.R.O.
19R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705, T 70/58, 211, 
P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Feb. 1705/6, ibid., 217.
2 0Donnan, ed., Documents, I I , .78.
21R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 May 1707, T 70/58, 289,
P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 18 Nov. 1707, ibid. , 310-311; 
R.A.C. to Corbin, 15 Dec. 1707, ibid. , 311.
22R.A.C. to Capt. William Cook [sic ], 30 April,
4 and 21 May 170 8, T 70/9, P.R.O.
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Harassment, the threat of capture, and actual mate­
rial losses inflicted by the enemy prompted the company's 
attempts to utilize the protection which the government 
provided the wartime tobacco trade. The convoy system was
made mandatory in the English Chesapeake trade according
21to a 1690 decree from the Parliament, though permits for
unaccompanied voyages were granted and resulted in the loss
24of many vessels at sea during this era. By the turn of
the century, the convoy system was widely accepted as nthe
only possible expedient in time of war for securing the
25Atlantic shipping lanes of English commerce." The 
African Company records abound with references to convoys
26used in transporting company slaves to Virginia; but 
because the convoys were tailored to the tobacco trade, the 
company found difficulty in adapting their slave-trading
23Cal. S. P. Col., 1689-92, 244.
2 4Middleton, "The Chesapeake Convoy System, 1662- 
1763," Wm. and Mary Qtly., 3d Ser., II (1946), 187.
25Ibid.., 186.
26See R.A.C. to Capt. Arnall, 16 Nov. 1704, T 70/63, 
42, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Gawin Corbin, 18 Oct. 1705, T 70/58, 
201-202; R.A.C. to Capt. Cooke, 9 April 1706, T 70/63, 
80-83, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 1707, T 70/58, 
277-279, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to James and John Arnold, 28 Aug. 
1707, T 70/44, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas Mackley,
28 Jan. 1706/7, T 70/63, 111-113, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to 
Capt. John Yeamens, 2 Dec. 1707, T 70/44, P.R.O.; R.A.C. 
to Henry Feilding [sic], 9 March 1703, T 70/58, 124. See 
also T 70/43, T 70/62, passim.
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voyages to the protection provided by the Royal Navy. The
two followed different routes, the tobacco fleets generally
having no reason to stray south of the Madeira Islands, the
slavers pushing almost due south to the Guinea coast for
their human cargo. On only one occasion is there evidence
in the company's Virginia records of a convoy from England
to Guinea, that being in 1704 when H.M.S. Oxford and
H-. M.S. Hastings were known to be available to the slaving
27voyage of the Angola frigate. At best, the captain of the
slaver could hope to follow the first available convoy out
of the English Channel and, as he was advised, "keep company
with the said Convoy as far as you can without prejudice to 
2 8your voyage." On occasion, the captain could follow a 
tobacco convoy as far as the Madeiras, there perhaps pur­
chasing some wine for use as a "dash," or bribe, in the
29African trade, and putting his ship "in a defensive 
20posture" for the voyage through the Ca.pe Verde Islands to 
the company factories in Africa.
The company slavers normally required five to seven 
weeks to sail from England to the Guinea Coast, and they
27R.A.C. to Arnall, 16 Nov. 1704, T 70/63, 42, P.R.O.
p o
R.A.C. to Capt. Joseph Bemister, 3 Nov. 1702,
T 70/62, 162, P.R.O.
29R.A.C. to Arnall, 16 Nov. 1704, T 70/63, 42,
P.R.O.; see also T 70/1225, 7-
•^R.A.C. to Capt. John Tozer, 11 Jan. 1703, T 70/62, 
246; R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas Mackley, 28 Jan. 1706/7,
T 70/63, HI, P.R.O.
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allowed from one to three months to collect their cargo of 
31slaves. The next leg of the triangular voyage was vir­
tually unprotected, because there was less likelihood of 
their locating a British convoy westward across the Atlantic 
than of their being discovered by pirates or a hostile 
privateer or man-of-war. A stop in the West Indies often 
proved commercially advantageous to the Virginia-bound 
slaver and provided a safety-valve for the slave cargo if 
the captain thought he could get better prices in the 
islands than in Virginia, or if he could not arrive in 
Virginia before the tobacco had been sold. But, because the
British chose not to protect their Caribbean trade with the
32American mainland at this time, the captain found little
^See R.A.C. to Capt. Arnall, 16 Nov. 170*1, T 70/63, 
42, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Gawin Corbin, 18 Oct. 1705, T 70/58, 
201-202; R.A.C. to Capt. Cooke, 9 April 1706, T 70/63, 80- 
83, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 1707, T 70/58, 277- 
279, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to James and John Arnold, 28 Aug. 1707,
T 70/44, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas Mackley, 28 Jan. 
1706/7, T 70/63, 111-113, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. John 
Yeamens, 2 Dec. 1707, T 70/44, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Henry 
Feilding [sic], 9 March 1703, T 70/58, 124. See also 
T 70/43, T 70/62, passim.
■^Middleton, "Chesapeake Convoy System," 195-197, 
reminds his readers that the convoy system was an imperial­
istic venture, "established and maintained primarily for the 
protection of the commerce of the mother country. . . .
Insofar as colonial vessels used . . . [the sea lanes from
England] . . . they were afforded the same protection
enjoyed by British vessels." After heavy losses of unpro­
tected ships, the company proposed in 1704 two West Indian 
convoys per year. See also Davies, Royal African Company, 
210 .
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hope of convoy for the final stint to Virginia. In some
cases of imminent danger, the company ordered the captain
to sell his slaves in the West Indies, load with sugar, and
return to England, rather than risk the Caribbean journey,
13unless a convoy presented itself.
Once the company slaver had reached Virginia safely, 
the captain could hope to attach his ship to the return 
voyage of the huge Chesapeake tobacco convoy. Unfortunately 
for the Royal African Company, it encountered the same prob­
lem in attempting to coordinate its efforts with the convoy 
as did the Virginia planters— unreliability. No master plan 
governed the tobacco convoy to the Chesapeake colonies, with 
the result that there was no fixed date or fixed number of 
convoys in a given year. The planters were forced either to 
patronize the season’s first convoy, at exorbitant freight
rates and low tobacco prices, or risk the loss of their crop
34
by gambling upon the arrival of a second convoy. Like­
wise, the captains of the company ships were forced to play
the same odds, and their return voyages were often delayed
35
by waiting for a convoy during time of war.
33R.A.C. to Addis, 26 Oct. 1703, T 70/^3, 183, P.R.O.
3^Middleton, "Chesapeake Convoy System," 186-195; 
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 295-
3^R.A.C. to Capt. Wm. Cook [sic], 22 Sept. 1707,
T 70/9, P.R.O.; Davies, Royal African Company, 207-208.
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Waiting on convoys was only one of several possible 
delays which faced the company cargoes. The British govern­
ment periodically ordered embargoes against merchant ship­
ping, the most notable during this era being the general 
embargoes of 1689 and 1702, at the outbreak, respectively, 
of King William’s and Queen Anne's wars. It Is impossible 
to determine the extent to which the embargoes hindered the 
delivery of company slaves to Virginia, but records show
that at least three ships were considerably delayed by a 
171707 embargo. Even during the general embargoes, pro­
visions were made to allow selected vessels to break the ban 
by supplying each with a letter of marque, referred to by
o  Q
the captains of that era as "the Queens lettre."-3 Among
Virginia-bound company cargoes which apparently had been
39granted letters of marque were the Katherine and the
40Thomas and John, allowed to pass in early 1702, the Sea-
4l 42ford, in 1705, and the Bridgewater on its voyage of 1707.
36Ibid., 209.
27Donnan, ed., Documents, II, 78.
3^R.A.C. to Capt. Cook [sic], 22 Sept. 1707* T 70/9*
P.R.O.
^Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, 65* citing Acts of the 
Privy Council, II, 220-221.
110 Ibid., II, 4, n. 2.
2|1R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 1707* T 70/58, 277-279*
P.R.O.
il 2
R .A .C . to Cook [sic], 22 Sept. 1707* T 70/9* P.R.O.
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However, even the "Queen’s lettre" did not provide absolute 
assurance of breaking the embargo as is demonstrated by a 
1705 petition on behalf of the owners of the Dolphin and 
the Mermaid, both of which had delivered slaves to Virginia. 
The owners complained that the ships had been detained in 
colonial ports despite the letters of marque which they
4 3
carried.
Other wartime restrictions which in turn dealt blows
to the company’s Virginia trade were the various emergency
impositions of the Royal Navy. In order to assure that it
had kept an adequate pool of trained manpower for the naval
campaigns against the'French, the British government placed
a limit on the maximum size and composition of the merchant 
44marine. Crew size was particularly critical to the 
African slavers which required relatively more sailors than
45
the vessels of the Mediterranean or Baltic trade. Once 
the company was able to recruit a crew, it was anxious to 
maintain it intact and to secure it from impressment. In 
1707i for example, the John and Thomas, Alexander, and Mary, 
all large ships sent by the company to Virginia via the 
Guinea slaving factories, lost their crews to the Royal Navy 
which planned to use them for an invasion of
41Petition of Sir Richard Levett and William Lone to 
the Queen, 18 Feb. 17053 Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, 84.
44Davies, Royal African Company, 209.
45
Ibid.., 193; see also above, p. 72.
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46Scotland. Any time a British man-of-war anchored at a
colonial port, including Virginia, its captain had the right
to apply to the colonial governor for the authority to
4 7impress additions to his crew. William Byrd II noted in
his diary in 1709 that his sea sloop had lost several men to
48the Navy under similar circumstances. In addition to 
these mandatory losses of merchant sailors, the company 
incurred numerous other losses of personnel when its crew 
members deserted. Fear of impressment was so great among 
the mariners that they frequently deserted as soon as their 
ships made port, with the result that government action in 
this way, though Indirect, further weakened the company's 
manpower.
This manpower drain from the merchant marine to the 
Royal Navy proved debilitating in mid-voyage to some of the 
company’s efforts to transport slaves to Virginia. In 1695, 
for example, London merchant Arthur Baily, who frequently 
traded with the company, complained that the British Navy
46Board of Trade Report on the Trade to Africa, 1709 3 
"Answer of the Separate Traders to Severall Queries, 31 Dec. 
1708," Donnan, ed., Documents, II, 78.
^Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 275-281, states that "the 
mariner was at all times subject to impressment into service 
aboard vessels of the Royal Navy."
48"The sea sloop is safe arrived, . . . Two of her
men were pressed by the man-of-war, not withstanding the 
proclamation." June 29, 17093 Byrd, Secret Diary . . .
1709-1712, 54.
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had at Barbados "impressed so many of his men as to make it
unsafe to proceed to Virginia" with his cargo of Guinea
slaves. Baily’s ship was so handicapped as a result of his
loss of sailors that he had to recruit men in the islands
before he sailed for London. His ship, undermanned by an
inexperienced crew, was seized shortly thereafter by two
French privateers at a loss to the owners of over 25>000
49
pounds sterling. Losses because of shipwrecks were 
similarly often the results of wartime restrictions on the 
merchant marine, which was forced "to carry a high propor­
tion of unskilled landsmen"; this was particularly dangerous 
when delays caused by waiting on the tobacco cargo fre­
quently forced the company slavers to navigate the Atlantic
50to England in bad weather.
B. The Trade, 1689-1697
The two decades following the Restoration of the 
Stuart dynasty brought such little demand for slaves in 
Virginia that the Royal Adventurers and their joint-stock 
successors, the Royal African Company, hardly considered 
the Chesapeake area a market for slaves. Virginia was mired 
in one of its long and frequent depressions, which saw 
tobacco prices drop to a low of one-quarter pence per pound,
49 ^
Stock, Proceedings, II, 136 n., citing MSS, House
of Lords, XV, 98.
•^Davies, Royal African Company, 207-208.
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the result of overproduction and mercantile legislation
strictly enforced by the mother country. The domestic
disturbances which began in 1676 with Nathaniel Bacon’s
rebellion, itself the partial result of these economic
strains, practically halted what remained of the Virginia 
51trade. Profits were so scarce that, even if the poorer
planters bought slaves, as Wertenbaker argues, neither they
nor many other Virginians could have afforded to invest in
slave labor during this depression. Despite England’s
increasing domination of the trade which had previously
belonged to the Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish, the slave
population of England’s Virginia colony increased slowly
from approximately two thousand in 1671 to three thousand
5 2during the l680’s. In 167^, the company managed to import 
650 Africans to Virginia, and although their operations 
continued on a minor scale, their 1676 scheme of trade 
included Virginia as one of four potential New World mar­
kets . ^
By 1680, the return of internal stability and the 
rise of tobacco prices to the pre-depression level of
^Bruce, Economic History, II, 70 * 73-76.
5 2The 1671 figure is quoted by Hening, e d ., Statutes, 
II, 51^, from a report of Governor Berkeley; the latter is 
taken from an estimate by Governor Culpeper in Greene and 
Harrington, American Population, 137-
5^Donnan, e d ., Documents, IV, 5*
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two pence per pound accompanied the recovery of the tobacco 
trade; and the supply* demand, and prices of slaves began to 
increase in Virginia as planters’ profits and the flow of 
trade made the importation of slave labor again commer­
cially feasible. But the company’s response was feeble.
The three ships they dispatched* 1684-1686* the Sarah *
Two Friends, and Speedwell * were hardly adequate to satisfy
S 4even the relatively small demand of the Virginia planters.
So consistently did the African Company overlook the demand
for slaves in Virginia that the separate traders broke their
monopoly and delivered slaves in greater numbers than the
company; the combined sources brought to Virginia an annual
average of between one and two hundred slaves during these 
55years.
The major reason why the Royal African Company 
appeared to ignore the potential market in Virginia during 
the 1680’s was the success of the British slave trade to 
the West Indies. Though demand for slaves in Virginia 
generally increased over the course of the last quarter of 
the seventeenth century* it remained inferior to the demand 
in the sugar-producing islands to the south. Neither the
q 2i
R.A.C. to Captain Marmaduke Goodhand, 12 Jan. l685j 
T 70/61* ff. 3 vo.-4 ro., P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Goodhand*
23 Dec. 1686* ibid.* f. 30 ro. and vo.; Lists of Ships*
T 70/61* ff. l6 8 v o .-169 ro.* 170 vo.* P.R.O.; see also 
Middleton* Tobacco Coast * 135.
5 5Donna n* ed.* Documents * IV* 56 rrn. 1 and 2.
9 5
separate traders nor the African Company could afford to
transport slaves to Virginia before 1680, when prices in the
West_Indies ran much higher, and when West Indian planters
were complaining of the scarcity of slaves while Virginians
56appeared largely indifferent. The West Indian sugar trade
thrived during the Virginia tobacco depression, and even
after the recovery of tobacco prices in 1680, the Virginia
planters were unable to compete as potential buyers with
their rivals in the islands.
In 16 895 when King William joined the foes of
Louis XIV in the War of the League of Augsburg, the tone was
5 7set for a century of Anglo-French warfare. One result of 
this conflict was the retardation of transportation and 
business activity which hampered the slave trade to Virginia 
for the two succeeding decades. Convoys, embargoes, and 
impressment became a way of life for the company’s London 
office as well as for its seamen. Perhaps just as important 
in determining the company’s success in trading slaves to
56Ibid., 56, n. 3a citing also Beer, Old Colonial 
System, I , 367-368. ~
5 7Charles M. Andrews, "Anglo-French Commercial 
Rivalry, 1700-1750: The Western Phase, I," American His­
torical Review, XX (April, 1915)> 5^6, states: "At the
close of the seventeenth century France and England, the 
greatest states of the European world, after persistent 
efforts for forty years, had deprived the Dutch of their 
maritime and commercial supremacy. They now stood face to 
face, two powers actuated by like commercial and colonizing 
aims." See also Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 40.
Virginia were the economic influences which the Atlantic
warfare of the 1690s exerted on the Virginia economy. At
any given time, at least one of the European markets was
closed to Virginia tobacco; soaring freight and insurance
rates squeezed tobacco profits to the levels of depression;
the depression produced a spiral effect by bankrupting some
tobacco merchants and by tightening the credit available to
Virginia planters; planters in a desperate struggle to
regain prosperity increased tobacco production and attempted
to diversify their economic liA/elihood by manufacturing.
Despite a recovery from the conditions of the tobacco
depression of the 1660s and 1670s, the Virginia tobacco
trade was still depressed when the war of the League of
5 8Augsburg broke out in I689 • This war, known in the 
Americas as King William's War, only aggravated the depres­
sion and left the Virginia market even less attractive to 
the African Company. Trans-Atlantic commercial ships became 
a rare sight in Virginia, and freight rates were by 1691 as
high as 15 pounds sterling, almost three times the normal 
59rate. During several of these years, the Virginia tobacco 
fleet failed to arrive in sufficient strength to transport 
the crop, so apprehensive were shippers and merchants of
5 8Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial 
System, 7•
59Bassett, "Relation Between the Virginia Planter and 




capture and of the credit potential of Virginians.
Several documents partially explain the quality of
Virginia as a slave market during King William’s War. A
1692 petition complained of an impending labor shortage
brought on by a combination of factors— the expiration of
the indentures of a large number of white servants in
Virginia and the failure of the company to import slaves
61since the outbreak of the war. If a labor shortage truly
existed and if Virginians possessed the means and the desire
to correct this shortage, then the company was largely
unaware of it. Although they dispatched large numbers of
slavers to Africa and the West Indies during King William’s
War, only the Jeffrey, in 1693* is in their records as hav-
6 2ing reached Virginia with a cargo of slaves. Two years 
later the London office explained trade conditions to 
William Sherwood, who had replaced Christopher Robinson as 
Virginia agent in January 1695. "At present we have no 
concerns in Your Parts," they stated, "but upon the return 
of Peaceable times tis probable we may." Obviously the 
company at least recognized Virginia as a potential market, 
as they had in their 1676 scheme: "If anything should
60 *Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial
System, 7 .
61 "Orders of the Privy Council, 3 Nov. 1692," Donnan, 
ed., Documents, IV, 65-
6 2Ships in Service of the Royal African Company of 
England, T 70/61, ff. 165 vo.-l66 r o ., P.R.O.
9 8
occurr in respect to the demand of Negroes or any thing else
6 1materiall we hope you’l comunicate it to us."
c » The Trade, 1698-1701
On January 9, 169 8, approximately three months after
the event, "the welcome news reached Governor Andros that
the long war against Prance had ended with the Treaty of
Ryswick and that ships bound for England need no longer
64sail in convoys from Hampton Roads." The end of hostil­
ities stimulated the growth of the European economy, 
enabling England greatly to improve its commercial status 
among the imperial powers by expanding its overseas trade.
In classic mercantilistic fashion, Virginia was both bene­
factor and beneficiary of this postwar economic surge; the 
expansion of world markets and the newly found freedom of 
the Atlantic shipping lanes reinvigorated the tobacco trade 
by increasing demand and prices and lowering the costs of 
transportation and insurance. Virginia planters once again 
began to taste prosperity. Profits appeared to be limited 
only by volume of production; and as a result a great new
thrust for land and labor developed in Virginia in the
6 5closing years of the seventeenth century.
63R.A.C. to William Sherwood, 14 Jan. 1695, T 70/57, 
ff. 120 vo.-121 ro.
64Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 352, citing Cal. St. 
P. Col., 1697-1698, 90, 132.
65Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial 
System, 5-18; Wertenbaker, Planters, 115-133*
9 9
English commercial ships had begun to appear in 
Chesapeake Bay with more frequency in late 169 7, delivering 
English manufactures in exchange for relatively scarce 
hogsheads of tobacco and bills of exchange which were granted 
more freely than they had been at any time since the Restora­
tion. The following year, 169 8, was an exceptionally good 
year for tobacco;^ and because of the high prices and the 
necessity for laborers to harvest the plentiful crop, the 
suppliers began to deliver Africans to Virginia on an 
entirely larger scale, so that the slave population of
rj
Virginia doubled in the next decade.
Most of the responsibility for doubling the slave
population of Virginia belongs to individuals not affiliated
with the Royal African Company. These separate traders
supplied almost 90 per cent of Virginia’s slaves in the
6 8decade following the compromise act of 1698. In contrast 
to its past performance, the African Company became aware 
of the Virginia market during this decade and began an 
attempt to reap the benefits of the Virginia planters’
66Ibid., 120.
^Middleton, Tobacco Coasjb, 13^ ff.
^ P o r  totals of slaves delivered to Virginia in this 
period, see "Report of the Board of Trade to the House of 
Commons, 19 Dec. 1709," Donnan, ed., Documents, II, 106; 
see also "Negroes Imported Into Virginia, 1699-1708," 
ibid., IV, 172-173* The law, 9 & 10 Wm. c. 26, is printed 
in ibid., I, 421-^29.
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demands for slaves. This awareness resulted in part from 
the outcry of Virginians who had aired their grievances dur­
ing the Parliamentary debates of the 1690s. Virginia 
planters and merchants had joined the opponents of the 
monopoly in accusing the Royal African Company of inepti­
tude; and regardless of the degree of accuracy of their 
petitions, charging that the monopoly had failed almost 
completely to supply the colony, the Virginians succeeded
in confronting the company’s directors with the discontent
6 9which company operations had provoked in the colony.
The Treaty of Ryswick brought the conditions of peace which 
the London office had told agent William Sherwood they were 
anticipating; now the company understood that it had a 
genuine opportunity to improve its Virginia trade.
The rise of Virginia as a market for slaves during 
the peaceful interval of 1697-1702 is documented by scat­
tered records . The headrights for the years 1699 and 1700
show that 3^9 and 229 Negro slaves were imported, respec-
70tively, in those years. Two letters written by 
Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson in August 1700 reveal a new 
enthusiasm in official circles for the trade. "There are as 
many buyers as Negroes," Nicholson reported on August 1,
^Stock, ed., Proceedings, II, 160-162.
70' U. S. Bureau of the Census, His tori cal Statistics 
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington,
i960), 7W -
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"and I think that if 2,000 were imported . . . there would
71be substantial buyers," Writing to the Board of Trade
several weeks later, Nicholson wrote cautiously of the new
prosperity. He wished, said the Lieutenant-Governor, "that
the Royal African Company and others that trade thither
would send in some [slaves] and while people have money to
buy some, for it may happen that if Negroes don’t come
within a year or two that people may dispose of their money
7 2some other way."
By 1701 the company was expressing to its employees a 
newly optimistic assessment of the Virginia market. In 
separate letters written the same day, the London office 
redirected a slaver to Virginia, then explained the action 
to the captain. Writing to the agents in Barbados, the com­
pany informed them that they were to order the frigate Evans
77to Virginia instead of Jamaica, its original destination. 
Explaining the change, the company wrote to Captain Prowde: 
"Since your departure wee have considered which may be the 
best Market for the Sale of Your Negroes, and are of opinion 
now that they will sell much better at Virginia than at
^Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, 67 n., citing Cal. St. 
P. Col., 1700, 452. Hemphill, Virginia and the English 
Commercial System, 21, believes that "the Governor erred on 
the side of understatement."
72Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, 67 n., citing Cal. St. 
P. Col., 1700, 497.
7 7R.A.C. to Messrs. Horne, Thomas, and Willy,
23 Oct. 1701, T 70/58, 16-18, P.R.O.
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Jamaica where wee first intended."
If the company’s attitude toward the Virginia market 
became more optimistic with the advent of peace in 1698, 
this attitude had been tempered by a decade of conditioning 
to the effects of warfare and by the uncertainty of the cur­
rent fragile peace in Europe. Even in 1701 the company’s 
new optimism began to waver as court intrigues and new 
treaties foreshadowed the return of convoys, embargoes, and 
depression. "We are at present under some apprehentions of 
a War," they instructed agent Edward Hill, who was replacing 
the deceased James Howell in the James River agency, "but 
upon encouragement, we may make some consignations to you." 
And in the fall of that year the company officials continued 
to express to their agents their anticipation of the 
approaching European conflict: "Wee . . . are unwilling to
run farther into shipping at present untill wee know
t~T S'
whether wee Shall have peace or war."
D * The Trade, 1702-1713
Peace in Europe was indeed short-lived, interrupted 
soon after these letters were written by the conflict some
^R.A.C. to Capt. Prowde, 23 Oct. 1701, ibid. , 18.
^R.A.C. to Edward Gill [sic], 3 April 1701,
T 70/57, ff. 172 ro. and vo., P.R.O.
^R.A.C. to Messrs. Horne, Thomas, and Willy,
23 Oct. 1701, T 70/58, 17, P.R.O.
77consider the first of the "world wars," Late in 1701 the 
forces of Eugene, Prince of Savoy, invaded Italy and offi­
cially began the War of the Spanish Succession, the 
twelve-year Hapsburg-Bourbon struggle for the Spanish 
throne, the European balance of power, and the great 
colonial empires. The only English military action in the 
New World during "Queen Anne’s War," as the colonists knew 
it, was a defensive phase in the Caribbean in which Admiral 
Benbow and ships of the Royal Navy attempted to protect
British islands and trade against Chateaurenault’s strong
7 ft
French fleet and bands of French and Spanish privateers.
Queen Anne’s War subjected Virginia to circumstances similar
to those which had prevailed during the preceding war: a
contraction of markets for their tobacco. Increased costs of
shipment, lower prices of tobacco, particularly the Orinoco
79variety, and a scarcity of European manufactured goods.
The tobacco trade suffered immensely, debt again became 
widespread, and the depression in Virginia at times reached
8o
depths unknown even during King William’s War. Yet the 
reactions of many Virginia planters to this depression
77Paul A. Beik and Laurence Lafore, Modern Europe 
(New York, 1959)3 182.
^ J . H. Parry and P. M. Sherlock, A Short History of 
the West Indies (New York, 1966), 99-101.
^Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 396.
80Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial 
System, 26.
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ensured the success of the slave trade, at least as long as
they were able to continue their buying tactics.
Though some Virginians made serious attempts to
diversify their production during this depression, and some
successfully harvested other crops, the majority of the
planters appeared to have reasoned that they could best
improve their immediate economic situations by cultivating
more tobacco, compensating for low prices by increasing
production. Consequently, the traders, now familiar with
the Virginia market, continued to meet the demand with
greater energy than they had during the previous war, the
Virginia labor force continued to expand, and tobacco pro-
81duction rapidly grew.
Despite the fact that the African Company considered
Virginia superior to Jamaica as a market for its slaves at
the turn of the century, it continued to import a much
larger volume of Africans into the West Indies than to the
8 2Chesapeake colonies throughout the period. While the 
separate traders were taking advantage of their new legal 
recognition by supplying the Virginia planters with laborers 
in ever-increasing numbers, no ship is on record as having 
delivered Royal African Company slaves to Virginia from the 
end of King William's War until 1703* In June of that year,
O  "1
Ibid., 26-28; see also Nettels, Money Supply, 55*
82c .See above, p. 11.
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the Angola frigate delivered 9 2 Angolan slaves to agent 
Henry Fielding at the York River and began a new spurt of
O q
company activity in the Chesapeake colonies.  ^ The next
ship in the company’s service to reach Virginia was the
Postillion galley which, although smaller than the Angola,
8 4brought 150 slaves to the York in 1704. Fielding, the 
company agent on the York River, died in that year, leaving 
the cargo of the Postillion to the management of his suc­
cessor, Gawin Corbin.
The company correspondence with Colonel Corbin con­
cerning his duties in 170 5 explains some of the difficulties 
which plagued the trade to Virginia during Queen Anne’s War. 
Even though many Virginians continued to depend upon 
imported African laborers to bolster their tobacco output,
and though Corbin had advised the company of a "great
8 5demand" for slaves in Virginia, the depression was pro­
gressively diminishing their ability to pay. Numerous 
references to protested bills of exchange indicate the 
tightening of credit and the mounting debt which resulted
83R.A.C. to Fielding, 4 March 1702/3, T 70/56, 57, 
P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Capt. Thomas Arnall, 21 July 1702,
T 70/62, 121-126, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Arnall, 28 July 1702, 
ibid., 129; R.A.C. to Col. Gawin Corbin, 29 Nov. 1706,
T 70/279, 11-18, P.R.O.; Lists of Ships, T 70/62, 273-274, 
P.R.O.; Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, 173*
84List of Ships, Postillion galley, T 70/62, 273- 
274, P.R.O.
85R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705, T 70/58, 211,
P.R.O.
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basically from the Virginians 1 inability to sell their
86tobacco profitably. The London merchants were becoming 
more discreet in screening their debtors as the sum of 
Virginia tobacco credits fell. As an example, the company 
office advised Corbin late in 1705 that the bills of 
exchange he submitted had not at that time been, accepted, 
"the Persons on whome they are Drawn haveing taken time to
O *~7
Consider whether they will accept or not."
In addition to the tightening of credit by London
merchants, the economic squeeze of the war era damaged the
Virginia market in another respect— the company slaves
brought unsatisfactory prices. As noted above, the company
blamed Colonel Corbin because the slaves "will not answer in
88their prices." But the blame for poor prices in 170 5 must 
be attributed largely to the tobacco depression, which left 
Virginia a market of willing but increasingly less capable 
buyers .
Regardless of the weakening of the market and the 
general deterioration of the trans-Atlantic commerce, the 
African Company and the separate traders were able to import 
a larger number of slaves into Virginia during the year 170 5
^R.A.C. to Corbin, 26 April 17053 ibid., 175-176; 
R.A.C. to Corbin, 15 May 17053 ibid., 18^; R.A.C. to Corbin, 
20 Feb. 1705/6, ibid., 217-
^R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Dec. 17053 ibid. , 211.
^R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705* ibid., 211; see 
also R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Feb. 1705/6, ibid., 217.
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than during any year between 1689 and 1713* A total of nine
ships, including three sailing for the company, delivered
more than sixteen hundred slaves to Virginia that year.
The Dorothy galley was the first company slaver of 1705,
89arriving in June with 75 slaves; in August the Angola
frigate returned, this time reporting a larger cargo of 
1 90214 slaves, and during the same month, after a troubled
voyage, the Phoenix sloop delivered a cargo of 51 from 
91Gambia.
The year 1705 was exceptional, not only because of 
the large volume of slaves imported in the face of a severe 
tobacco depression, but also because of one special circum­
stance which apparently contributed to the boom— the import 
duty on slaves expired. The Virginia Assembly had first 
passed in 1699 a twenty shilling head tax on slaves with the 
expressed purpose of raising revenue for rebuilding of the 
state house which had been destroyed by fire. The legisla­
tors were also motivated to some extent by the desire to
^R.A.C. to Capt. Edward Tomlin, 16 Nov. 1704,
T 70/63, 43-46, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 18 Oct. 1705,
T 70/58, 201-202, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Tomlin, 9 April 1706, 
ibid., 47; Lists of Ships, T 70/63, P.R.O.; Donnan, ed., 
Documents, IV, 173*
90R.A.C. to Arnall, 2 Nov. 1704, T 70/63, 41, P.R.O.; 
R.A.C. to Arnall, 16 Nov. 1704, ibid., 42; R.A.C. to Corbin, 
26 April 1705, T 70/58, 175-176, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin,
20 Dec. 1705, ibid., 211; R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Feb. 1705/6 , 
ibid.., 217; Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, 173*
9 1Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, 173*
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limit the importation of slaves, either because of genuine
fear of the social and economic effects of the uncontrolled
growth of the "dangerous population," or because they hoped
to increase the value of their own slave holdings by limit-
9 2ing importation. Regardless of the motives of the legis­
lators, their tax does not appear on the surface to have 
acted as a deterrent to the slave trade; the import totals
continued to rise even though the law was renewed in 1701 
■ 9 2and 170 4. J However, it is possible that, despite the 
growth in absolute numbers of the slaves, the duty acted as 
a relative deterrent— perhaps an even greater growth in the 
slave population would have ensued without the tax. In 
April 170 5 the 20 shilling duty expired. It was renewed in 
October, but did not take effect until May 1706, which left 
more than a year during which slaves were imported into 
Virginia duty-free. This proved a fruitful period for the 
slave traders. Governor Nott, writing to the Board of Trade 
in December 1705* reported: "I understand that there hath
been brought into the country this summer about 1,800
92R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Dec. 1705, T 70/58, 211, 
P.R.O.; R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 Feb. 1705/6, ibid.., 217; Copy 
Book of Bills, T 70/279, 3, P.R.O.; Donnan, ed., Documents, 
IV, 173* For the view that the purpose of the tax was to 
limit the "dangerous population," see James Curtis Ballagh,
A History of Slavery in Virginia (Baltimore, 1902), 11; the 
opposite view can be found in Donnan, ed., Documents, IV,
66 n .
^%ening, ed., Statutes, III, 193-195, records the 
1699 law.
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Negroes. . . . All these except a few are imported since the
9 4imposition Act expired." The Governor may simply have
been informing the Board of Trade and not necessarily
pointing out the lapse in legislation as cause for the heavy
summer traffic in Africans; but whether or not the change is
attributed to the absence of a head tax, nearly two thousand
slaves came into Virginia during the thirteen-month lapse,
much larger than any annual total during the years under
9 5consideration.
Accelerated by this "black tide" of labor, production
continued to spiral, enabling Virginians to export a record
quantity of tobacco in 1706; but, ironically, because of the
basic unsoundness of the economy, a turn of fate converted
this great harvest into a disaster. The huge fleet of
nearly three hundred ships, reputedly the largest ever to
leave the tobacco colonies, hauled away most of the forty
thousand hogsheads shipped between the summers of 1705 and 
s’ 9 61706. During its winter Atlantic crossing, the fleet was 
victimized by French privateers and bad weather to the 
extent of losing at sea 30 ships and almost fifteen thousand
9 4Hening, ed., Statutes, III, 212-213:, contains an 
account of the 1701 renewal, and the 170 4 law is found 
ibid., 225•
^Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, citing C. 0. 5/1361, 421.
^Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 396; see also Middle­
ton, Tobacco Coast^ 244-245 .
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9 7hogsheads of tobacco. Many planters and merchants suf­
fered from the loss; and yet so restricted were European 
outlets that the remainder of the tobacco Inundated the 
London market. Unable to reexport the tobacco and unwilling 
to absorb the losses, London merchants retaliated on the one
front where they held the initiative by tightening credit to 
9 8the limit.
The combined effects of the disasters of 1706 and the 
extreme measures of retrenchment by the merchants against 
the depressed and glutted tobacco market precipitated the 
most dramatic substantive changes in the Virginia economy 
since the outbreak of King William’s War. Whereas credit 
had been advanced to Virginians with progressively closer 
scrutiny through 1705, it was now discontinued. The mer­
chants began methodically to protest all bills of exchange 
not covered by credit already on their books, and Virginians 
were, therefore, no longer permitted to purchase English 
imports on speculation of a profitable tobacco crop the 
following season. Because advance credit was no longer 
available, and because of the dearth of ships in Chesapeake 
Bay, English manufactured items became so scarce that many 
Virginians resorted to growing cotton, wool, and flax in
o 7
Parliaments of Great Britain, House of Lords, 
December 17, 1707, Stock, ed., Proceedings, III, 156-157*
q 3
 ^ Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial 
Systern, 26-29 *
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order to produce cloth from which to fashion their own 
99clothes. The new difficulty in procuring clothing meant 
that the maintenance of slaves, who could not usually pro­
duce their clothing as they could their food, became a 
greater burden to the planter than it had been in the 
past.^^ "Debt" had always been measured on an arbitrary 
chronological scale by the planter and the merchant, the 
quantity of debt depending upon the particular point in time 
where either man chose to begin or end his calculation. 
Immediately after a good tobacco crop had been sold by 
British merchants, Virginia debt was at a minimum. But 1706 
was a year of poor profits; and when the merchants closed 
their books, refusing to honor any credit not previously 
existing, they trapped most Virginia planters deeply in 
debt. By any measure, the Virginia economy had been 
depressed for many years; but, with the exception of the
spontaneous tobacco riots of the 1680s and occasional less
10 2frenzied attempts to limit production of the weed, 
planters continued to increase their output throughout the 
depression. In 1706, when the English tobacco merchants
99Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 396.
100Nettels, Money Supply, 13^.
^Bassett, "Relation Between Virginia Planter and 
London Merchant," 568.
10 2Craven, Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth 
Century, 39 8 ff.
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salvaged their businesses from bankruptcy by closing their 
books, they forced many planters to face financial ruin from 
the one cause they had most frequently disregarded, over­
production of tobacco. Tobacco was now hardly worth the 
cost of shipping, and knowing that they were literally 
unable to earn a living by growing that traditionally sound
staple, Virginia planters began of necessity to curtail its
 ^ +-• 10 3production. J
A contemporary historian who elucidates the develop­
ments of the Virginia economy in the perspective of the 
English commerce of this period, and who emphasizes the 
importance of the "crisis” of 1706, also contends that
Virginians began in that year to limit their purchases of
10 *1slaves. The total volume of slaves imported in the
following years indicates a marked decrease in purchases in 
each year after the "flood" of 170 5; however, it is impos­
sible to know the degree to which the business decline can 
be attributed to a decision by Virginia planters to limit 
production. Undoubtedly, the downward trend of the Virginia 
slave trade was a product of the general deepening of 
depression, the effects of which included the ruin of 
increasingly larger numbers of Virginia planters and
10 3Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial 
System, 26 f f .; Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 396.
10 4Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial 
System, 26 ff.
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mounting pressure on the remainder.
According to their records, African Company sales did
decrease; they failed to deliver a cargo to Virginia from
August 170 5 until the Bridgewater anchored at the York River
10 5with 170, slaves from Gambia in August 1707* This period
of inactivity contrasts to the relatively brisk flow of
business in 17055 but instructions to agents and captains
reveal no change in company policy regarding Virginia
imports. Throughout Queen Anne's War, the company appears
to have taken a pragmatic approach to its Virginia market.
The company office, for example, warned Gawin Corbin in the
wake of the 1706 crisis that they were discouraged by poor
10 6payment resulting from so many bad bills of exchange; but 
if they knew that the English merchants had begun the cate­
gorical rejection of all bills not covered in advance, they 
did not acknowledge this information to Corbin. Since they 
must have been acutely aware of English finances, it can 
only be assumed that the company officials purposely avoided 
restricting Corbin unnecessarily, hoping that he could 
locate enough good risks to enable them to continue credit 
transactions at least on a small scale. In addition, the 
company had always been reluctant to change its credit
105R.A.C. to Capt. Wm. Cook [sic], 22 Sept. 1707,
T 70/9, P.R.O.; R.A.C. to William Thompson, 3 April 1708,
T .70/44, P.R.O.
10 R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 1707, T 70/58, 278,
P.R.O.
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policy3 even though recovering its capital was a constant
problem. Eliminating credit sales to debtors would have
further tarnished the company’s public image in the
colonies, and it would have eliminated practically all
potential customers. Meanwhile, knowing that "good bills"
were scarce, and hoping to recover some of the lost profit
10 7on the third leg of the voyage, the company issued Corbin
a new directive: "We have been so disappointed by Bills of
Exchange that we are willing that you should send us in our
owne ship some returnes in the best sort of tobacco proper
10 8for exportation." The African Company, of course, was
forced to depend upon the planters’ resources as well as 
their demands; and they knew that the Virginians’ demands 
often exceeded their ability to pay.
In 170 7 the company must have found it difficult to 
determine the best method of tapping the planters’ meager 
assets. Which medium of exchange was worth less— tobacco
10 7'The slave trading concerns traditionally hoped to 
profit from all three transactions of the triangular trade: 
the sale of European manufactured goods in Africa, the sale 
of African slaves in the New World, and the sale of New 
World agricultural products in Europe. During the tobacco 
depressions, when prices were low and European markets 
glutted with the weed, the Royal African Company chose bills 
of exchange in payment for slaves, avoiding shipments of 
tobacco and thereby forfeiting the third potential profit.
108R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 1707. T 70/58, 278,
P.R.O.
115
which probably could not be sold, or bills which probably
would be rejected? The company office appeared to leave
this rather arbitrary decision to the Virginia agent who was
free to make the most advantageous arrangements possible in
a given situation. Corbin utilized both media in processing
the Bridgewater. By the end of September, a month after the
109arrival of the ship, he had sold 140 of its 170 slaves, 
a fact which, in itself, proves that demand for slaves in 
Virginia had not in any sense been eliminated by 1707. 
Despite the glutted tobacco markets and the economic dis­
aster of the previous season, Corbin loaded the slaver with 
tobacco for the return voyage. Because large quantities of 
tobacco had been left in the colonies each year for want of 
ships, and because there was no Virginia fleet in 1707, it
is probable that the tobacco carried by the Bridgewater
\ 110 
would not ^ otherwise have been exported. A year later,
Corbin used the second method of payment, forwarding
approximately 124 bills of exchange which totalled over
3,500 pounds sterling as payment for the Bridgewater1s slave
cargo.'1''*"'1' The Virginia planters obviously hoped that their
tobacco credits would have been sufficient by September 1708
■^^R.A.C. to Capt. Cook [sic], 22 Sept. 1707,
T 70/9, P.R.O.
^■^Middleton, "Chesapeake Convoy System," 188.
111Copy Book of Bills, 16 June 1708, T 70/279, 36, 
P.R.O.; 10 Dec. 1708, ibid., 39-42.
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to accommodate their bills. The fact that the majority of 
the Bridgewater's bills of exchange were protested indi­
cates that neither system of payment was functioning well in 
1707; the tobacco cargo was still worth little and credit 
remained extremely tight in England.
The story of the African Company trade to Virginia 
between the 1707 voyage of the Bridgewater and the Treaty 
of Utrecht, which ended Queen Anne's War six years later, is 
one of decided inactivity. The company's London office had 
dispatched the Seaford to Virginia later in 1707, hut her 
captain, Thomas Mackley, exercised his prerogative by 
rerouting his ship to Jamaica because he found it impossible
to reach the Chesapeake shore before October, the estab-
112lished deadline. The Seaford thus failed to reach
Virginia, and while various merchant ships and men-of-war
continued to transport the company's correspondence and
bills of exchange to Virginia, as they had done during peace 
113and war, the Bridgewater was apparently the last ship to
112For an explanation of the deadline imposed by the 
Royal African Company for delivering slaves to Virginia, 
see above, p. 58.
11 Q
JThe ship Corbin delivered bills to Colonel Corbin, 
R.A.C. to Corbin, 30 Sept. 1707, T 70/58, 304, P.R.O. The 
51 bills of exchange carried by the ill-fated Chester 
Man-of-War, R.A.C. to Corbin, 18 Nov. 1707, ibid., 310-311, 
were later transferred to H.M.S. Guernsey, 15 Dec. 1707, 
ibid., 311. Correspondence was carried to Corbin that same 
year aboard the Hannibal of Bristol, ibid.; the Bristol 
Man-of-War transported bills to Corbin, R.A.C. to Corbin,
11 March 1709, T 70/58, 378, as did the Martha, 8 Nov. 1710, 
ibid., 393, and the Page frigate, 14 Sept. 1711, ibid.,
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deliver African Company slaves to Virginia before the end of
,, 114the war.
The slaves supplied to the planters of Tidewater 
Virginia in the final years of Queen Anne's War were brought 
up the rivers by ships of the separate traders. The decline 
of Royal African Company activity in Virginia was only part 
of the company’s general descent during the years of its 
desperate attempt to maintain a grip on the last vestiges of 
monopoly. The company's financial status had never recov­
ered from the blow dealt it by the Revolution of 1689 which 
heaped discredit on all Royal monopolies and negated the 
support which the Stuarts had traditionally given the com­
pany since the Duke of York’s sponsorship. In the prosper­
ous years before the pressure of the Revolution and the wars
with Prance, the company had made large profits from which
115it had paid dividends. But after an inter-war effort to
stave off collapse by heavy and indiscriminate borrowing, 
the company had settled into a trend of steady fiscal 
deterioration, its stock losing value all the while it
405; and the ship Mortimer carried correspondence from the 
company to Corbin, R.A.C. to Jacob Reynardson, 31 March 
1713, T 70/45, P.R.O.
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The company indicated this in a letter, R.A.C. to 
Corbin, 8 Nov. 1710, T 70/58, 39 3, P.R.O.: "Tis now over 3
years since the arrival of the Royal African Company’s last 
cons ignment."
115Scott, Constitution and Finance of Joint-Stock 
Companies, I, 30 2.
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petitioned Parliament for a fresh, monopolistic start.
Until 1707, the company still paid some meager dividends,
though these payments were made from capital. By 1708, so
deeply were its capital assets tied up with the colonial
planters that it was no longer possible to find the money to
pay interest on its bonds, and the stock, which had sold at
an average of 17 Pnom 1701 to 1706, fell to 4 7/8 in 1708
ll6and to a fraction of 2 during the next four years. The
Royal African Company was solvent only in the most technical 
117sense.
The financial weakness of the company, and particu­
larly the inaccessibility of liquid capital, compounded the 
effects of the restrictions of Atlantic warfare and depres­
sions, forcing a recession in the total volume of the com­
pany’s business. The African Company managed to export from 
England goods valued at £1,500,000 between 1672 and 1713, 
averaging about £40,000 annually; but by 170 6 the annual 
total dropped below £15,000 for the first time, and though 
it surpassed £23,000 in 1707, the total dipped to barely 
above £5,000 in 170 8 and below that mark the following year. 
By 1709, the individual interests out-traded the company at
11 Ibid., I, 374.
117Ibid. , I, 302, ff., 3 7 i4, ff., II, 21-25; Davies,
Royal African Company, 79, PP.; see also C. M. Andrews,
Guide to the Materials Por American History, to 1783, in the 
Public Record Office of Great Britain (Washington, 1912- 
1914), II, 256.
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118a 30-to-one rate; and in 1710, the company no longer
exported any goods, which explains their failure to dispatch
119ships to Africa. The same pattern is apparent in the
drop in total imports., which can be measured in relative
terms by the annual number of auctions for the sale of goods
imported to England by the company. The company had held
an average of six auctions per year at the African House
before 1689, fewer thereafter, and the total tonnage of
imports plunged after 170 8 until in 1711 there was an unpre-
120cedented absence of import auctions.
Despite the general decline in company business in 
Africa, Europe, and the colonies, and despite the void in 
its Virginia slave trade, the African Company continued to 
operate, particularly in the West Indies, and continued to 
maintain a concern for Virginia throughout Queen Anne’s War. 
The company had a vested interest in Virginia in the form 
of protested bills of exchange amounting to several thou­
sands of pounds. This alone provided sufficient reason to 
retain an agent; even if he were never again to be consigned 
a shipment of slaves, it was hoped that he would
118Scott, Constitution and Finance, II, 2k.
119These totals are taken from Davies, Appendix I, 
Exports, Royal African Company, 350, which is derived from 
Royal African Company Invoice Books, Outward, T 70/910-920, 
P.R.O.
120 Davies, Royal African Company, 179; see also 
ibid., Appendix II, Imports, 358-359, compiled from Invoice 
Books, Homeward, T 70/936-956, P.R.O.
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successfully pursue payment of the planters’ established
bills. He was legally bound to collect, and after numerous
warnings the company brought suit against Corbin for his
failure to submit payment for his accounts within the time
121allotted by the terms of his agency. Beyond its desire
to settle old accounts, however, the company remained 
interested in Virginia because of its hopes for the future 
of the slave trade.
Encouraged by the successes of Marlborough on the 
battlefield and the preliminary peace negotiations in 1708, 
1709, 1711, and 1712, the Royal African Company nourished 
throughout these years aspirations of an imminent and pro­
fitable conclusion to Queen Anne’s War. The company appears 
to have been confident of its future even while being 
energetically opposed in Parliament by an imposing coalition 
of separate traders and colonial planters which threatened 
its very existence. By using counter-petitions, the company 
waged a direct offensive against its foes, blaming the
separate traders for the rise in the prices of slaves and
122the fall in the prices of English goods in Africa.
Rather than beg Parliament to retain the semi-favored 
status, the company, with support from the Crown and some
■'■‘^ See above, p. 21.
122Scott, Constitution and Finance of.Joint-Stock 
Companies, II, 24, citing Journals of the House of Commons, 
XVI , 6 4 .
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London business concerns, particularly those represented on 
the company’s board of directors, boldly petitioned for a 
new monopoly of the pre-169 8 variety. In response, com­
mittees of Parliament consistently recommended plans for a 
regulated company similar to the one in existence, but the 
company’s London office appears to have anticipated better 
business in spite of the opposition. Though its hopes 
proved largely fruitless, the enthusiasm is understandable.
First, the 1698 "compromise act” establishing a 
regulated company was scheduled to expire in 1712- The 
African Company officials assumed that, failing to win a 
new monopoly, they would at least be able to force a stale- 
male in Parliament, preventing new legislation and thereby 
reverting to pre-1698 status as a monopoly. Secondly, 
regardless of the outcome of the Parliamentary debate, the 
prospect of peace inspired visions of the expanded markets 
and unimpeded shipping of the previous peaceful interlude, 
with the added incentive of the treasured Asiento. El pacto 
del asiento de negros, the exclusive contract for supplying 
slaves to Spanish America, had been held in succession by 
the Portuguese and the Dutch, and while the Asiento had been 
suspended in the mid-seventeenth century, the Royal Adven­
turers had gained some experience supplying the Spanish-
12?American colonies with slaves. With its experience m
12?Davies, Royal African Company, 326.
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the slave trade, its network of commercial ties, and its 
forts on the African coast, the company considered itself 
the organization most likely to assume the responsibility 
for transporting the slaves if the English were in a strong 
enough position at the conclusion of the fighting, as it 
appeared they would be, to win the Asiento at the bargain­
ing table.
Because of the hopes which the Royal African Company
held for the postwar trade, and because of its financial
interest in Virginia, the company retained Gawin Corbin as
agent in the colony well past the end of Queen Anne’s War,
though they frequently threatened him and blamed him for the
low prices as well as the company’s inability to collect
124for its slaves. It appears that Corbin did not spend
much time pursuing the payment of debts, although the com­
pany reminded him several times each year of his obligations
125in prosecuting the debtors. The Colonel was called upon
to arrange minor shipments of tobacco as payment for overdue 
126bills, and though there is limited evidence that some 
Virginia planters undertook new debts to the company in 1710 
and 1711, it is highly unlikely that Corbin was occupied
124 1See above, pp. 4-5*
^^^See above, pp. 40 ff.
R.A.C. to Corbin, 18 April 1710, T 70/58, 382- 
383, P.R.O.
127managing slave cargoes during these years. Had the Sea-
ford completed her original schedule in 1707, Corbin would
have found his work load and potential profits for that year
significantly increased by the cargo of 199 slaves which the
12 8Seaford carried. Anticipating the arrival of the slaver
in Virginia, the company officials had instructed Corbin to
collect tobacco for its return voyage, evidently hoping to
compensate for the bad bills of exchange they expected to
129accompany any Virginia transaction. After Corbin had
dispensed with the Bridgewater in August 1707, the company rs 
failure to ship slaves virtually relegated the Colonel’s 
agency to a position of collector and correspondent. The 
latter function gained importance as the company became 
increasingly preoccupied with its quest for a new monopoly. 
If the African Company could regain its position of favor, 
the logic read, then the Virginia trade would inevitably 
improve. Consequently, the company made a concerted effort 
to keep Colonel Corbin, as well as its other colonial 
agents, well-informed on the issues of the Parliamentary 
proceedings pertinent to the company, forwarding to him
^^R.A.C. to Corbin, 14 Sept. 1711, ibid., 405; 
Receipts by Corbin, ibid., unnumbered pages attached to
pp. 406-407.
"'‘^ Instructions to Captains, T 70/63, P.R.O.;
R.A.C. to Mackley, 28 Jan. 1706/7, ibid., 111-113, P.R.O.; 
R.A.C. to Corbin, 27 March 17073 T 70/58, 277-279, P.R.O.
129R.A.C. to Corbin, 30 Sept. 1707, T 70/58, 30 4.
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diatribes against the "enemy of the Royal African Company"
and literal transcriptions of the petitions which had been 
110presented; the company also directed Corbin to enlist
support from the planters, sending him blank petitions to be
signed, particularly in the last critical, years before the
111expiration of the 1698 act. The Virginia planters are
not known to have presented a petition favoring the Royal 
African Company monopoly, but Corbin cannot be held respon­
sible for alienating them, since they had traditionally been
112counted among the allies of the separate traders. Even
when the company was supplying slaves to the colony at
prices cheaper than those of the separate traders, the
Governor of Virginia stated that he believed the planters
111would oppose any restrictions against free trade.
E . Conclusion
The Royal African Company experienced periodic spurts 
of commercial success in the years following the Treaty of
13°R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 April 1708, ibid., 332-334. 
IllT 70/58, unnumbered, undated sheet attached to 
p. 331; R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 April 1708, ibid., 331-332; 
R.A.C. to Corbin, 20 April 1708, ibid., 332-334; ibid., 
note, p. 35^; R.A.C. to Corbin, 4 June 1709 5 ibid. , 384.
132Stock, ed., Proceedings, II, 160-162, 217;
Commons Journals, XII, 133a l85; Davies, Royal African 
Company, l45a 1^9•
H I
Davies, Royal African Company, 143, citing Cal. S. 
P. Col., 1708-9, 197-
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Utrecht, particularly with the wave of speculative invest­
ment which accompanied the South Sea Bubble in the early 
1720s. But the gains were never sufficiently productive to 
be shared among the company's stockholders, only temporary 
aberrations from the trend of decline which had steadily 
followed the Glorious Revolution. In 1730 the African Com­
pany requested and received from Parliament a grant of 
£10,000 per annum for the upkeep of its forts and factories 
in West Africa, a final admission by the government that the 
company's African garrisons served the Empire by defending 
British commercial interests. After 1730 the company 
existed more as an arm of British imperial authority than as 
a viable trading corporation. In this posture the company 
atrophied and became entirely dependent so that, when the 
Crown in 1756 ended its subsidy, the company could no longer
exist. The following year Parliament dissolved the African
134Company and in 1752 transferred its forts to the Crown.
The small scale of the Royal African Company's 
Chesapeake commercial venture minimized the interrelation 
between the company's lack of success in Virginia and its 
gradual demise as a joint-stock corporation. In either 
component of its commercial venture, old world or new, the 
African Company must be judged in relation to the adverse 
conditions of the time. Although it failed to satisfy the
^%avies, Royal Afri can Company, 344-349 ; Andrews, 
Guide, II, 256.
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demands of Virginians for labor, the company did supply them 
possibly as many as one thousand slaves during this quarter- 
century. That it did so without long-term financial growth 
can be attributed to the high risk factors inherent in the 
slave trade and in shipping on the high seas in time of war, 
to the instability of the Virginia economy, to the ineffi­
ciency of the company's absentee operations, and to the high 
costs of maintaining its facilities on the African conti­
nent. To operate profitably a trade of similar magnitude, 
even under ideal conditions, would have challenged the 
resources of a mid-twentieth century corporation. This is 
not to excuse individual carelessness, mismanagement, and 
shortsighted policy decisions by the company's board of 
directors, but it does emphasize the futility of the 
efforts of all. If the losses of royal favor and of the 
monopoly were not fatal, the prolonged pressures of Queen 
Anne's War were. The Virginia trade inevitably suffered. 
Perhaps in the light of the difficulty the company met in 
delivering slaves across the Atlantic and in collecting for 
their sale in Virginia, the surprise is not that the trade 
collapsed, but that it survived as long as it did.
APPENDIX A
SLAVE SHIPS DISPATCHED TO VIRGINIA, 1689-1713
year ship slaves captain home
1689 *Benjamin Thomas Hone
1692 Katherine-1-
1693 Jeffrey 265 John Soan
1694 *Averilla^
1700 Nicholson 229
1701 Neptune 79 Henry Forty London
Expectation 67 Wm. Leve rcombe Bristol
Two Brothers 60 Roger Gray London
Shrewsbury 154 Jona. Gladiman London
African Gallv 57 James Westmore London
Warner 184 Jno. Jarman London
Nicholson 262 Joseph Mundav London
*Evans^ 300 John Prowde
*Urban3 250 Joseph Bemister
1702 Gambia Galley^ 100 Patrick Bourn
Anna Bonaventure 90 Fra. Martyn London
Mary 143 Ambrose Smith London
Callibar Merchant 181 Ph. Gadson London
1703 ^Industry
*Angola frigat 92 Thomas Arnall London
Ann 64 Hump. Howard Bristol
*Lusitania 360 Paul Sorel
1704 Ann Gaily 81 Nicho. Gellibrand London
Mermaid 229 James French London
William 110 Wm. Martyn London
*Postillion 76 John Tozer London
Eagle Gaily 229 Wm. Snelgrave London
Codrington 262 Frances Squerrel London
1705 *Dorothy 75 Edward Tomlin London
London Gaily 240 John Bickford London
Jno. Bonaventure 420 Anthony Ford London
Constant Abigail 148 Jno. Vanburgh London
Wm. & Mary 90 Wm. Be11 London
Thomas & John 292 Robert Ransom London
Claron Frigat 109 Thomas Smith London
*Angola Frigatt 214 Thomas Arnold London
*Phoenix Sloop 51 Thomas Durham London
1706 William 120 Jno. Collingwood London
Neptune 243 Wm. Thurticle London
Eagle Gaily 300 Wm. Snelgrave London
Waking Lyon 154 Arnol Wimtell Bristol
African Gaily 196 Francis Bond Bristol
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Queen Anne 9 0
John & Constance 2 85
Delight 106
Bridgewater
1708 Eagle Gaily 296
Young Margaret 2 80
Mary Crookshank 2 74
Prosperous 100
Providence^ 150



















*Owned or engaged by the Royal African Company.
1Donnan, Documents, Ships From Great Britain to Africa, II, 
92-94, citing C. O. 388: 13, p. 103 (1-3).
^Donnan, Documents, II, 116-117.
^Failed to reach Virginia because it was unable to meet 
deadline.





The above list of ships was assimilated from the extensive work 
of Donnan, Documents, IV, 172-173, and the Virginia Colonial 








1. Upon receipt hereof, having signed Bills of Lading for 
the Goods, Merchandize, Stores, and Provisions put on board 
Your Ship, You are to take the first opportunity of wind and 
weather that God shall send, and sail with your Ship
from the River of Thames, and after being cleared at Gravesend, 
put your Ship in a posture of defence and make the best of 
your way to
[here is a large blank space, presumably for particular 
instructions]
2. And that God may bless you with good Success, We desire 
and recommend it to you, that the worship of God be 
religiously observed on board your Ship.
3. We strictly require you to stow your Gun-powder securely, 
and that your Gunner be a careful and sober person.
4. Take especial care, that your Ship be sailed according 
to the Act of Navigation, and that you have at least two 
thirds of your Men English, and healthy season'd Men; that you 
be duly cleared at the Custom-House in all respects relating 
to the King, and that you have a Mediterranean-Pass.
5. We desire and require you to give the best accommodation 
your Ship can afford to such Passengers as We shall order on 
board, and to treat them civilly, and with respect according 
to the Posts they serve us in.
6. We Order and Direct you (whether at Sea or in Port)
frequently to heel and scrub your Ship, and to Paye the same
between wind and water, that she may be at all times clean
and fit for sailing.
7. If you happen to put into any Island, [y]ou are to be 
cautious what Men you send on shore, especially of your 
Officers that they may not under any pretence of stopping, 
bring you under a necessity of complying with any unreasonable 
demands, or have power to stop your Ship, and ruin your Voyage.
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8. And because Pirates do frequently and much infest the 
Coast of Africa, and the Ships of Sallee have been very 
troublesom of late, We Order you to be very circumspect, and 
not to leave your Ship, nor speak with any other, without 
absolute necessity, but always keep a good look out and guard, 
to prevent surprize.
9. Let us hear from you from all Ports you put into, and by 
any Ship you meet with at Sea, before you get to Guinea, and 
afterwards by all Ships you can conveniently send by, whether 
bound to the West-Indies, Holland, or other parts; and therein 
advise Us as fully as you can, of all needful perticulars.
10. We Order you at your return, to render Us an account in 
Writing of every particular taken on board your Ship, at any 
time during Your Voyage.
11. You are to receive no Corn on board your Ship but what is 
sound and good; And -you are to take a receipt from our Governors 
and Chief Merchants for all Goods, Stores, Passengers, Provisions, 
or whatever else you deliver them, signifying in what condition 
they are.
12. Whereas our Chiefs on the Coast of Africa have received 
Orders, to put on board each of our Ships that Trade thither, 
three or four Negroes, in order to their being trained up, and 
instructed in the Sea service, You are to take particular care 
they be so instructed accordingly, as the Company's Servants; 
but you are not to enter them on the List of the Ship's Company 
as Sailors.
13. Carefully keep a Journal of all particulars, and if any of 
your Men happen to die, mention the time of their death, and 
what is due to them.
14. You are to take care upon your return to England, within 
ten days after your arrival in Town, that your Own and your 
Mate's Journals be deliveted to the Committee of Shipping, 
upon pain of suspension for the neglect thereof.
15. You are hereby strictly charg'd and required, not to carry 
out or bring home any Letters or Packets, but what are delivered 
you at your going out, by Us or Our Secretary, and at your coming 
home by Our Governors and Chief Merchants at the settlement from 
whence you are dispatched, which you are to put up in a box, 
directed for Our Secretary; And take care upon your coming into 
any Port in England, immediately to send them up to this House, 
by some trusty person belonging to your Ship; And as you are not 
to suffer any of your Ship's Crew to carry out, or bring home 
any private Letters, but all such are to be put under the 
Company's Cover, or in the box before-mentioned. In all which 
you are not to sail, on penalty of the forfeiture of all 
Salary, Wages, and Gratuity, which may be due to you.
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16. When you come into the Downs, either outward or homeward 
bound, you are to hoist the Company's Jack, to the end our 
Agent there may know when you pass by him, in case he should 
have any occasion to speak with you.
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After receipt hereof you are to take the first oppertunity of 
wind and weather that God shall send to sett sail with your 
Ship the Lusitania from the river of Thames and make the best 
of your way to the Coast of Angola in Africa as your self 
and Owners are Obliged by Charterparty where you are to use 
your uttmost Endeavours to dispose of the Cargo of Goods wee 
have Laden on board your ship amounting as per Invoice to 2500 
4s. 7d. for the purchasing of 360 lusty and with provisions 
for them and with the surplus of of [sic] the Cargo you are to 
buy what Elephants Teeth you can get for our Account.
Having finished your business on the Coast of Angola 
in such time as that in all probability you may arrive at 
York river in Virginia from the first of May to the last of 
July. In such case you are to make the best of your way 
thither and deliver your Negroes to Mr. Willis Wilson our 
factor there, But in case there be no liklyhood or probability 
of reaching Virginia within the time limited then you are to 
Make the best of your way to the Island of Antigua and deliver 
our Negroes to Mr. Edward Chester or to Such person or persons 
as at your arrivall shall produce our Orders for the receipt 
and disposall of our Effects there.
If you deliver your Negroes at Virginia you are to 
receive from our factor there Two third parts of your freight 
in Negroes as they shall arise by Lott at Twenty pounds Ten 
Shillings per head but if you dilliver at Antigua Antigua [sic] 
you are to take from them to whom you deliver a certificate 
of the number of Slaves you deliver and deliver to him or them 
the remainder of your Negroes provisions and take their rest 
for the same.
Your Orderly Government on board your Ship must be 
needful for the good of the whole voyage and more especially 
when your Negroes on board for many mischifs have happened 
thro too much neglect and security.
Herewith you have a book Signed by our Sub-Governor or 
Deputy Governor wherein you are daily to enter all passages 
in the trade and how you dispose of what you sell which will 
be an account of your managing the trust reposed in you 
reposed in you [sic] and a Charge on your success or in case 
of your decease therefore use it daily and fairly and not 
Late. (?)
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Wee hereby order you to take notice of all Negroes as 
they shall be put aboard the Ship that you as Master with 
your Mates Boatswain and Carpenter or so many of you as Shall 
be a board do number them and enter such Number with their 
Quality each day into the Book therewith delivered you and 
that The said Officers do sign such Entries in the said Book 
as often as any Negroes come aboard and that the Negroes be 
mustered once every fourteen dayes all the voyage untill 
their arrivall and that every muster be entered in the said 
Book by the said Officers and what mortality shall happen 
among the Negroes in the Voyage wee require you for our 
satisfaction that you send or bring home a Certificate 
thereof under your Mates or Surgeons hands listifying [sic] 
the time of the death of such as shall happen to dye or wee 
will not allow of any more that shall by missing but what 
was certifyed to be dead nor shall wee without such certificate 
pay your Surgeon the head mony wee allow for the Living 
which is Twelve pence each.
Any curiosities of Birds Beasts etc. that you meet with 
take care to preserve for our disposall.
Let us hear from you from all ports you put into before 
you come to Guiney and afterward. By such ships as you can 
conveniently send by wether bound to the West Indies, Holland 
or any other part and therein advise us as fully as you can of 
all needfull particulars.
You are to advise us by all opportunities what ships 
you meet with or hear of trading on the Coast, wherein advise 
the Masters Name and what he brought the ships burthen and 
as near as you what slaves or other goods they carry off the 
Coast.
To prevent the Mortality of your Negroes you must 
observe frequently to wash your Deck with vinegar and divert 
them as much as you can with some Musick and Play.
We strictly require you to take especiall care to store 
your Gunpowder securly and that your Gunner be sober carefull 
person.
Wee do here [sic] that some Pirats are cruising upon 
the Coast of Africa. Wee order you therefore to be very 
circumspect and not to leave your ship nor speak with any 
other without absolute necessity but alwayes keep a sufficient 
guard both at sea and in port to prevent any surprize whatsoever.
Wee order you not to come nearer than fifty Leagues 
to the Westward of the Madeiras nor to the Eastward of the 
Meridian till you pass the Tropicks.
Take Especiall care that your ship be sailed according 
to the Act of Navigation that you have at Least Three forths 
of your men English that you be duly cleared at the Custom 
house in all respects relating to King and according to the 
Act to Settle the Trade to Africa that you be Registred as 
the plantacon Act directs and that you have a Mediterranean 
pass.
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Wee herewith deliver you an Act of Parlaiment [sic] 
for the more Effectuall Suppresing of Pirats which we order 
you to read or cause to read once a month (at least) on 
board your Ship during the Voyage Voyage [sic] in the hearing 
of all your men or so many of them as can possibly be present.
Make observatons what sorts of Goods are most vendible 
in every place and Colect what Cargoes are most proper for 
those places and render an account to us in writing.
Wherein anything is omitted in those Instrucons you 
must always observe to Act what is most for the Companies 
Intrest and cause that all under you do the like and according 
as you approve your self in this present Trust you may depend 
upon our favour upon any occasion where it may be usefull to 
you. Wee wish you a good Voyage and remain your Loving friends 
etc.
John Evans Esqr Sub-Governor 

















The following passage is a description of the 
Gambia Galley , a slave ship dispatched to Virginia by the 
Royal African Company in May, 1701. The description 
appeared in a letter, R.A.C. to Benjamin Alford, 10 March 
1701/2, T 70/58, 29-31, P.R.O., enlisting Alford's support 
in locating the slaver which had taken *'100 and odd Negroes" 
at Sierra Leone, touched at Barbados for fresh provisions, 
and was lost on her way to Virginia. Copies of this letter 
went to Edward Hill, James River, and Henry Fielding, York 
River.
The Gambia Galley is about 70 Tuns,
Square Sterned, a Long Sharp vessell, hath 3 
Masts, one Deck and a half with a fall in the 
fore Castle and Cabbin. Is Irish Built which 
any Carpenter may know by her Plank and Timbers, 
is about 6 years old, and sheathed about 2 years 
Since with a half Inch Board. Carries 6 Guns and 
2 Patteraroes.
Hath Small round ports with Carved work 
Thereon, as also Carved work on Each Side of her 
quarter in Imitation of small Gallerys or Window. 
When she went home was Painted Yellow.
The five officers:
Ages
47 Patrick Bourn, Master, a Tall Spare Black man, 
long visage, Stoop a Little in the Shoulders. 
Irish.
31 John Paul, 1st Mate.
32 John Greenhill, 2d Mate and Guner. A thick 
Short man, fair Complection, round Visage, 
Inclining Sanguin.
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Rowland Hall, Carpenter, A thin, Spare man, 
Middle Size.
Robert Brown, Bosen.
The men aboard the Gambia Galley:
Patrick Bourn Capt. 45
John Paul Chief Mate 30
John Greenhill 2d mate and Guner 30
Rowland Hall Carpenter 46
Robert Brown Boatswain 38
Thomas Carter Chyrqeon [sic] 30
William Blundle (?) Cooper 23
Robert Micham Cook 24
John Alder Seaman 31
Jos. Thomlinson Sailmaker 23
Peter Reylout Seaman 35
William Ellerby Seaman 23
Robert Rippitt Seaman 18
Edward Burbank Seaman 32
Peter Ward Seaman 17
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APPENDIX E
COMPANY SLAVES PURCHASED IN VIRGINIA, BY COUNTY, 1689-1713 
County (number of purchasers) amount(£) number
1. King and Queen (32) £2052.13.04 70
2. Gloucester (22) 1654.08.07 58
3. Essex (28) 1359.14.09 47
4. Richmond (10) 851.04.05 35
5. Lancaster (8) 404.15.06 15
6. King William (5) 391.18.04 14
7. New Kent (6) 275.06.03 9
8. James City (4) 209.00.00 7
9. York (4) 188.00.00 8
10. Accomac (4) 184.04.10 9
11. Northumberland (5) 177.03.04 6
12. Northampton (3) 135.03.09 5
13. Surry (4) 120.12.10 4
14. Isle of Wight (1) 92.00.00 3
15. Westmoreland (3) 67.04.11 2
16. Nansemond (1) 61.00.00 2
17. Middlesex (5) 55.07.03 2
18. Stafford (2) 46.00.00 2
19. Isle of Wight (1) 35.00.00 1
20. Prince George (1) 34.00.00 1
21. Charles City (1) 30.00.00 1
22. Norfolk (2) 28.06.00 1
23. Henrico (3) 23.19.02 1
24. Elizabeth City (1) 17.00.00 1
25. Warwick (1) 3.15.01
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Charles City County 





Bird, Katt. (Widdo.) 100 29.00.00 1
Brown, Daniel Jr. 150
Sr. 450 21.10.01
Buckner, Richard 1200 200.00.00 7
Catlatt, Thos. 15.14.03 1
Chew, Larkin 850 72.02.06 2
(Lakin, Larden)
Crittenden, Henry 28.00.00 1
Covington, Wm. 400 30.03.09 1
Dangerfield, John 270 29.00.00 1
(Daingerfield)
Edmondson, Thos. 700 60.00.00 2
Faulkner, Ed. 530 129.04.03 5
Ferguson, John 150 27.00.00 1
Finney, John 38.18.03 2
Fisher, Jonathon 250 50.00.00 2
Garrett, Thomas 1000 34.00.00 1
200 (KW)
Gordon, Mary 34.00.00 1
Gouldman, Edward 20.03.04 1
Haile, John 900 55.00.00 2
(Hail, Hayle, Laile) 685 (KQ)





















































Reed, Thomas (Read) 2400
150













































































































































name estate amount number dates
Shackelford, Roger 250 50.11.03 2
Shea, Patrick 200 74.00.10 3
Smith, Nicholas 700 60.00.00 2
280 (Gl)
Southerland, Daniel 200 35.00.00
Story, John 3000 104.08.03 3
Todd, Richard 1050 20.00.00 1
Walker, John 7000 32.00.00 1
Walton, Thomas 200 69.19.03 4
(Wallson)
Ware, Edward 735 47.16.00 1
Welborn, Thos. 250 18.00.00 1
(Willbourn)
Williams, Eliza. 900 32.00.00 1
Wise, Richard 209 285.16.08 11














Craddock, Samuell 600 200.00.00 6 1704
Fleming, Charles 1700 80.01.09 4 1704
Palmer, Martin 1200 52.00.00 2 1708
Spencer, Thomas 600 24.16.07 1 1704






































































































Name estate amount number dates
North amp ton County
Hunt, Samuel 104.00.00 4 1708
Waterson, John 4T 3.13.09
(Watterson)
Northumberland County
Ingram, Charles 3.00.00 1 1710
Neale, Christopher 65.02.07 2 1705-8
Neale, Ebenezer 25.05.06 1 1709
Presley, Peter 16.15.03 1709
Wilday, George 35.00.00 1 1704
(Wilde, Wildey, Wildy)














Glascock, Ann (Glasscock) 
































































































150 (Ac) 34.00.00 1
235 (PG)







400 (KQ) 47.02.11 2
350 (Su)
350 (Gl) 99.00.00 3
300 (IW)
50 (KQ)





150 (KQ) 59.07.00 2
100 (KW)





























Walters, John 400 (Nh)
(Waters) 150 (Ex)
50 (Gl)
White, John 400 (Nh)
190 (Nk)
150 (Na)












(CC)=Charles City County 
(Ex)=Essex County 
(EC)=Elizabeth City County 
(Gl)=Gloucester County 
(H)= Henrico County 
(IW)=Isle of Wight County 
(JC)=James City County 
(KQ)=King and Queen County 
(KW)=King William County 
(L) = Lancaster County 
(M) = Middlesex County 
(Na)=Nansemond County 
(NK)=New Kent County 
(N)= Norfolk County 
(Nh)=Northampton County 
(No)=Northumberland County 
(PG)=Prince George County 
(R) = Richmond County 
(St)=Stafford County 
(Su)=Surry County 
(Wa)=Warwi ck County 
(We)=Westmoreland County 
(Y) = York County
T=number of tithables according to 1716 lists of 
tithables, Wertenbaker, Planters, 153, and Wm. 
and Mary Qtly., Ser. 1, XXI 
*In some cases, e.g. William Smith, each landholding 
may represent a different person? in other cases, 
e.g. Lewis Burwell, the multiple landholdings 
belonged to the same owner.
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APPENDIX G
ENGLISH FINANCIERS OF THE AFRICAN COMPANY TRADE TO VIRGINIA*
name amount financed dates
Arthur Baily 549.11.01 1703-10
James Ball 27.10.00 1703
David Beddore 29.00.00 1705
Thos. Bettyjohn, Bridgewater 25.05.06 1709
William Bowden 26.13.03 1710
Benjamin Bradley, James Bradley
and Salvatore Muscoe (Va.) 62.10.01 1709, 1710
Benjamin 3radley 40.13.01 1708
Owen Buckingham 30.19.05 1709, 1710
Arden Carlton 5.00.00 1707
Wm. Clayton, Esq., Liverpool 65.02.07 1705, 1708
John Cleveland 5.05.10 1708
George Cooke 26.06.00 1711
John Cooper 175.03.09 1703-10
Capt. Thos. Cooper 66.00.00 1705
Thomas Corbin, Steelyard 258.12.07 1703-8
William Dawkins 171.12.00 1705-10
John Dawson & Co. 67.00.00 1704
Robert Dunkley 20.00.00 1707
Thomas Ellis 143.01.09 1703-8
Edward Foy 55.12.10 1708
Joshua Franklin, Bristol 29.00.00 1705
Richard Franklin, Bristol 95.07.01 1703-8
James Geough, Bristol 105.06 8 00 1705, 1708
John Goodin (Goodwin) 328.18.09 1705-10
Nathaniel Grundig (Gundry) 8.15.03 1709
Edwin Harford 20.01.09 1704
Thomas Hartwell (Haistv/ell) 43.00.00 1707
Hugh Hayward, Bristol 168.13.05 1705-7
Benjamin Hatley (Heattlay, Hatly)
186.00.11 1704-9
Capt. John Hide 107.14.03 1709, 1710
Samuel Hunt 104.00.00 1707
Jeffrey Jeffreys 50.00.00 1690
Cuthbert Jones (John's) 189.10.00 1704-9
Thomas King 108.18.00 1703, 1708
Francis Lee 285.15.06 1703-5
Richard Lee 355.16.00 1707-10
George Livingston (Levingstone) 37.00.00 1703, 1704
James Loyd (Loyde), Bristol 137.11.04 1705-9
Joseph Lyman 26.10.00 1710
George Martin 20.10.03 1710
George Mason, Bristol 36.00.00 1705
Jonathon Mathews 37.00.00 1704
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name amount financed dates
John Maynard 6.13.02 1710
Edmund Mountjoy 30.00.00 1711
Arthur North 198.05.03 1703, .1704
Henry Offley 158.03.06 1709, 1710
Thomas Orbell 52.02.07 1705, 1.708
John Pemberton, Liverpool 30.00.00 1705
Micajah Perry & Co., (Perry, Lane
1703-9and Company) 2176.05.06
Thomas Pitkin & Co. 12.03.04 ?
Joanna Pope 27.12.00 1707
Michael Pope & Co., Bristol 178.05.09 1703-9
(Michael Pope, James Loyde & Co.)
John Purvis (?) 22.00.00 1703
Royal African Company 2194.27.06 1703-5
William Raphe & Co. 200.00.00 1704
Hamlett Robinson 180.00.00 1705-8
Thomas Sandford 31.04.08 1707, 1710
Richard Sargent 26.00.00 1709
Arthur Sawyer, Jr. 30.00.00 1710
Braham Smith 7.07.11 1706
Abraham Springer (Spranger 74.00.00 1705
Thomas Storke 40.00.00 1689
John Walcar 25.14.06 1706
Capt. Thom. Wharton 67.00.00 1704, 1705
Francis Willis & Co. 385.00.00 1703
Robt. Wise 426.05.00 1704-10
John Wright (Right) 254.18.08 1704-10
^Derived from the records of the Royal African Company, bills 
of exchange, T 70, P.R.O., passim. Although most are 
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